ISSUE 12
03. - 16. 10. 2022
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- Security Update
- New systems for the Ukrainian air defence
- Losses of the Ukrainian energy industry due to Russian missiles and UCAVs strikes
- Ukraine's economy needs the support of the world
- Towards Reconstruction of Ukraine: A Long To-Be-Developed Process
- Russia continues to obstruct the export of grain from Ukraine
- How to use Russian assets to reconstruct Ukraine?
- EU sanctions are an effective tool for forcing Russia to peace
- New cases of collaboration between Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the aggressor
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SECURITY SITUATION UPDATE |
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On the morning of 10 October, Russia launched a massive missile attack on Ukraine. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) reported that the Russian Federation used 84 cruise missiles and 24 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAVs), 13 of them Iranian "Shahed-136". The Armed Forces destroyed 56 targets. Among them were 43 cruise missiles and 13 UCAVs (10 of them of the "kamikaze" type). Despite widespread opinion that the attacks were the response to the partial destruction of the Kerch bridge, there is evidence that the Russians had been planning missile attacks on the Ukrainian capital and infrastructure since the beginning of October. The main objectives of the attacks were the destruction of critical energy infrastructure, instigation of panic among Ukrainians and intimidation of the European public.
It should be noted that this attack only strengthened the massive support for the AFU from within the country. One example of this support is a fundraiser campaign launched by civil activists Serhiy Prytula and Serhiy Sternenko on 10 October, hours after the massive missile attacks. Within 24 hours, Ukrainians donated 352 million UAH (9,6 million USD) for RAM II UCAV kamikaze drones (based on the Ukrainian "Leleka-100") and ground control stations for them. This is one of the many examples of fundraising activities for the AFU, demonstrating that one of the Russia’s objectives of the escalation – intimidation of the populations – has failed.
During the week, Russia continued attacks on many Ukrainian cities, and while the Ukrainian Air Defence intercepts about 50% of missiles and UCAVs every day, several critical infrastructure objects have been hit, causing blackouts across the country. At the same time the Russian Armed forces (RAF) continued ground attacks in Kherson region in order to regain lost territories, and intensified attacks on Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut (Donetsk region). RAF success is very limited, though the pace of the Ukrainian advancement has also significantly slowed down compared to September.
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Despite the nuclear attack rhetoric, Russia tends to escalate the war in Ukraine by conventional means, using recently mobilised personnel and attacking the critical civilian and military infrastructure with missile and UCAV strikes. In yet another signal of a broader escalation by Russia, on 8 October the Ukrainian ambassador in Belarus received a note accusing Ukraine of “preparing an attack on Belarus.” The letter can be interpreted as providing a pretext for attacks on Ukraine from Belarusian territory. On 10 October, Belarusian president Alyaksandar Lukashenka announced Russia and Belarus had agreed to deploy a “joint regional group of forces,” with the Russian contingent officially accounting for 9,000 troops. Also, there are reports on the covert mobilisation in Belarus. This raises concerns about whether the northern fronts in the regions of Chernihiv and Kyiv would be reactivated to distract the AFU from the directions, where RAF are challenged to keep the occupied territories under control.
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NEW SYSTEMS FOR THE UKRAINIAN AIR DEFENSE |
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Strengthening Ukraine’s air defense was the number-one item on the agenda at the sixth meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group under the aegis of the United States on 13 October. Several important political decisions on supplying air defence systems to Ukraine have been made. “These are expensive systems, complex, for which you need to train – so that there are no illusions that everything will change tomorrow,” Ukrainian Defence Minister Reznikov explained after the meeting. However, those systems will allow Ukraine to increase its percentage of possible interception to 80%.
The main publicly announced outcomes of the Ramstein meeting included delivery of two more NASAMS air defense systems (USA) in the near future, commitment of Germany, in cooperation with Denmark and Norway, to provide Ukraine with 16 Zuzana self-propelled guns, as well as Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled guns and Mars-2 multiple rocket launchers. France has promised to supply Ukraine with three LRU MLRS (modernized M270), and an additional batch of self-propelled guns, radars, and air defense systems, including six Caesars. France will also transfer Crotale short-range anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine, which are used to intercept missiles and aircraft at low altitudes, and can be used for interception of the UCAVs. Also, the Netherlands will provide missiles for air defense systems worth $15 million. Canada announced an additional $47 million aid package, which will include artillery shells, winter uniforms and equipment, drone cameras, and satellite communications equipment.
