ISSUE 22

 06 - 19.03.2023

• Security update: March developments
• Results of Ramstein, aircrafts for Ukraine, and the EU joint ammunition supply plan
• Ukrainian MPs presented draft laws banning members of pro-Russian political groups
• Taiwan is an underestimated partner of Ukraine
• Why isn’t Rosatom under sanctions?
• Turkey-Russia cooperation

The active front line in Ukraine has reached a length of 1,500 km, claimed President Zelenskyy in his regular address to the nation on March 18, which makes the current war the largest armed conflict since the end of World War II. “Battles take place in fields, forests, on water, in the sky, and in cities. We continue fighting for our native land. The liberation of all occupied territories is ahead. And Ukraine will definitely do it,” Zelenskyy stated. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has reported 21,965 official civilian casualties in Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among them are 8,231 Ukrainian civilian deaths and 13,734 injured.

The Russians continued to attack Ukraine with full military might over the past week. On March 18 alone, the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) carried out attacks on 11 regions of Ukraine. The RAF shelled Kherson Oblast 50 times, firing 237 shells from heavy artillery and "Grad" MRLS. The invaders shelled the city of Kherson three times. Seven shells hit residential areas, including houses and apartment buildings. Three people were injured. In Mykolaiv Oblast, on March 17, the RAF once again attacked Ochakiv and Kutsurub hromadas (communities) with mortar and artillery strikes. In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, the enemy shelled civilian infrastructure in the area which includes 14 towns and villages.

Major offensive actions are concentrated in the area of Kupyansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Shakhtarsk directions. Fighting continues on three sides of Bakhmut. The Russians are also trying to break through the Ukrainian defense near Bilohorivka and Kreminna, 50 km north of Bakhmut, but without success, said General Oleksandr Syrskyi - commander of the Ground Forces of Ukraine who is responsible for the direction. Serhii Cherevatyi, the spokesperson for the eastern grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has stated that Russian occupiers are tactically unable to complete the operation to capture Bakhmut and are suffering heavy losses during the fighting.

Source: DeepStateMap

The Russian leadership is also trying hard to accumulate trained personnel for a larger-scale offensive in the spring. In order to motivate the army and show his close control of the developments, Russian President Putin held a meeting at a military "command post" in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, after making a surprise visit to occupied Crimea and Mariupol. In the comments during his trip, Putin admitted that he considered the option of a large-scale invasion of Ukraine back in 2014, but that was not possible nine years ago due to the situation of the Russian economy and the lack of the necessary, hypersonic, weaponry.  

ANALYSIS

In the short term, the enemy will concentrate its efforts in the areas between Bakhmut and Bilohorivka, and in the Kreminna-Lyman direction. A majority of experts question Russia’s ability to launch a large-scale military campaign this spring, and last week senior American generals hosted Ukrainian military officials for a set of “tabletop” exercises designed to help Kyiv map out the next stage of its battle to reclaim territory from dug-in Russian troops. According to media reports, during a war-game session at the headquarters of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, military officials rehearsed a range of options for an offensive. No details were made public on the options tested, but experts suggested that Kyiv might try to move against Russian defensive lines in the eastern parts of the country, including in Donetsk and Luhansk. The key factor for Ukraine’s ability to perform any serious actions against Russia will be the preparedness of personnel and the supplies of weapons and systems. And while the latter remain more or less secure, the issue of motivated and trained personnel appears to be critical. Despite control over the informational space, it is clear that the situation regarding mobilization in Ukraine is deteriorating, and the qualitative characteristics of the troops are degrading. Most concerning is that top military command prefers to stick to propaganda narratives rather than recognizing accumulating problems.  One of the recent cases is the demotion of Anatolii “Kupol” Kozel from the post of combat battalion commander of the 46th Airmobile Brigade to deputy battalion commander of the training centre after his interview to The Washington Post in which he confirmed that the Defence Forces of Ukraine had lost many of its most experienced fighters on the battlefield. He stressed that the inexperience of new recruits, coupled with a lack of weapons, was allegedly reducing optimism and calling Kyiv’s readiness for a spring offensive into question. The reaction of the military command was very negative and revealed old-style soviet thinking within the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as exposing “cultural” conflict within the army. Many Ukrainian officers stood up in defence of Kupol’s position. So, to enable the success of Ukraine on the battlefield, the Ukrainian military should not only request more weapons, but also undergo internal institutional changes, including casting aside Soviet cultural inheritance, improving mission command practices, and fostering the application of after-action reviews and lessons learned tools.  

