December 2024

Sunday 01 December to Tuesday 31 December 2024

Dear 

Please find below our most recent Burkina Faso Monthly Security Report. If you have any queries about our reports please contact us at africaops@castorvali.com.

• Militant violence in Burkina Faso continued to evolve throughout 2024. Groups such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and other armed factions have adapted their tactics and shifted their geographic focus, significantly impacting the security landscape.

• On 18 December 2024, customs authorities in Cinkansé, Koulpélogo Province (in Centre-Est Region), intercepted three individuals attempting to smuggle 28.6 kg of gold, valued at approximately USD 2.3 million, en route to Lomé, Togo. The suspects reportedly admitted to acting on behalf of an unidentified third party.

• On 22 December 2024, Burkina Faso's transitional government passed a bill granting amnesty to individuals convicted for their involvement in the failed 2015 coup attempt, contingent on acknowledging their actions, demonstrating good conduct, and agreeing to participate in counter-terrorism operations. A few days later, on 26 December, President Ibrahim Traoré authorised the release of up to 1,200 prisoners, effective 01 January 2025. The release targeted those who had served their sentences and expressed a willingness to reintegrate, although political prisoners and non-combatants were excluded from this measure

• Emerging Trends & Events:
  
  • New government appointed. On 08 December 2024, President Ibrahim Traoré appointed a new government. Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouédraogo, communications minister and government spokesperson, was appointed as the new prime minister.
    
  • Junta regional bloc establishes visa-free zone for ECOWAS nationals. On 14 December 2024, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, announced the creation of a visa-free zone for all nationals of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). According to the declaration, ECOWAS nationals will maintain the right to enter, move freely within, reside in, settle, and exit AES territories.
    
  • AES reject six-month withdrawal period. On 22 December 2024, the military-led transitional governments of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso rejected the six-month withdrawal period granted by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regional bloc for their exit. In a statement, the countries said they saw it as an “attempt at external destabilisation”.
    
  • Military receives delivery of armoured vehicles from China. On 22 December 2024, the military received a delivery of 50 Chinese-manufactured armoured vehicles. The acquisition of military equipment forms part of the interim administration’s Strategic Equipment Plan to enhance the army’s counter-terrorism efforts.
    

• Moving forward, Burkina Faso's security forces are likely to face continued challenges in consolidating control over key territories, particularly in resource-rich regions, in the long term. Militant actors will likely maintain pressure through a combination of territorial expansion, economic disruption, and asymmetric tactics, ensuring that the conflict remains dynamic and complex.

• Gold smuggling is likely to remain a significant threat to Burkina Faso's stability and security particularly given the deep-rooted challenges in its mining sector and governance. While efforts to address informal artisanal mining could help reduce smuggling, the process will be slow and dependent on both domestic and external factors. The state will likely struggle to implement meaningful reforms unless there is substantial political will and external support, as entrenched corruption and limited resources may hinder progress.

• Government measures and amnesty are unlikely to significantly alter the country’s security dynamics. While the integration of former coup plotters into military operations may enhance the government's capacity to combat armed groups, the release of prisoners, although alleviating prison overcrowding, does not address the underlying causes of instability, such as governance issues and widespread poverty.

Castor Vali advises its clients to limit all but essential travel to Ouagadougou and against all travel outside of Ouagadougou.

On 20 September 2024, the president of the special delegation (PDS) of the municipality of Ouagadougou announced the introduction of new security measures at the city’s entrances. Vehicles that were previously exempt from verification – including ambulances, hearses, armoured vehicles, and those belonging to the diplomatic corps and mining sectors – will now be subject to systematic checks. The PDS also noted that drivers or accompanying personnel must present official documents, such as a mission order, a transfer order for deceased individuals, or a diplomatic card, to gain entry into the city. Furthermore, vehicles displaying pennants or distinctive markings are required to remove them prior to entering the city. The new measures are likely in response to the 24 August 2024 militant attack that the al-Qaeda-aligned JNIM extremist group carried out in Barsalogho, located 40 km north of Kaya, which is a strategic town critical for the defence of the capital, Ouagadougou. Ongoing efforts to retake Barsalogho and enhanced security measures in Ouagadougou should mitigate the risk of a major attack on the city. Further movement restrictions in the city are possible in the near term.