Meanwhile Ukrainians report that the AFU are already using German IRIS-T air defense system “somewhere in the southern direction… We are waiting for the rest of the systems that Germany is going to send us," Yuriy Ihnat, spokesperson for the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said during a nationwide telethon.
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International support with the air defence systems is likely to be a decisive factor for the next stage of the war. With the Russian intention to escalate by missile and UCAVs attacks on civilian and military infrastructure, Ukrainian resilience will hugely depend on the ability to withstand these attacks throughout the cold season.
Against reports of increased support of the Ukrainian air defence, Russia is seeking ways to compensate for its exhausted arsenal. Thus, on 17 October, the media released US intelligence data on Russia’s expected deal with Iran on the supply of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, such as Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar, capable of hitting targets at a range of 300 km to 700 km, respectively. This delivery will come in a package with an additional set of kamikaze drones, already used in the attacks against Ukraine. This makes the issue of the quick delivery and deployment of the promised air defence systems even more urgent and critical.
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LOSSES OF UKRAINIAN ENERGY DUE TO RUSSIAN MISSILES AND UCAV STRIKES |
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As a result of massive missile strikes on 10 October, as well as repeated strikes during the week, energy infrastructure facilities in many regions of Ukraine suffered significant damage. The targets of the rockets were heating stations, power plants, and electrical transformers. The entire chain was hit - from generation to electricity distribution systems. For example, the energy company DTEK, which owns most of the electricity generation, estimated losses in the hundreds of millions. A large number of settlements were cut off. Emergency plans were implemented, and some consumers were swiftly transferred to backup power systems. Water supplies were also affected in many regions.
On the evening of 10 October, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Kyrylo Tymoshenko called for the first time to turn off electrical appliances in order to reduce the load on the power system (subsequently such requests from the authorities became a regular practice) and warned of temporary scheduled power outages. Attacks on thermal power plants threaten the timely start of the heating season.
On 10 October, long queues of cars formed at gas stations throughout the country - drivers fearing fuel shortages, as was the case in May. The head of the parliamentary committee on energy issues, Andrii Gerus, said that there is no shortage of petroleum products and the queues disappeared almost immediately.
On 14 October, it was already possible to stabilize the electricity supply throughout the country and the energy system is now stable. The government allocated the first funds for the restoration of electricity supply in the Kyiv region.
The exact estimate of the damage was not published. And although the Minister of Energy Herman Halushchenko stated that “up to 30% of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure was damaged as a result of the unprecedented terrorist attacks of the Russian Federation on October 10-11”, the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov later refuted this statement, noting that the losses are actually smaller and there is no reason for panic.
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The main consequences of the Russian missile attack were significant damage to energy infrastructure, public concern over the impossibility of providing enough heat during the winter season, and the termination of Ukrainian electricity exports to the EU. Since June, Ukraine has actively exported electricity to the EU after the synchronization of energy systems, and also supplied it to Moldova and Poland via separate lines. Even after the shutdown of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (under Russian occupation for over seven months), Ukraine fulfilled its obligations to export electricity to its European partners. But the attacks on 10 October forced Ukraine to suspend exports from 11 October, in order to stabilize its own energy system. After the start of commercial exports to ENTSO-E in June of this year, export revenue doubled every month and had a potential for growth.
Violation of energy and transport infrastructure due to shelling is one of the key risks of the macroeconomic forecast for 2022-2023. However, the latest shelling is not yet a reason to review them, since the negative impact on the economy was moderate and short-term but it is difficult to predict further development.
According to approximate calculations, immediately after the shelling, electricity production was reduced by 40%, but within just a few days it was almost completely restored. Warm weather, low electricity consumption and prompt response of repair teams contributed to the swift stabilization of the system.
There is a risk that Russia will continue to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. This would negatively affect the operations of large industrial enterprises. In this scenario, economic losses can reach several percent of GDP.