Ukraine is urging partners to accelerate their supply of artillery ammunition. In his interview with the BBC, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba said that  “if one delivery is postponed for one day, it means that someone is going to die on the frontline.”  The shortage of artillery ammunition is especially visible in the eastern city of Bakhmut, where the fierce battles continue. He also raised the issue of expediting the delivery of artillery ammunition with the US counterpart Antony Blinken.  “We are working with the US and other partners around the clock to ensure that Ukraine has all of the ammunition we need for defense and counter-offensive operations”, stated Kuleba. 

This issue is widely recognized by Ukrainian partners. For instance, the EU is to set up a joint plan for ammunition supply to Ukraine. The goals of this plan are to provide Ukraine with the critical weapons supply and to fill depleted stockpiles. The EU is likely to provide only €1 billion to Ukraine and €1 billion will be spent to fill its own stockpiles. According to EU High Representative Josep Borrell, the envisioned plan will provide financial incentives to EU Member States to provide ammunition to Ukraine. The plan should be finalized at the meeting of foreign ministers on March 20.  

The issue of munitions was also discussed on March 15, at the 10th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (Ramstein Group) in online format. According to Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov, the meeting inspired optimism, especially with regard to strengthening air defense, ammunition supplies, training soldiers and forming what has been called an “armoured fist.” There were no specific announcements on new initiatives, but Reznikov thanked allies for their continued support. During a joint press conference with Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren on March 14, Reznikov stated that the success of the Ukrainian counteroffensive will hinge on forcing the Russian military onto the defensive, neutralizing their air superiority, and disrupting their supply lines. He reiterated that allied countries supplying Ukraine with fighter jets would help speed up the process of liberating Ukrainian territory. 

Soon after, on March 16, Poland became the first NATO nation to pledge four MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine. The significant move in Kyiv’s battle to resist Russia’s onslaught was announced by Polish President Andrzej Duda, who said that the planes would be handed over in the coming days after being serviced.  

ANALYSIS

With the previous image of the EU as an entirely peace project, the decision regarding the joint ammo buying scheme seems unprecedented. However, since the early days of the full-scale war, the European Peace Facility (EPF) has served as the EU funding arm to provide Ukraine with military aid. In 2022, the EPF provided €3.6 billion of military aid to Ukraine delivered by EU Member States. Ukraine’s needs are also tremendous. Estonia, which took the lead in the EU on this issue, estimated Ukraine’s need in 2023 to be €4 billion. According to Estonian calculations, Ukraine fires from 60,000 to 210,000 rounds of ammunition per month, but the European defense industry only has the capacity to produce as many as 25,000 shells monthly. The plan is aimed at boosting production and stock supplies.  

The request for the joint procurement is said to be coming from Ukraine. Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov joined the foreign committee asking for more supplies, specifically 155-millimeter artillery shells. Another issue is that the EU prices for ammunition have grown since the full-scale war in Ukraine. The plan’s goal would be to prevent the prices from skyrocketing again by encouraging more collaborative programs.  

Regarding the provision of weapons and military equipment, the Ramstein group meeting did not bring any breaking news. The main question remains if sending MiGs by Poland would change the dynamic within the alliance, acting as a catalyst for more countries to do so, or upset countries such as Hungary that are opposed to NATO getting more involved in the conflict. In order to manage expectations, the United States reacted immediately that Poland’s decision to send the fighter jets is a “sovereign decision” that won’t spur President Joe Biden to send F-16 aircraft, requested by Ukraine from several sources. However, the discussions on F-16s are ongoing, insiders confirm.  

On March 6, in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), a group of MPs from the Servant of the People and Holos registered bill No. 9081-1 on restricting members of banned pro-Russian parties from running to the VRU and local (city/village) councils. According to the author of the draft law Halyna Yanchenko, the purpose of this legislative initiative is to conduct "anti-Kremlin lustration" and prevent former Kremlin henchmen from state governance. The day after the registration of the first draft law, a group of deputies from another Verkhovna Rada Committee registered an alternative document. That document specifies a ban on running for those who have been pro-Kremlin representatives since the beginning of Russia's aggression against Ukraine – 19.02.2014. In addition, the bill's author Vitaliy Bezgin considers it necessary to expand the list of restricted access to anyone associated with pro-Russian parties, which would not exempt those in the highest office, including the President of Ukraine, members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine – ministers, and the highest rank of civil servants.