On 01 March 2024, a memorandum from the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Brigadier General Célestin Simporté, expressed concerns about potential suicide bombings in urban centres. Clients are advised to exercise increased vigilance in case of essential travel to major urban areas in the short to medium term, including Ouagadougou.

On Tuesday 02 May 2023, the transitional government extended, for an unlimited period, the state of emergency currently observed in provinces that include Banwa, Kossi, Nayala and Sourou in Boucle du Mouhoun Region; Koulpelogo in Centre-Est Region; Gnagna, Gourma, Komondjari, Kompienga and Tapoa in Est Region; Kenedougou and Tuy in Hauts-Bassins Region; Loroum and Yatenga in Nord Region; Oudalan, Seno, Soum, and Yagha in Sahel Region; Comoe in the Cascades Region; and Bam, Namentenga and Sanmatenga in Centre-Nord Region. While no additional information was provided, the decree will “strengthen the existence of legal means” to combat terrorism in these administrative divisions. All these areas remain under strict curfew.

The government has also extended ongoing, overnight, security-related curfews in several Sahel region localities, until at least the end of the year. While the town of Dori is exempt from these measures, curfews in Djibo will continue to run between 0000hrs and 0400hrs, while the curfew in the Bani, Falagountou, Sampelga, Seytenga, Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, and Sebba townships is between 2200hrs and 0400hrs.

On 12 November 2024, local authorities lifted all curfews in the Est region. A curfew had been in place in the area for the past five years.

Following the military coup on 30 September 2022, air borders were briefly closed and while they since have re-opened, the national air space could close again on short to no notice. Land borders are also open.

1. Kossi Province: On 01 December 2024, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) militants attacked a position of Burkinabe forces and Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland fighters (VDP) in the town of Bomborokui. At least 10 soldiers and VDPs were killed. The militants also caused extensive material damage and also set fire to shops and houses in the town. JNIM claimed to have attacked the camp and seized a vehicle and four motorcycles, weapons including 10 Kalashnikovs, and various other items.
2. Loroum Province: On 05 December 2024, JNIM militants attacked a VDP position in the village of You (Titao department). The Burkinabe air force intervened and conducted several drone strikes against the militants. JNIM claimed to have killed 12 soldiers, and seized 161 magazines, two motorcycles, a large quantity of weapons including 20 Kalashnikovs, and various other items, the statement claimed.
3. Bam/Soum Provinces: On 08 December 2024, Burkinabe forces escorting a food supplies convoy struck several IEDs likely planted by JNIM militants between Namssiguia (Bourzanga department) and Mentao (Pobe-Mengao department). JNIM claimed to have planted the IEDs along with others between Namssiguia and Djibo. The explosions resulted in human and equipment losses, the statement claimed.
4. Nahouri Province: At 2000hrs on 10 December 2024, the detonation of two vehicles carrying explosives along the Po-Dakola axis at the Tambolo customs checkpoint killed five people. While the precise cause of the explosion remains unclear, militant groups are known to employ explosive attacks as part of their campaign against the state. However, the Po-Dakola axis is a significant transit corridor connecting Burkina Faso to the Ghanaian border. The route is frequently used to transport materials, including explosives destined for gold mining operations in the region. Accidental detonations of mining explosives are known to occur in Burkina Faso.
5. Kossi Province: On 10 December 2024, Burkinabe air forces and special forces from the Rapid Intervention Battalion 10 (BIR 10) carried out air and ground operations against JNIM militants in the area of Sadigan (Bomborokui department). Several air strikes were carried out against the militants, followed by sweeps and clashes. The soldiers seized many weapons, ammunitions, motorcycles, magazines, mobile phones, solar panels, communication radios, and various other items. Local sources stated that at least 30 militants were killed while official public media stated that 102 militants were killed.
6. Séno/Sanmatenga Provinces: On 17 December 2024, suspected militants reportedly attacked a civilian convoy on the National Road 3. The trucks, heading to Niamey, Niger, were attacked between Kaya and Dori. Additional reports indicate that at least six of these vehicles were set on fire by the suspected militants.
7. Gourma Province: On 20 December 2024, JNIM claimed it had captured a VDP post and a Burkinabe military barracks in Tagou and Nagaré.
8. Koulpélogo Province: On 25 December 2024, suspected JNIM militants attacked Sologo 2 village and killed six VDP members. Additional reports also indicate at least 20 people were injured, with one VDP member reported missing. The village was looted, and granaries were destroyed.
9. Mouhoun Province: On 30 December 2024, suspected JNIM militants reportedly ambushed a Burkinabe military convoy in Dédougou. Fatalities are unknown.

