UKRAINE WATCH BRIEFING #4 |
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- Security situation update
- Ukrainian Resistance Successes in Kherson
- Russian “filtration camps”
- Missing Ukrainian children
- Fire on drilling gas platforms in the Crimea
- Ukraine starts exporting electricity to the EU
- 27 “YES” for the EU candidacy to Ukraine and Moldova
- Cooperation between Taiwan and Ukraine to combat dictatorship regimes
- Russia threatens Lithuania
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SECURITY SITUATION UPDATE |
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As of June 27th 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue heavy fighting in the Donbas area, where the Russians continue attacks from several directions, using massive air, artillery and MLRS power. The cruellest fighting currently takes place around Lysychansk, after the Ukrainian military was forced to leave positions in Zolote and Severodonetsk to avoid the encirclement. On 22-23 June, when the Russians occupied the town of Popasna, they had a massive artillery group on the line Vrubivka - Komyshuvakha - Zolote -Berezivske. Immediately they began to prepare a breakthrough from the opposite direction, launching shelling to systematically destroy Toshkivka - Nyzhne to open a hole and encircle Armed Forces in the Zolote area. But, reportedly, with the assistance of the U.S. M777 howitzers, this scenario was avoided, with the Ukrainian military successfully retreating to a safer location with considerable losses. After imposing relatively high damage on the Russian troops, the Ukrainian Armed Forces decided to leave Severodonetsk, which potentially could have become “the second Mariupol”.
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The Russians’ primary tactical goal remains to fully occupy Luhansk and Donetsk districts. Apart from that, Russians continue shelling Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernigiv, Zaporizhzhya, and Dnipro. Following the announcement of the candidacy status for Ukraine by the EU, Russians launched 70 missiles on the Ukrainian territory within 36 hours, including four missiles on Kyiv, striking a residential area and kindergarten. Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson is stalled, despite initial successes. More activities in this area are expected in the second half of July, Ukrainian military intelligence reported recently. Ukrainian officials also seriously consider the possibility of a repeated land attack on Kyiv from the territory of Belarus at the end of July. As of the end of June, Belarus keeps its forces combat-ready on the border with Ukraine and moved additional troops to the border of Poland and Lithuania. According to military analysts, the Belarus Armed Forces’ decision to participate in Russia’s operation in Ukraine has already been secured by the Kremlin in the recent meetings with Belarus’s de-facto president Alexander Lukashenka.
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UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE SUCCESSES IN KHERSON |
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Russian Armed Forces and Russia-imposed administrations in the occupied regions of Ukraine are faced with the Ukrainian resistance, which lost the public component under intimidation and violence and went underground. For instance, car explosions are on the rise, targeting local collaborators. One on June 18th, burnt the car of the head of a local prison colony. And on June 22nd, two more happened. The explosion of the vehicle of Yuriy Turuliov, former director of the local bus station in Chornobayivka, whom the occupiers appointed as the local quisling mayor, was reported with no victims. However, another car explosion claimed to take the life of Oleksiy Kovalyov, a Ukrainian MP collaborating with the Russian occupiers, but no official confirmations followed. And on June 24th, an explosion attributed to partisans took its first known and confirmed victim: Dmytro Savluchenko, a pro-Russian activist in Kherson appointed to head the Department of Youth and Sports at the Kherson occupation administration. On June 27th, an explosive device went off in the car of corroborator Irina Makhneva in Kakhovka, local occupant administration representative for education and culture. Makhneva was not hurt. Apart from these attacks, which the Russians describe as acts of terrorism, Ukrainian resistance also includes the distribution of leaflets addressed to the Russian soldiers, as well as cooperation with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which continue slow advancement towards Kherson, to ensure Ukrainian offensive actions bring maximum damage for the occupants.