ANALYSIS

The discussion about the legislative ban on representatives of pro-Russian forces from running in elections is dictated by time, the threat from the Russian Federation, and the demand of Ukrainian society. According to a sociological survey, the majority of Ukrainians stand for the deprivation of powers of politicians from pro-Russian parties so they are not able to influence the political life in Ukraine in the future. In 2022, 12 pro-Russian parties were banned, but the deputies from these political parties continue to work because the government's draft law, which could withdraw their mandates, is still under review in the first reading. These two recent parliamentary initiatives have long been expected. Sooner or later, the war will end, and the country will return to democratic elections. Therefore, it is crucial to develop appropriate safeguards now to prevent Kremlin collaborators from coming to power. At the same time, these draft laws contain certain risks, which may complicate their adoption process. Firstly, their provisions do not comply with the current Constitution of Ukraine (CU). It is possible to change the conditions for running in elections at all levels only by amending Article 76 of the CU. However, during martial law, it is forbidden to change the CU. Secondly, there are concerns that if the law is adopted, citizens who are prohibited from running will apply en masse to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to receive compensation from Ukraine. The authors of the draft laws recognize that there are areas for improvement regarding compliance with the Constitution and problems with the judicial perspective in the ECHR. They, therefore, promise to develop a compromise option for the second reading.  

Political lustration is not a new practice. After the fall of the communist regimes in the 1990s, several European countries imposed similar restrictions on representatives of communist parties and their functionaries. Such legislation is valid in countries including the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, and Poland. In Ukraine, the law banning the Communist Party of Ukraine was adopted in 2015. Taking into account the security challenges and losses from Russian aggression, in the near future, Ukrainian MPs will adopt legislative safeguards to prevent pro-Russian politicians from coming to power. 

Ukraine has been following the "one China" policy for a long time. Since 1991, Taiwan has attempted to establish cooperation with Ukraine, but due to the PRC's opposition, these attempts have not been successful. Currently, Ukraine perceives the PRC as a strategic partner. Beijing's reaction to Russia's war against Ukraine gives reason to reconsider the effectiveness of such a partnership.

ANALYSIS

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Taiwan has actively supported Ukrainians. During the one year of the war, the country donated more than $41 million in humanitarian aid. For 2023, the aid budget was set as $59 million. Taiwan is working with city councils and helping rebuild energy and critical infrastructure. But the support is not limited to such assistance. Taiwan has also started broadcasting news in the Ukrainian language, canceled concerts of Russian artists who support the occupation of Ukraine, and joined world sanctions against Russia and Belarus. All these actions fundamentally differ from the policy pursued by PRC concerning Russia's war against Ukraine. 

Until now, cooperation between Ukraine and Taiwan has been underdeveloped. The bilateral trade volume between the two countries is approximately $400 million. Taiwan mainly exports technical equipment, spare parts for electronics, and cars to Ukraine. To Taiwan, Ukraine exports chemicals, metals, and agricultural products. Through deepening cooperation with Taiwan, Ukraine will not only gain a partner that supports it politically; Taiwan is also a technologically-advanced country that produces and exports high-value-added goods and innovative products. This cooperation could massively support the development of Ukraine’s technological sectors, and the modernization and automation of essential industries. For example, Taiwan is actively developing modern approaches in its agricultural sector. This field is important for the Ukrainian economy and has been severely affected by the hostilities. Therefore, its restoration with the help of modern solutions will benefit Ukraine.  

In turn, it would enable Taiwan to establish stable cooperation with one more European country. Opening a representative office of Ukraine in Taiwan and vice versa could be the first. Such actions do not violate the provisions of communiqué with the PRC and at the same time significantly facilitate a deepening of cooperation. 

Unfortunately, Ukrainian authorities are still reluctant to extend their cooperation with Taiwan. Last fall, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine created an inter-factional association to support friendship with Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Presidential Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still declare their desire to cooperate with the PRC. In Taiwan, they understand the danger of authoritarian regimes that want to occupy the territory of democratic states. Therefore, the struggle of Ukrainians is reflected by great support and respect at the state level and throughout civil society in Taiwan. Thus, Ukraine should reconsider its attitude towards this country. 