Another potential consequence could be a new wave of migration. A large number of citizens leaving the country will accelerate the outflow of capital and have a negative impact on the currency market. Last week, in connection with massive Russian missile fire, for the second time since 10 May, a net weekly outflow from the country of 11,000 people was recorded (250,000 people left, 239,000 entered). However, the flow of migrants from Ukraine to EU countries may become much larger if there is no stable heating and electricity supply with the onset of cold weather.
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UKRAINE'S ECONOMY NEEDS THE SUPPORT OF THE WORLD |
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Due to its full-scale invasion by Russia, Ukraine’s GDP fell by almost a third in a year. Since 24 February, military operations have damaged or destroyed critical infrastructure facilities, private and state-owned enterprises, and residential buildings, and millions of people have become internally or externally displaced. All these factors entail huge losses that the country cannot cover independently. It is expected that the budget deficit of Ukraine in 2023 will amount to $38 billion. Roughly speaking, the country will need more than $3 billion every month, which is not in the state budget.
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Since the first weeks of the war, the world has been actively supporting Ukraine, particularly financially. As of 1 October, Ukraine has received $19.4 billion in grants and loans from foreign partners. These revenues are directed to social assistance, defense, reconstruction, and other areas that require additional financing. Although this money is not enough to cover all the damages caused by Russia, such assistance significantly eases the country’s life in war conditions.
In early October, the United States announced its readiness to support Ukraine’s financial system with $1.5 billion every month while the war against Russia continues. This is almost half the necessary amount to cover the state budget deficit for the following year. The USA and Ukraine asked European partners for the second half of the amount. Information has already appeared that the European Commission is working on forming a similar initiative with the same amount. Concrete proposals may be ready before the conference on the restoration of Ukraine in Berlin on 25 October. Currently, financial assistance in the form of long-term loans on favorable terms is provided once and depends on needs and requests. Recently, members of the RRR4Ukraine coalition also called on the IMF to increase the speed and volume of financial support to the country and make it permanent. This will help to plan and systematically solve the problems caused to the country’s economy, rather than point-by-point problem-solving, and will contribute to the more effective planning of expenditures by the state.
Before the full-scale offensive, Ukraine built a reasonably stable economy, so it will try to return to the pre-war level in the coming years. Such a country is a profitable partner for the EU. In particular, Ukraine is a major exporter of industrial goods, agricultural and mineral products, etc. The world economy is also under attack due to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Household consumers notice this mainly due to increased prices of goods, products, and energy sources. However, a full recovery of the world economy is impossible without the recovery of the economy of Ukraine. Because of its scale, location, population, and the number of goods Ukraine produces, it is an important component of the EU’s economic climate. Therefore, international partners, regardless of the financial difficulties faced by their countries, continue their support. Ukraine, for its part, should develop transparent mechanisms for using aid from other states and demonstrate the development of an anti-corruption policy in wartime conditions.
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TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION OF UKRAINE: A LONG TO-BE DEVELOPED PROCESS |
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The government adopted one more legal step in order to implement the Recovery Plan of Ukraine related to urban planning as well as community developments of Ukraine. In the format of the Cabinet of Ministers decree, it serves to add practical aspects of how the Program of Comprehensive Restoration of the territories of Ukraine will be functioning. In practice, Ukraine now has a unified legal toolkit for procedures to develop its territories involving public discussion, starting from the designing of recovery programs until their final approval, as well as adjustments.
Both of the legally binding acts (the Law and the Decree) determine the main spatial, urban planning, and socio-economic priorities of the recovery policy, and include a set of measures to ensure the recovery of the territory of the relevant region, the territory of the community (its part), which suffered as a result of the full-scale aggression against Ukraine.
In contrast to all classical programs of such type, this approved program presents components of the initial data in order to develop and introduce changes to the urban planning documentation at the local level. However, it does not belong to urban planning documentation, and therefore is not subject to a strategic environmental assessment and consideration by the architectural and urban planning council. This step is being seen positively by some of the experts who believe that the bureaucratic burden can be decreased.