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Partisan movement in the Kherson region is multi-layered. It includes separate individuals, unofficial self—organized groups, and a more structured network established with the help of the Ukrainian Special Operation Forces. This makes it quite challenging to oppress. Russian troops constantly shut down internet access and mobile networks in the Kherson Oblast. However, social media groups for locals offer clear instructions on reconnection. According to local expert Sergiy Danilov, Russians already used all tools and resources to fight with partisans: pro-Ukrainian citizens routinely face imprisonment, deportation, torture, and even death. He says the only way to escalate repressions for Russians would be to launch public executions. Being exposed to partisan attacks, members of the Russian administration in Kherson Oblast require armoured vehicles to drive through the occupied cities; they wear bulletproof vests and are usually accompanied by guards. The local population also mostly ignores public gatherings promoted by the occupant administration. Also, Russians had to offer payment (approx. 250$) to people who would like to get the Russian passports. Marketing of Russian citizenship also includes benefits for those “who bring more friends”. The expected number of people who eventually apply for Russian citizenship, according to the experts, will not exceed ten thousand in the region. With Ukrainian troops reportedly advancing towards Kherson, the positions of the local collaborators become even weaker. The Ukrainian resistance movement will not be the key factor in releasing the Southern regions of Ukraine. Still, its existence and organization play an essential role in depriving occupants of morale and messing up the initial plans of immediate annexation through the referendum, which is now scheduled for November 27th.
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RUSSIAN "FILTRATION CAMPS" |
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The so-called “filtration” camps near Mariupol appeared in the second half of March (the first confirmed information is dated March 20th). People who tried to leave the city were “passed” through them. And at first, it was still possible to go to the territory controlled by Ukraine, but now it is possible to leave only for LDNR or Russia. Over time, the “filtration” procedure became more rigid, and the camp system became more extensive.
Currently, there are these types of facilities:
- “Filtration points” (for those who want to leave) are located in the villages of Mangush, Nikolske, Bezimenne, and Starobesheve in the cities of Dokuchaevsk and Donetsk;
- “Filtration colonies” (men who have not been “filtered” are kept here. But they are not tortured) in the villages of Bezimenne and Kozatske (Novoazovsky district);
- “Filtration prisons” - the town of Olenivka (two different regimes), Donetsk (detention centre) and Makiivka (it is known that some Azov prisoners are in Olenivka, but most of them are in the colony №120 in Volnovakha)
Representatives of the so-called DNR army are responsible for the “filtration” at “filtration points”.
There are no clear rules that would guarantee “filtering”. In general, it all depends on the mood of those who conduct the process. As to the procedures, here are some observations:
- If people arrive at the block post by personal transport, it is forbidden to leave it - waiting for “filtration”. Even to children. Waiting at the entry point, according to eyewitnesses, can often last more than a day;
- Women and men are separated and interrogated separately. Men are usually more meticulous. Both are stripped to their underwear, sometimes completely. Primarily they are searching for tattoos. Russians believe that tattoos indicate affiliation with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Also, looking for traces of bruises caused by using weapons. And they are fingerprinted;
- The interrogation clarifies the attitude to the Russian aggression to the policy of Ukraine. Representatives of FSB took an active part in the interrogations in the beginning, but now they are almost absent;
- They also check any communication devices. Mainly they search for photos of the destruction caused by Russian aggression, content in messengers, social networks, and contact lists.
Those who want to go to the territory of Russia must be granted a “certificate pass”. It indicates the name, surname, date of birth and a number (by which the person was filtered in a particular place). It also includes a seal with the word “dactyloscopy” and the signature of the person who issued the “document”. It is known that the Russians have lists (received from collaborators) of employees of the Ukrainian prosecutor’s office, police, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, volunteers, journalists, and anti-terrorist operation veterans. All these people end up in the “filtration prison”. There are also lists of doctors, teachers, and communal workers - they are forbidden to leave the city. The exact number of people being illegally held in these facilities is currently unknown.
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At the official level, the Russians explain that they are carrying out “filtering” to prevent the entry into Russia of “fascists, nationalists, former Ukrainian prisoners”. But in reality, the “filtration” camps are aimed at intimidating peaceful Ukrainians and suppressing resistance. In addition, as noted, torture is often used against people, especially men.