In March, one year passed since the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) came under Russian occupation and Rosatom began exerting control over it. Putin issued a decree declaring the ZNPP a "federal property”, with the registration of the corresponding company in Moscow under the name "Zaporizhzhia Station". Rosatom, a direct executor of Russian occupying policy, must face the same sanctions as Russian oil and gas companies. The recent gas and oil sanction packages proved their effectiveness. However, with regard to the nuclear energy sector, we observe no will to apply sanctions. The EU and G7 countries have not yet introduced sanctions against Rosatom and related companies.

ANALYSIS

Sanctioning the Russian nuclear corporation is more difficult than it seems. Some Western countries are not ready to take radical steps. At least three countries of the European Union - France, Hungary and Bulgaria – are blocking the introduction of sanctions against Rosatom. France is the biggest supporter of cooperation with Rosatom in the nuclear sphere. The loudest are the Hungarians who, when it comes to sanctions against Rosatom, cite issues of national security. Bulgaria has also raised concerns about the security of its nuclear fuel supply. Rosatom has realized that the risk of it being sanctioned is currently minimal. But Rosatom’s activities are not strictly related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Rosatom maintains Russia’s nuclear missiles arsenal on combat duty, which is being used by the Kremlin to threaten the world. Rosatom also imports components for Russian tanks and aircraft, taking advantage of the fact that no sanctions have been implemented against the company.  

Rosatom uses its strong market position. In a short term perspective it’s necessary to find an alternative supplier of fuel assembly. For decades, Rosatom has established itself deeply within global supply chains. The operations of reactors all over the world depend on Rosatom specialists, equipment and enriched uranium. The annual revenue of Rosatom from the export of fuel assembly, equipment and services in the last few years reached $9 billion. This is only 1.5% of the total exports from the Russian Federation, but this is enough to maintain a significant influence. In the EU a quarter of all electricity is produced in NPPs, and 18 out of 103 power units depend on Rosatom's fuel assembly. Three more reactors operate on Russian-French fuel. The total share of Rosatom on the global market is 17%.  

During their lifetime, nuclear reactors are tied to their manufacturers, who perform maintenance, supply fuel, provide equipment, and train personnel. Contracts for the provision of nuclear power plants last for decades. Nuclear technologies in the world have historically developed separately. The reactors differ from each other. Each reactor operates on a specific fuel. TVEL (Rosatom fuel company) have not only different types of uranium but also designs. Power units in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and two of the four in Finland operate on TVEL’s fuel assembly.  

Rosatom's influence goes far beyond the boundaries of NPPs in Europe. The company enriches uranium for other global corporations that produce their nuclear fuel for reactors around the world. On a global scale, Russians control 15% of raw uranium mining, over a third of its primary processing, and 46% of the world's uranium enrichment capacity. A quarter of the enriched uranium in the EU and the USA is of Russian origin.  Rosatom is the only company in the world that has enterprises that serially produced HALEU concentrated uranium for high-tech Western reactors. The Russian corporation owns a number of enterprises in the EU that supply equipment for reactors in various countries. In 2022, Rosatom began building two power units in the Hungarian city of Paks. The cost of the project is $11 billion, and Hungary has no intention of cancelling it. 

Rosatom has already faced some consequences of Russia's war against Ukraine - the Swedish company Vattenfall has refused to use Russian nuclear fuel. Rosatom also lost the opportunity to enter new western markets. This is most vividly illustrated by Finland's refusal to build the Khanhikivi-1 NPP, which would have been a 7-billion-euro project. 

The US company Westinghouse, which learned how to produce fuel assembly for reactors of Russian design, can help to decrease the dependence on Rosatom’s TVEL. However, such processes can take a long time, for instance, it took ten years for the Ukrainian "Energoatom" to switch its NPPs from Russian to American fuel. Moreover, Westinghouse's capacity is limited. Their expansion requires new tests, investments, and long-term contracts. 