Data covered is from 01 to 13 December 2024. An updated report will be issued in mid-January with the remaining data and events.

Data source: ACLED

Data source: ACLED

Data covered is from 01 to 13 December 2024. An updated report will be issued in mid-January with the remaining data and events.

Data source: ACLED

Militant violence in Burkina Faso continued to evolve throughout 2024. Groups such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and other armed factions have adapted their tactics and shifted their geographic focus, significantly impacting the security landscape.

Between 01 January and 13 December 2024, the total number of violent incidents attributed to militant actors showed a marked decline of approximately 13 per cent when compared to 2023. This trend may reflect operational constraints on the part of militant groups, potentially due to counterinsurgency efforts, resource depletion, or internal fragmentation. However, while the overall number of events decreased, certain types of attacks and their geographic distribution suggest a recalibration rather than a diminishment of militant capabilities. This is further illustrated by the number of fatalities caused by terrorism-related events: 2024 marks the deadliest year in Burkina Faso since the beginning of the insurgency.

Terrorism-related fatalities in Burkina Faso since 2019 until 13 December 2024 (Data source: ACLED)

Militant groups kept employing a variety of tactics, including armed assaults, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and ambushes. In 2023, IED incidents accounted for 135 recorded events, while in 2024, the figure decreased slightly to 125, suggesting a relative stabilisation in their use. The slight decline in IED incidents may be attributed to enhanced detection and deactivation measures by security forces or logistical challenges faced by militant actors. Nevertheless, IEDs continue to play a significant role, allowing militant groups to disrupt supply chains, target military convoys, and spread fear without requiring confrontation.

Conversely, armed assaults remained the predominant mode of attack, underscoring the reliance on direct confrontations to exert control over territory and intimidate local populations. For instance, armed clashes constituted 52 per cent of total incidents in 2023 and 55 per cent in 2024, indicating a continued focus on seizing strategic locations and overwhelming security forces.

Sustained southward expansion

The geographic focus of militant activity has also shifted. In 2023, the Sahel and Centre-Nord regions were the most affected, accounting for 42 per cent and 30 per cent of all recorded events, respectively. By 2024, there was an increased concentration of incidents in the Est and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, signalling a deliberate expansion into new areas (see maps in Mapping of terrorism-related events by year section). The Sahel Region remained a hotspot, with 37 per cent of incidents in 2024, but the emergence of new fronts in the Est (up from 12 per cent in 2023 to 18 per cent in 2024) reflects the groups’ intent to stretch security forces thin and exploit less fortified territories.

At the local level, departments such as Djibo (Sahel Region) and Sebba (Yagha Province) continue to face significant pressure, with sustained blockades and intermittent attacks crippling local economies. The increased activity in eastern areas, such as Fada N’Gourma, highlights militant efforts to control resource-rich zones, particularly artisanal gold mining sites.

Evolving insurgent strategies

The decrease in overall incidents suggests that counterinsurgency operations have achieved localised successes, potentially disrupting militant supply lines and operational bases. However, the increased focus on specific regions and a shift in tactics reveal adaptive strategies by militant groups. The stabilisation of IED use, coupled with a slight uptick in armed assaults, underscores the enduring capability of these groups to project power, even amid countermeasures. Furthermore, the geographic expansion into the Est and Boucle du Mouhoun regions underscores a strategic pivot, likely driven by the need to access untapped resources and exploit governance gaps in peripheral areas. These trends reflect the resilience and fluidity of militant networks.