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MISSING UKRAINIAN CHILDREN |
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In mid-March, a special working group was set up at the Office of the President of Ukraine that would purposefully deal with the issues of deportation and documentation of crimes against children by the Russian military. The official head is Andriy Yermak, and the coordinator is the Secretary - Daria Gerasymchuk.
According to testimonies of Russian officials, there are currently known cases of about 900 thousand deported people from Ukraine to Russia, including 324 thousand - children of various statuses (accompanied by one or both parents, and orphans).
It should be noted that during the war, the Ministry of Reintegration established the National Information Bureau, the so-called NIB, which accepts applications from citizens regarding the deportations or missing children. According to the latest data, 5018 such applications were received (as of June 21st). These children are gradually appearing in the missing persons database and will be searched for. As of June 21st, the NIB received 14,824 notifications of deportation of Ukrainian citizens.
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In the near future, the Ukrainian authorities plan to launch a thematic portal. It will contain all the information on children and crimes against children during the war. In addition, the number of children killed and injured will be updated daily (324 dead and 592 wounded as of June 21st. Questionnaires for missing children will also be posted.
Russian authorities have simplified the law governing the adoption procedure in Russia. This is not officially acknowledged, but it is evident that the simplifications were made purposefully for the “Ukrainian case”. According to former Ombudsman Lyudmila Denisova, 24 Ukrainian children are ready for the adoption procedure in the Moscow region alone. Their future fate is currently unknown.
The profile council at the Office of the President relies as much as possible on cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, which, while maintaining neutrality, has the mandate to search for wanted children.
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FIRE ON DRILLING GAS PLATFORMS IN CRIMEA |
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On June 20th, the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea stated that a fire erupted on drilling rigs of Chornomornaftogaz in the Black Sea (evidenced by NASA satellite images). These platforms are known in Ukrainian society as “Boyko´s rigs”. In addition, Russian authorities have accused the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) of destroying three drilling rigs at the Odesa field in the Black Sea near Snake Island.
There is no official confirmation that it was AFU shelling the rigs in the Black Sea. Still, experts are inclined to believe that AFU had a reason to do so, as Russia has deployed military and equipment on these towers. After the capture of the drilling rigs, Russian Navy servicemen were stationed on them, and a radar station was deployed there. Plus, patrols of this sector of the Black Sea were carried out by Russian warships.
Russian authorities have already begun threatening Ukraine by striking the drilling rigs. In particular, Mykhailo Sheremet, a State Duma deputy from the Russian-occupied Crimea, said that the attack by the Ukrainian military had “untied Russia’s hands” and that “retaliation would soon be struck at decision-making centres.” He also hinted at the responsibility of Western countries if it is confirmed that the attack was carried out with their weapons.
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This event is of great importance in several respects, mainly Russia’s loss of opportunity to extract gas in the Black Sea, primarily provided to the annexed Crimea peninsula. The Russian Federation illegally expropriated all property and assets of the state joint-stock company Chornomornaftogaz during the annexation of Crimea, including drilling rigs, and created the fake enterprise Chernomorneftegaz (the difference in the name is the letter “e” instead of “o”). Thanks to high-tech self-elevating floating drilling rigs “Petro Godovanets” and “Ukraine”, Chornomornaftogaz planned to triple gas production in the Black Sea shelf before the occupation of Crimea (in 2015 to 3 billion cubic meters per year, and from 2020 - to 5 billion cubic meters per year). In total, during the period of occupation of Crimea as of January 1st, 2022, Ukraine lost about 14.7 billion cubic meters of gas. Prior to the occupation of Crimea, Ukraine drilled 11 wells at the Odesa gas field. Another 11 were drilled by the fake Chernomorneftegaz after the annexation of Crimea, extracting 9 billion cubic meters of gas during this time and planning further exploration and production.