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine still needs to clarify some of the procedural details related to the absence of a legal definition and clear criteria, including technical and economic indicators, according to which the construction object is defined as "for the temporary residence of internally displaced persons".
After all, the specified provision of the law can play into the hands of unscrupulous developers, since it allows to carry out the construction of objects contrary to the functional purpose of the land plot. The restoration of territories affected by Russian aggression requires time as well as legal preparation related to how efficiently develop programs are for the comprehensive restoration of territories. The adoption of Law as well as Implementing Decree is a first step to equip Ukrainian hromadas with measures for the comprehensive restoration of its settlements affected by the RAF’s attacks. However, further legal amendments, as well as clarification with hromadas, is needed in order to coordinate smooth and accountable territory development.
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RUSSIA CONTINUES TO OBSTRUCT THE EXPORT OF GRAIN FROM UKRAINE |
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On 22 July, in Istanbul, the delegations of Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, and the UN signed agreements on unblocking Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea. This made it possible to resume grain export from Ukraine by sea. In August-September, 241 vessels with Ukrainian grain were sent from the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny. Due to the partial opening of sea routes, the volume of all agricultural exports from Ukraine increased from 1.3 million tons in April 2022 to 4.2 million tons in August. The government believes that it can increase this figure to 6 million tons per month and approach pre-war export volumes by all means.
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The restoration of Ukrainian grain exports is important for Ukraine and the world. On the one hand, this contributes to the income of the country’s budget. On the other hand, Ukraine is the leading grain supplier for many countries worldwide. In addition, Ukrainian grain silos still store a lot of grain from the previous harvest. Currently the export capacity is significantly lower than before the start of the full-scale war. The main reason is Russia’s continued blockade and occupation of part of Ukrainian ports and territorial waters. The volume of exports is also affected by the procedure for passing cargo prescribed in the agreements. According to them, the ships must undergo an inspection in Istanbul by representatives of Ukraine, the UN, and Russia. However, the Russian Federation constantly prevents an increase in inspectors from its side. Thus, the occupier again limits the volume of grain that Ukraine can export.
The number of vessels departing from Ukraine is greater than expected at the time of signing the agreements, but it is still not enough to meet the world’s needs. This agreement was undesirable and not beneficial for Russia, which planned to continue blackmailing the world with famine in African countries and increased food prices in Europe. However, now the aggressor has chosen a new way of delaying the grain export process. The current grain export agreement is valid till 19 November but Ukraine and the UN plan to extend it. On 12 November, Moscow again threatened the world and sent the UN a list of demands. If these are not met Russia plans to withdraw from the agreement. It is not known what exactly the requirements are, but Putin has already stated that he wants to limit the list of countries to which Ukraine can export grain. The requirements may relate to that and also to reducing the number of vessels. Russia is trying to win this battle to compensate for the military defeats.
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HOW TO USE RUSSIAN ASSETS TO RECONSTRUCT UKRAINE? |
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The reconstruction of Ukraine will cost loads of money and since Russia caused the destruction, it must pay. The estimated value of Russian Central Bank assets frozen abroad after the invasion is around $300 billion. Ukrainian Justice Minister stated
that Ukraine wants to get those $300 billion in reparations from Russia for the harm it has caused. The Ukrainian Prime Minister also stated
before that the key source of reconstruction funding within the $750 billion plan would be confiscated Russian assets. According to Polish Prime Minister Morawiecki, frozen Russian assets should
be used to rebuild Ukraine. In May this year, President Zelenskyy established
a working group to propose an international mechanism of reparations by Russia. Will the seizure of Russian assets be a piece of cake, and can justice be restored?
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Two processes should be distinguished, namely freezing of Russian assets broad and confiscation of those. Freezing
of Russian assets has been no problem within the international sanction regime. But seizing those assets and rechanneling them towards Ukraine’s reconstruction or individual compensations will be the main legal puzzle of the near future. International law protects Russian state assets abroad with sovereign immunity. Breach of this immunity is illegal and would set a precedent for other states to illegally seize public property of other countries. The international laws do not have a ready-made solution in which a victim state can be compensated by an aggressor state for the harm caused. This mechanism has to be invented. There are, however, several precedents from the past that can be used as an example but all of them have different specifics.