Overall, the trajectory of militant violence in Burkina Faso in the past few years suggests a protracted and adaptive insurgency. While the overall reduction in incidents may indicate progress, the geographic diversification and sustained use of sophisticated tactics such as IEDs highlight the challenges ahead. The shifting focus to regions like Est signals an intent to exploit vulnerabilities in under-secured areas, potentially drawing security resources away from traditional hotspots.

Moving forward, Burkina Faso's security forces are likely to face continued challenges in consolidating control over key territories, particularly in resource-rich regions in the long term. Militant actors will likely maintain pressure through a combination of territorial expansion, economic disruption, and asymmetric tactics, ensuring that the conflict remains dynamic and complex.

On 18 December 2024, customs authorities in Cinkansé, Koulpélogo Province (in Centre-Est Region), intercepted three individuals attempting to smuggle 28.6 kg of gold, valued at approximately USD 2.3 million, en route to Lomé, Togo. This seizure, one of the most significant, involved gold concealed by the suspects who reportedly admitted to acting on behalf of an unidentified third party.

The smuggling of gold from Burkina Faso reflects deeper structural vulnerabilities within the country’s mining and governance systems. While gold mining is a significant driver of the national economy, contributing approximately 10 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and up to 70 per cent of export earnings, the unregulated artisanal mining sector undermines the state’s capacity to reap the full benefits of this wealth. It is estimated that 10 tonnes of gold are smuggled out of the country annually, highlighting the scale of illicit activity. These operations not only deprive the state of critical revenue but also fuel criminal and militant networks. The confiscation of 28.6 kg of gold in Cinkansé underscores how Burkina Faso’s strategic location as a transit hub exacerbates the challenge, with gold often routed through neighbouring countries such as Togo for laundering into global markets.

Armed groups such as JNIM and ISGS exploit the informal mining sector to finance their activities. These groups often exert control over mining sites or demand taxes and “protection fees” from miners and transporters. This situation in return creates a vicious cycle where criminal profits fund further destabilisation, including attacks on military forces, civilians, and infrastructure. Moreover, the proceeds from smuggling have a cascading effect, financing weapons procurement, recruitment, and logistical support for armed groups, further undermining the security of Burkina Faso and neighbouring countries.

The seizure in Cinkansé also highlights significant weaknesses in law enforcement and regulatory oversight. Despite efforts to formalise the artisanal mining sector and tighten border controls, corruption, lack of resources, and porous borders continue to limit the effectiveness of state interventions. International buyers, often complicit in sourcing conflict gold, exacerbate the problem by failing to enforce due diligence in their supply chains. This broader context reveals how local illicit activities are intertwined with global demand and a lack of international accountability, deepening Burkina Faso’s challenges in addressing gold smuggling comprehensively.

Assessment 

Gold smuggling is likely to continue as a significant threat to Burkina Faso's stability and security particularly given the deep-rooted challenges in its mining sector and governance. While efforts to address the informality of artisanal mining could help reduce smuggling, the process will be slow and dependent on both domestic and external factors aligning. The state will likely struggle to implement meaningful reforms unless there is substantial political will and external support, as entrenched corruption and limited resources may hinder progress.

On the domestic front, while incentivising legal compliance through tax reductions and improved access to mining licenses may eventually reduce the appeal of the informal sector, these measures will likely face resistance from well-established networks within the informal mining community. The informal sector, being a significant economic player, might not transition quickly into legality without significant shifts in local power dynamics and the provision of robust infrastructure, which is unlikely in most sites, due to their remote location. The state’s ability to strengthen border controls and law enforcement, particularly in regions like Cinkansé, will be fundamental, but such efforts will likely be constrained by inadequate funding and institutional capacity.

Regionally, cooperation between West African states is likely to remain fragmented. The transnational nature of gold smuggling means that without a coordinated approach, individual countries may not have the incentive or resources to combat this issue effectively. While organisations like ECOWAS could potentially play a role in fostering collaboration, the actual implementation of joint border patrols and intelligence sharing is likely to be undermined by competing national interests, logistical challenges and most important, the rejection of ECOWAS by the AES.