The fire may also damage infrastructure used to transport gas from drilling rigs to Crimea. As a result, production from this field may be stopped entirely (approx. 63% of the total gas production of the fake Chernomornaftogaz). The total natural gas consumption in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is about four bcm per year. The occupation authorities compensate for the deficit by increasing the volumes transported via Krasnodar Krai - Crimea gas pipeline (built in 2016). But still, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is facing energy problems due to this significant decrease in production on the Black Sea shelf.
Ukrainian State Group Naftogaz (legal owner of Chornomornaftogaz) continues investment arbitration against Russia. The compensation for lost assets claimed by the plaintiffs is 5.2 billion USD, of which Chornomornaftogaz’s assets are about 3.3 billion USD, and the total amount with interest is over $ 10 billion. The Arbitration court´s decision is expected by the end of 2022. However, Russia is using recent developments with the shelling of rigs to reduce the amount of compensation.
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UKRAINE STARTS EXPORTING ELECTRICITY TO THE EUROPEAN UNION |
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Against the background of a significant shortage of energy resources caused by the reduction of gas supplies by Russia to Europe, Ukraine may become a supplier of ready-made electricity to the EU. However, this was almost impossible until recently, as the energy transmission systems of Ukraine and the EU were not synchronized. As a result, partial exports took place only through Burshtyn Energy Island, and Ukraine sold minimal volumes.
The synchronization of power systems took five years. On March 2nd, the Council of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) praised Ukraine’s efforts to synchronize the Ukrainian and European energy systems and provided conditions for its rapid implementation. This included assessing the protection and dynamic stability of power systems, operations and markets, legal, regulatory and information technologies, including cybersecurity. As a result, from March 16th, 2022, the Ukrainian power system operates synchronously with the European continental network ENTSO-E. NEC “Ukrenergo” (dispatcher of the integrated power system of Ukraine) fulfilled all six technical prerequisites necessary to start the export of Ukrainian electricity to Europe. The fulfilment of the conditions was confirmed on June 8th by the ENTSO-E permit. As a result, Ukraine expects to receive from ENTSO-E by the end of June the first quotas for electricity exports to Europe in the amount of 100 MW. These volumes will be distributed among neighbouring system operators (Slovakia, Hungary and Romania).
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In the context of Russia’s military aggression, the demand for electricity inside Ukraine has decreased significantly. Therefore, the country has a surplus of generating capacity, which makes it possible to increase exports to Europe. This is a promising way to earn money for Ukraine suffering from the economic crisis caused by the war. From January-April 2022, Ukraine increased revenues from electricity exports by 2.6 times compared to the same period in 2021 - to $ 141.05 million (mainly due to export to Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania). In 2022, Ukraine can receive up to 1.5 billion euros in revenues from electricity exports and further increase this amount. According to some estimates, Ukraine will be able to profit from the sale of electricity no less than from the operation of the gas transmission system, which transits Russian gas to Europe (currently, it is $ 1.2-2 billion per year). From now on also, state-owned companies will be able to export electricity to the EU, not just private ones (Burshtyn Energy Island, created based on Burshtyn TPP, which belongs to Ukrainian oligarch Rinat Akhmetov).
Some aspects are still being worked out at the technical and organizational levels at the request of ENTSO-E. Naturally, Ukraine would like to implement all the requirements as soon as possible, but the European bureaucracy requires detailed elaboration and documentation of all the nuances.
Germany, which previously planned to abandon energy production at nuclear power plants, and now, due to the threat of cessation of gas supplies from Russia, is even considering the possibility of resuming coal-fired power plants to produce electricity, may well begin to import Ukrainian electricity. The surplus electricity generated by Ukrainian nuclear power plants could replace 10 billion cubic meters of Russian gas.
Other EU countries will also be able to buy “climate-neutral” Ukrainian electricity produced without carbon emissions, which will facilitate the implementation of the “green transition” strategy. The ENTSO-E decision on the export permit results from complex and lengthy work on the part of Ukraine and has a significant political component. It would be impossible without the support of Ukraine-friendly states. Therefore, this is a real, mutually beneficial step of real, non-declarative European integration.