One of them is the case of Iraq reparations to Kuwait after the 1990 invasion. The UN established a special Compensation Commission to manage this process. The source of funding was percentage
of the export revenue of Iraqi oil and oil products. The main difference with the Ukrainian case is that Iraq agreed to pay reparations which in the case of Russia might be impossible to achieve. Also, the majority of compensations were individual ones and the commission reluctantly compensated to government entities.
The first practical case of seizure
of Russian assets for future use by Ukraine was demonstrated by Canada. In June, Canada amended its Special Economic Measures Act aimed at confiscating international assets in Canada as a response for breaking international peace and security. The law mentions special decision of the “union of states” in this regard that would legitimize this process at the international level. Although this international union has yet to be established, Canada’s example can be used for changing other countries’ national legislation in order to open the path for establishing this international mechanism.
Indeed, establishing an international mechanism rather than a bilateral one is preferred. Ukraine is lobbying
for such an international compensation mechanism within the UN by a resolution of the UN General Assembly. Ukraine sees this international agreement as a framework for compensation in other conflicts that could happen in the future.
Setting up the international mechanism will be decisive in moving forward. This process will take time and require patience from Ukraine and its allies. Any fast decisions are not recommended as they can be overruled in the international courts. However, if the due process is established, it might become a case to deter other countries from aggression against other states, and thus will serve to preserve international peace.
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EU SANCTIONS ARE AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR FORCING RUSSIA TO PEACE |
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On 10 October, 2022, Russia launched the most unprecedented missile attack during the war across the entirety of Ukraine using strategic aviation. As a result of the shelling, both critical and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv and 13 regions of the country were damaged. Twenty people were killed, 108 were injured, and more than 200 objects were damaged. As a result of Russian shelling, the buildings of the EU Advisory Mission and the German Consulate were harmed. Dozens of countries condemned the escalation of the Russian Federation. In particular, the presidents of 11 European states claimed that Russia’s massive missile attacks against Ukrainian cities were a war crime without a statute of limitations. PACE adopted a resolution
recognizing Russia as a terrorist regime. A draft decision on the recognition of the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism was submitted to the Estonian Parliament. The leaders of the G7 adopted a joint statement that warned Moscow against using chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The signatories also stressed that the Kremlin and its supporters would be subject to additional economic sanctions. Ukraine will receive financial, humanitarian, military, diplomatic, and legal support “as long as necessary”. In turn, the European Union has already begun work on its 9th package of sanctions against Russia.
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Russia’s attacks in Ukraine on the eve of the heating season are aimed at destroying its energy facilities, intimidating civilians, sowing chaos, undermining the West’s determination to support Kyiv, and inclining it to “peace” negotiations. However, the reaction of Ukrainians and the world turned out to be diametrically opposed to the Kremlin’s expectations. The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue liberating the temporarily occupied territories, Ukrainians donate money for weapons, foreign diplomatic missions remain in Kyiv, and nobody mentions negotiations with the aggressor (except Hungary).
Sanctions continue to be an effective tool for forcing Russia toward peace. According to the internal report of the European Commission, economic restrictions are significantly exhausting the military budget of the Russian Federation. On 6 October, the EU Council approved the 8th package of economic and individual sanctions against Russia. After the events of 10 October, the EU is working on a new package of restrictive measures. “It may include confiscation of assets, a ban on the sale of property and other parts,” Radio Liberty editor Ricard Jozwiak informed. The European Union is discussing granting new powers to its Prosecutor’s Office in this context. According to Bloomberg, the proposals predict that sanctions evasion will become a criminal offense at the level of the entire EU. Such actions are required in order to go beyond freezing assets (currently, 17.4 billion euros of Russian funds are frozen in the EU) and to create a legal basis for their confiscation. To do this, the European Union needs a legal justification. If such a mechanism is adopted, the confiscated property of Russians will become a source of funding for the Recovery Fund of Ukraine. This, in turn, would ease the burden on the EU budget. These ideas are currently under discussion and will require the support of all 27 member states.