On the international level, while there is a growing emphasis on corporate responsibility and stricter due diligence in gold supply chains, the market's demand for cheap gold, coupled with weak enforcement in certain regions, will likely keep smuggling networks alive.

On 22 December 2024, Burkina Faso's transitional government passed a bill granting amnesty to individuals convicted for their involvement in the failed 2015 coup attempt, contingent on acknowledging their actions, demonstrating good conduct, and agreeing to participate in counter-terrorism operations. A few days later, on 26 December, President Ibrahim Traoré authorised the release of up to 1,200 prisoners, effective 01 January 2025. The release targeted those who had served their sentences and expressed a willingness to reintegrate. Political prisoners and non-combatants were excluded from this measure.

The decision has sparked significant debate. Critics argue that it is troubling to reintegrate individuals who sought to destabilise the democratic process into critical counter-terrorism roles. However, the rationale behind these decisions seems primarily pragmatic. The amnesty is likely intended to address several objectives. Firstly, it provides an opportunity to strengthen military capacity at a time when the country faces severe security challenges. By re-integrating former coup plotters, the government may seek to leverage their military expertise and knowledge of the terrain in its fight against armed groups. This move also appears aimed at consolidating support within certain factions of the military, while stabilising the political environment amidst growing internal tension.

Additionally, the prisoner release is intended to address overcrowded prisons, a persistent issue in the country. However, that political prisoners, including those perceived as threats to the government, are excluded from this amnesty reflects the regime's selective approach to justice. In 2024, many political dissidents were sent to the frontlines of conflict, and this policy of exclusion further underscores the authoritarian nature of the regime. The government's actions have been characterised by arbitrary arrests, forced conscriptions, and the targeting of individuals critical of the regime.

In August 2024, when Human Rights Watch reported that the military authorities had forcibly conscripted judges and prosecutors who had initiated legal proceedings against members of the ruling military junta. Between 09 and 12 August 2024, approximately seven magistrates were abducted and their current whereabouts remain unknown. This action was interpreted as an attempt to suppress judicial independence and silence legal professionals critical of the government. In June 2024, Atiana Serge Oulon, the publishing director of the investigative newspaper L'Événement, was abducted by armed individuals who identified themselves as secret service agents. The abductors seized Oulon's computer and telephone, leading the newspaper to suspend its publication due to the challenges posed by the incident. In September 2024, the families of political opponents, including those of General Djibril Bassolé, an exiled former minister, were targeted. His daughter, Yasmine Bassolé, was abducted following a violent search of her residence, and his sons were also abducted.

These incidents reflect a broader pattern of suppression against political opponents, human rights defenders, and the media. Such measures have raised serious concerns about the erosion of civil liberties and the rule of law in Burkina Faso and highlight the government's prioritisation of military and strategic interests over broader national reconciliation.

Assessment

In the short term, the government measures are unlikely to significantly alter the country’s security dynamics. While the integration of former coup plotters into military operations may enhance the government's capacity to combat armed groups, the release of prisoners, although alleviating prison overcrowding, does not address the underlying causes of instability, such as governance issues and widespread poverty. These decisions, while strategically aimed at bolstering military strength and managing internal pressures, reinforce the government's authoritarian stance. They illustrate the selective nature of the regime’s approach to justice and reconciliation. Given the ongoing repression of political opposition and the absence of significant political reform, the broader impact on Burkina Faso's stability remains uncertain, with little indication of a shift towards more inclusive governance in the foreseeable future.