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27 “YES” FOR THE EU CANDIDACY TO UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA |
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The leaders of the European Union officially granted the status of a candidate for EU membership to Ukraine and Moldova at the summit in Brussels. This issue was the major one on the agenda of the European Council meeting. The historic decision was approved based on the recommendation from the European Commission. As for Georgia, which also applied for candidate status, the situation is different. As the summit decided, Georgia will be able to receive the status as soon as Tbilisi fulfils several conditions. Together with hundreds of congratulations to the new candidate states, the heads of European and Ukrainian diplomacy Josep Borrell and Dmytro Kuleba, recorded a joint video. The Kremlin’s reaction was relatively restrained.
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27 EU leaders said “YES” to Ukraine and Moldova on obtaining candidate status. This is a strong political signal of support from the EU, a demonstration of leadership, unity, and courage, as well as a clear message to the Putin regime that the European Union is determined enough to protect its values and interests on the European continent. For millions of Ukrainians, the decision of the European Council will become an incentive for the further struggle against the aggressor and a trigger for domestic transformations. In addition to symbolic importance, candidate status has practical value because simultaneously with the prospect of EU membership, it launches a process of fundamental reforms. Implementing the package of “European integration” laws will make it possible to move to a new stage of cooperation with the EU – membership negotiations. However, this process will not start until Kyiv and Chisinau fulfil the conditions defined in the European Commission’s conclusions. For Ukraine, these are 7 articles, the key of which will be the rule of law and anti-corruption. The EU has not determined the exact date by which Ukraine should implement the conditions, but European Commission will do the First Assessment of their implementation at the end of 2022.
Non-compliance with EU requirements or circumventing them may lead to the loss of candidate status, as stated in the European Commission’s recommendations. Realizing the potential risks, the authorities have already said that Ukraine expects to fulfil the requirements of the European Commission by the end of the year. However, this scenario is too optimistic. Some articles need time to be implemented. For example, legislation on national minorities should be adopted and examined by the Venice Commission. It can take months. Another obstacle to the start of accession talks is Russia’s aggression. The negotiation process is unlikely to take place with a country in war.
Therefore, considering these two reasons, the accession negotiation process will not start quickly. But it does not mean that the integration process will be put on hold. On the contrary, Kyiv must present and show real work and adopt the necessary bills. Profile Deputy Prime Minister Olga Stefanishyna claimed that more than 30 European integration bills would be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada for voting by the end of the year.
This means that there is still a lot of work to be done. And the duration
of joining the EU now, for the most part, depends on the speed of implementation of reforms in Ukraine.
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COOPERATION BETWEEN TAIWAN AND UKRAINE TO COMBAT DICTATORSHIP REGIMES |
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Since the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine, Taiwan has been actively supporting Ukraine and providing humanitarian and financial assistance. In addition, the island’s authorities are joining sanctions against Russia and imposing restrictions on exporting goods to Russia to prevent them from receiving high-tech goods that can be used for military purposes. This list includes semiconductor manufacturing equipment, lasers, and navigation systems (in total 57 items). Also, the Ministry of Economy of Taiwan has banned exporting modern chips to Russia and Belarus. These actions, together with the condemnation of the war in Ukraine, demonstrate Taiwan’s cooperation with the democratic world.
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Since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Taiwanese experts have analyzed its combat experience and the practical use of effective military strategies in fighting a larger enemy. Taiwan’s military strategists study Russia’s invasion and Ukraine’s resistance to creating its combat strategy if China decides to attack. Taiwan is in a similar situation and is forced to resist the dictatorial regime to move closer to a democratic world. It is already strengthening its defence capabilities and increasing the production of weapons.