Bulgaria's Kozloduy NPP, which produces 35% of the country's electricity, is the closest to abandoning Rosatom's fuel. In 2022, the management of the station signed ten-year fuel supply contracts with the American Westinghouse and the French Framatome. After years of testing, Bulgaria plans to switch to Western products in 2024 or 2025. The Czech Republic also plans to do the same. The Finnish company Fortum only recently started looking for another fuel producer, so it will not stop supplies from Russia, which are scheduled until 2030. Slovakia found itself in a similar situation. Hungary does not plan to give up Russian fuel at all; on the contrary, it is deepening its dependence on Rosatom. Significant stockpiles (up to two years) at nuclear power plants in these countries can speed up the abandonment of nuclear fuel from Russia. However, possible problems with American and French suppliers force insurance and continue cooperation with Russians. 

In addition to supplying fuel, the Russian state corporation provides reactor maintenance. Western companies already know how to perform some work at Soviet-made nuclear power plants, but a complete severance of ties with Rosatom is not feasible. It is quite possible to replace Russian products in the segment of primary processing of uranium (conversion). For example, in France, 83% of conversion capacities are idle, whereas in the US a specialized plant in Metropolis is awaiting restart. French and American capacities are able to replace the Russian conversion with a large margin. 

With the replacement of the next stage of fuel production - uranium enrichment, the situation is more complicated. According to a report by the Austrian Federal Environmental Protection Agency, Europe's uranium enrichment capacity should theoretically be enough to cover the needs of its reactors. However, Western countries cannot yet replace Russian HALEU (High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium) concentrated uranium, which is needed for small modular reactors (SRMs) and other next-generation developments. Western countries will be able to establish sufficient production of HALEU only in five to eight years. 

The situational ally of the Ukrainians in sanctioning Rosatom has become the European "greens". They pursue their own interest - banning any nuclear energy production. Greenpeace called to cease such cooperation with the Russians. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Ireland also spoke in favor of sanctions against Rosatom. None of these countries depend on the goods and services of Rosatom. Germany cautiously supported the sanctions. 

Decisions on sanctions will be adopted unanimously, so the decisive vote will be for countries that use nuclear energy and depend on cooperation with Russia. Hungary has traditionally declared that it will block all sanctions against the Russian Federation. France, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland and Bulgaria do not speak publicly about their position, but tough sanctions would be against their interests. The US is also in no hurry to make loud statements. 

If the countries agree to impose sanctions against Rosatom, they will probably include many exceptions. Currently, only Ukraine has imposed sanctions against Rosatom and related legal entities, and that happened only in February 2023. Three more legal entities have been identified for sanctions. Only Ukraine and Great Britain have introduced personal sanctions against Rosatom's leadership. The absence of any EU restrictive measures against Rosatom poses risks to the EU's nuclear security. No one can exclude the possibility that the "specialist" who takes over the Zaporizhzhia station today will come tomorrow to service the station in Slovakia or Bulgaria.  

This week, the Black Sea Grain Initiative which has enabled the export of Ukrainian grain via sea route was prolonged again, reportedly for four more months. Meanwhile, relations between Turkey and Russia are making waves. A recent development in Turkish-Russian cooperation in the region was the repeated postponement of the steps toward the gas transit hub, while the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) shows more concerning progress.

ANALYSIS

The gas transit hub plan was presented as a favor to Russia by Erdogan last autumn (we wrote about it here). The cooperation has now been paused due to the effects of the earthquake. Turkey voiced expectations that Moscow would finance the project, refusing to invest in it due to the economic situation. Now, Ankara expects Russia to make large financial flows to Turkey if it wants this project to come to life. Will Russia direct its resources to this project and try to sell its gas to Europe through Turkey? No agreement has been reached yet and the two countries seem to be negotiating on conditions. There is political will, but no financial resources on either side. Meanwhile, a new draft law on the regulation of the gas market was registered in the Turkish parliament that envisaged diversification of gas supply. Erdogan wishes to develop gas infrastructure in Turkey making it even more significant for the region. The Russian interest in the project is simply to sell gas to countries in Southeastern Europe through Turkish sellers. 