• New government appointed. On 08 December 2024, President Ibrahim Traoré appointed a new government. Burkina Faso’s transitional president appointed communications minister and government spokesperson, Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouédraogo, as the new prime minister. Ouédraogo replaces Apollinaire Joachim Kyelem de Tambela, who – alongside the government over which he presided – was relieved of his duties a day earlier. A day later, on 09 December, Prime Minister Ouédraogo announced a new cabinet. While several ministers retained their positions, there were some changes. Notably, brigadier general Celestin Simpore was appointed as the minister of defence, replacing Kassoum Coulibaly. Meanwhile, commander Passowende Kabre Kabore is now minister of humanitarian action, following the departure of Nandy Some-Diallo. Elsewhere, former director of presidential communications Gilbert Ouedraogo was appointed as lead of the ministry of culture, arts, and tourism, while also assuming the role of government spokesperson. Meanwhile, the ministers overseeing justice, foreign affairs, security, mining, and economy remain unchanged. Although the government did not provide an immediate rationale for the restructuring, these appointments come amid growing challenges faced by the administration of President Ibrahim Traoré, including national insecurity. This, as large areas of the country have fallen under the control of Islamist militant groups; however, the appointment of the new government is unlikely to have a marked impact on political stability and/or policy outlook in Burkina Faso in the near-to-medium term. To this effect, the government change may have been a bid by Traoré to engender a sense of governance accountability as a means of accruing political capital. Nonetheless, a change in government is unlikely to have any meaningful impact on prevailing social, economic and political conditions in the Burkinabe state, particularly given the centralisation of governance powers in the office of the presidency.

• Junta regional bloc establishes visa-free zone for ECOWAS nationals. On 14 December 2024, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, announced the creation of a visa-free zone for all nationals of countries part of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). According to the declaration, ECOWAS nationals will maintain the right to enter, move freely within, reside in, settle, and exit AES territories. Additionally, vehicles registered in ECOWAS member states – including private, commercial, and passenger transport – will be granted entry into the AES zone under existing regulatory frameworks. This announcement follows a joint communique from the three states re-affirming their decision to withdraw from ECOWAS, after the regional bloc extended a six-month grace period to the junta-led governments on 15 December 2024, urging them to reconsider their exit ahead of the scheduled departure in January 2025. Broadly, the visa-free arrangement, coupled with provisions for cross-border vehicle movement, underscores the sub-regional bloc’s intention to preserve critical economic and social connections with the broader region, aiming to mitigate any potential negative fall-out from its withdrawal from ECOWAS.

• AES reject six-month withdrawal period. On 22 December 2024, the military-led transitional governments of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso rejected the six-month withdrawal period granted by the ECOWAS regional bloc for their exit. In a statement, the countries – which form the AES sub-regional bloc – said they saw it as an “attempt at external destabilisation.” The development comes after a recent ECOWAS summit in Nigeria in which the regional bloc announced a six-month period for the three countries to reverse their decision after their formal departure by end of January 2025. According to the AES, the grace period is “only yet another attempt that would allow the French junta and its proxies to continue planning and conducting destabilisation actions against the AES.” It added that the “unilateral decision” cannot be binding on them, since they had already announced that their decision to leave the organisation was “irreversible”. In response, the AES countries stated that they had adopted new measures, including placing the defence and security forces of the three member countries on high alert and designating the AES confederal space as a “single theatre of military operations” to strengthen the coordination of defensive actions. ECOWAS has yet to respond to the development. The latest development signifies the AES bloc’s commitment to remain steadfast in their decision to exit ECOWAS. Their withdrawal from ECOWAS will have economic repercussions, given their exclusion from customs and trade treaties, and other related benefits associated with membership in the regional bloc.

• Military receives delivery of armoured vehicles from China. On 22 December 2024, the military received a delivery of 50 Chinese-manufactured armoured vehicles. The acquisition of military equipment forms part of the interim administration’s Strategic Equipment Plan to enhance the army’s counter-terrorism efforts. President Ibrahim Traoré indicated during an interview in January 2024 that Burkina Faso has relied on the likes of Russia, Iran and Turkey, for the supply of necessary arms, given the refusal of the United States, France, and other Western countries to sell lethal weapons to Burkina Faso. The acquisition of the vehicles from China suggests that the country could emerge as a new military supply partner. While the procurement of the armoured vehicles will contribute to the state’s ongoing counter-insurgency operations, a material improvement in the domestic security environment is not expected in the near term due to broader system challenges in the military.

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