Although Ukraine does not officially recognize Taiwan’s independence, governments are already working closely to rebuild the destruction in Ukraine caused by Russian troops. The Taiwanese government is holding meetings with Ukrainian officials and high-ranking officials. Currently, the island plans to assist in the amount of 500 thousand dollars for reconstructing the destroyed Bucha. In addition, financial and material aid will be directed to rebuild Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia. On March 2nd, the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also opened a special bank account for donations from individuals and legal entities, which received about $ 20 million in the first week alone. Many Taiwanese politicians have sent their funds to this account. Also, Taiwan sends humanitarian aid to Ukraine and supports Ukrainian refugees worldwide.
Taiwanese society strongly supports Ukraine in the fight against Russia. Residents organized rallies in support of Ukraine on the island. Taipei’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown that Taiwan is ready to resist dictatorial regimes to preserve democratic values and can be a strong full-fledged partner in the international arena.
The frequency of China’s aggressive statements about a possible capture of Taiwan continues to increase as Taiwan establishes its international cooperation. Furthermore, China is constantly carrying out provocations near the island using fighter jets and military exercises. Therefore, Taiwan cooperates with partners to prepare for defence operations and protect its territory.
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RUSSIA THREATENS LITHUANIA |
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Kaliningrad region is a subject of the Russian Federation, located between Lithuania and Poland. This region has no land connection with Russia. Therefore, the goods and passenger services supply mainly came through the EU’s neighbouring countries, particularly Lithuania, using the railway.
Lithuania has announced that it will suspend the passage of rail transit from and to the Kaliningrad region from the other parts of Russia of some goods subject to restrictive measures imposed by the EU (products made of iron, steel, and certain other metals, as well as caviar, alcohol, fertilizers, timber and wood products, glass containers and cement, cigarettes, fertilizers, furniture, and other goods). Lithuania complied with these sanctions after consulting the European Commission. According to the governor of the Kaliningrad region, 40 to 50% of all cargoes were banned. In addition, on June 21st, the country expanded restrictions on trucks. Furthermore, the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry said that steel and other products made of iron would no longer be imported through their territory.
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In response to this ban, Russia immediately began threatening with military aggression. Several Russian officials of various ranks have announced that the decision will seriously affect Lithuania. Russia’s Baltic Fleet has already started training in the Kaliningrad region. According to the Russian information resources, about 1,000 servicemen and more than 100 military and special equipment, artillery, and missile units were involved in the manoeuvres in the Kaliningrad region.
It should be noted that over the past 3 - 4 years, Russia has seriously militarized the region, threatening the European Union and NATO countries. Medium-range missiles were brought there. There are a large number of “Grads” and other weapons. In addition, even before Russia’s full-scale offensive against Ukraine, experts expressed concern about the security situation in Suwalki Gap. It is the nearly 100-kilometre border strip between Poland and Lithuania and the only section of land that connects Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the rest of the EU and NATO countries. It separates the Kaliningrad region of Russia from Belarus. The capture of this area could cut off all the Baltic countries from Europe. The ban on the transit of goods to the Kaliningrad region is an open economic pressure on Russia in connection with the outbreak of a full-scale war with Ukraine. By this, the EU wants to force the occupying country to lift the blockade on Ukrainian ports to resume food exports to various countries worldwide.
It is unlikely that Russia will dare to launch military aggression against a NATO member state. The lack of success in Ukraine and the loss of a large amount of equipment may prevent the decision to launch a full-scale war against the North Atlantic Alliance. However, there is a high probability of provocations near the Suwalki Gap, as before February 24th, and intensified protests in pro-Russian communities in the Baltic States. At the same time, the war in Ukraine has shown that not all NATO members are ready for war with Russia. This can give confidence in the Alliance’s inaction in the event of a hypothetical attack on the Baltic states.
So far, Russia’s actions indicate reconciliation with the ban on the transit of goods through Lithuania. The governor of the Kaliningrad region, Anton Alikhanov, has already announced that additional ferries will be launched to deliver goods from Russia and back. However, this will incur significant losses in time and finances.
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CZK: Transparent account
AN: 2300405420/2010
VS: 2022
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