In addition, the EU is preparing a proposal on the non-acceptance of foreign passports issued in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Czech Interior Minister Vít Rakušan commented that Russian travel documents issued to persons residing in the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine and Georgia would not be accepted as valid travel documents for obtaining visas or crossing the borders of the Schengen area. “This decision is aimed at establishing a common approach, ensuring the proper functioning of the external border and common visa policy, as well as ensuring the security of EU member states,” he added.
Currently, all the proposals mentioned above are under discussion and coordination in the EU institutions. However, we can already assume that this process will not last long. The most important thing is that the EU has the political will to adopt new sanctions. EU leaders are aware of the Kremlin’s threat and will continue to support Ukraine, accordingly, investing in the security of the entire European continent.
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NEW CASES OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE AGGRESSOR |
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The Security Service of Ukraine exposed the leader of one of the dioceses of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC; formerly known as “Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Moscow Patriarchate”) in Vinnytsia, Metropolitan of Tulchyn and Bratslav Ionafan (Yeletskyi) who justified the aggression of the Russian Federation and incited inter-religious enmity. Large-scale searches were conducted.
A little earlier, during the liberation of Kharkiv region by the AFU, another Metropolitan of the UOC of Izium and Kupiansk Elisey, who openly supported the local pro-Russian "administration" and worked for the occupiers, fled to Russian Belgorod.
This is not the end of the list of UOC collaborators. Several dozen cases are known - from metropolitans to ordinary priests and even monks who worked for the enemy, campaigned and helped in holding so-called “referendums”. Three of them - another metropolitan Panteleimon of Luhansk and Alchevsk, and two abbots of men’s monasteries from the Kherson region and the Zaporizhzhia region were even invited to the Kremlin for the solemn ceremony of “accession of new territories”. The UOC is trying to ‘ignore’ these cases. Ukrainian society and politicians are increasingly calling for a complete ban on the UOC.
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Strong pro-Russian sentiments among senior leaders of the UOC are not new. As well as the fact that many of them have passports of the Russian Federation (formally, dual citizenship is prohibited in Ukraine, so this information is not official, but the Security Service of Ukraine is currently actively working on publicly revealing facts that are well known in church circles).
After 24 February, many of the members of the UOC began to demand that the top leadership of UOC sever ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, condemn the actions of Patriarch Kirill (Gundyaev), and even try him in a church court.
On 27 May, the leadership of the UOC urgently held a meeting of the Council (the highest governing body). There were two reasons for this. The first is an attempt to take control of such revolutionary attitudes, to “let off steam.” The second is to avoid being under the law on the activities of organizations whose management centre is located on the territory of the aggressor state. Such a law was approved at the end of 2018 - specifically aiming at the pro-Russian political parties, public organizations, and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. As a result, all references to the connection with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) were deleted from the Statute of the UOC, the part “Moscow Patriarchate” disappeared from the name, and the UOC itself declared itself an “independent church.” However, in canon law there is no such form as “independent church”. Therefore, from the point of view of church law and Ukrainian realities, the UOC remains a “branch” of the ROC in Ukraine.
Before the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014, the UOC-MP was the largest church in Ukraine with approximately 12,000 parishes. Currently the UOC has less than eight.
The senior management of the UOC prefers not to react to cases of exposure of collaborating clerics in its ranks. On their official website two very neutral short statements, not even signed by the press service, were published on this matter.
Since 2014, the state of Ukraine has not added any Ukrainian cleric who openly defected to the enemy’s side to the sanctions list.
All these facts intensify conversations about the need for a complete ban on the ROC in Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada has registered two draft laws on significant restrictions for the UOC (still considered as a branch of ROC), which actually paralyze its activities. However, both draft laws are of extremely low quality, were not admitted to the first reading and - if adopted - would provoke significant social and inter-confessional conflicts.
The Criminal Code of Ukraine contains three important articles: on treason, collaboration and aiding these crimes. It is under these articles that the Ukrainian law-enforcers are trying to bring to justice the clergy-citizens of Ukraine who have been exposed in collaboration with the enemy - from direct transmission of information to moral and organizational support.
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CZK: Transparent account
AN: 2300405420/2010
VS: 2022
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