The problematic issue is not only Turkey's gas dependence on Russia and cooperation in this field but the nuclear field as well. Sanctions on Rosatom are reluctantly discussed by the West. And while the launch of the operation of the first reactor of the Akkuyu NPP on the south coast of Turkey is scheduled to be completed in 2023, Ankara and Moscow are already negotiating a second NPP on the Black Sea coast. The Akkuyu NPP project is based on a build-own-operate model, in which Russia is building, financing, and will operate the station. The entire board of Akkuyu Nuclear JSC consists of Russian nationals. Moscow plans to establish a radar system and possibly deploy long-range missiles near the plant. Located in Mersin province, on an area of 10 km2, the Akkuyu NPP will be a de-facto Russian base on the Mediterranean. The national security and environmental concerns of the opposition were not responded to. Russia reportedly transferred part of the total $20 billion of the Akkuyu NPP’s cost to Turkey in summer 2022, although the unofficial amounts are likely much higher. These amounts and income from increased trade with Russia definitely did stabilize the Turkish economy and saved Erdogan’s régime for the time being. On its side, Rosatom will continue getting more revenue from its activities around the globe instead of being punished for nuclear terrorism. 

Meanwhile, after long-term warnings from Western governments, a sudden stop in the supply of sanctioned goods to Russia via Turkey was reported by Russian media and confirmed by Turkish officials. The parallel import scheme has been a true problem since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Turkey quickly grabbed the possibility as did many European companies that have been selling their goods to Turkey and started to operate there. Turkey has been one of the key ways Russian citizens have been able to access global markets and destinations, enjoy banking and travel privileges without feeling the impact of sanctions that much, and moved assets and businesses. About 5.3 million Russians visited Turkey in 2022, and exports to Russia increased in 2022. Cooperation in trade, energy, and economy between the two countries is a reason why the Turkish government and elites enjoy this neutrality in foreign policy.  

The export of grains is one of the key factors that keep the Ukrainian economy, and global food security afloat. As the expiration of the prolonged grain deal approached (March 18), Russia reiterated its demands for privileges for the export of its own agricultural products and fertilizers, continuing its blackmail and threatening to sabotage the deal. Now, the extension is confirmed by the UN, but it did not provide details on the prolongation term, nor did Ankara.  

Oleksandr Kubrakov, Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine and Minister for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development, announced that the agreement (between Ukraine, Turkey, and the UN) was extended for another 120 days. Moscow claims it agreed to only 60 days with the sides if further Russian demands are not met. In November, upon the expiration of the first deal, Russia attempted to leave it. However, the functioning of the grain corridor continued, with Russia soon returning to the agreement. Since then, the average daily number of ships passing the corridor decreased twice due to Russian actions such as slowing down the checks and blocking the transit, to prevent the successful grain exports of Ukraine. Of course, for the global food market not just the transit of grain-carrying ships, but the ability of Ukrainian farmers to carry out a proper sowing campaign (demining of fields), the safety of Ukrainian ports, and the deoccupation of the south of Ukraine are all necessary. 

Meanwhile, a Russian ship carrying military equipment from Syria entered the Black Sea via the Bosphorus. According to the Montreux Convention on Turkish straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles), Ankara hasn’t been allowing the passage of military ships and military equipment through the straits for a year. This prevents Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea fleet, but military ships are allowed passage if they are returning to their home base in the Black Sea. However, there are no inspections conducted on civilian or merchant ships that carry weapons, military equipment, or fuel - a practice Russia has been utilizing. Ankara has the tools in the convention to prevent the passage of weapon-carrying merchant ships, but it lacks the political will to do so. 

Turkey looks at its Western partners when taking decisions to help Ukraine, most significantly - with weapons. Presidential and parliamentary elections will be held on May 14, right before the end of the grain deal according to the Russian promise to Turkey. Until then, Ankara is more focused on domestic politics. The opposition, if it comes to power, will strive to improve relations with the West, while continuing the anti-Western approach domestically, and a part of the main opposition party is pro-Russian. In either case, the cooperation between Ankara and Moscow will continue.   

Russia's current war against Ukraine demonstrated the readiness of the democratic world to unite in the fight for freedom and liberal values. However, there are democracies all over the world in need of protection against autocracies willing to challenge international order. One year from the start of full-scale invasion, we introduce you the report “War in Ukraine: Lessons identified and lessons learned“, which analyzes policies and practices that have impacted Ukraine’s resilience in key sectors. Outcomes of this research can be used as recommendations for other democracies building resilience against conventional, hybrid, or other threats (e.g., natural disasters), from Europe to the Pacific.

Thank you.

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