• Six incidents were recorded globally during the reporting period

• East Africa HRA and Indian Ocean: One incident was recorded during the reporting period

• West Africa HRA: Three incidents were recorded during the reporting period

• South and Southeast Asia: Two incidents were recorded during the reporting period

•  Americas: No incidents were recorded during the reporting period.

• East Africa: Threat of deep offshore piracy persists.

• Middle East: South Korea deploys anti-piracy unit to Strait of Hormuz.

• One incident was recorded during the reporting period.

• Continuous piracy threat off the Somali coast and extending to the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Oman. Actors involved in the ongoing conflict in Yemen have targeted vessels transiting the Bab-el-Mandeb Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS); increased vigilance is advised during daylight hours.

• High pressure dominates the weather pattern over the region producing mostly clear skies. Be aware of high winds from low intensity hurricanes forming within the Arabian Sea. Expect increased localised wind flow through the Strait of Hormuz due to funnelling effects.

1. 24/01/2020. 1330 UTC. SUSPICIOUS APPROACH. 06:39S - 049:21E. NYA. 239NM NE of Aldabra,Seychelles. Whilst underway, a MV sighted a suspicious fishing vessel. The fishing vessel followed the MV on a parallel course for approximately four hours before turning off its AIS and lights and reducing its speed. Two speedboats were then launched, approaching the MV within a distance of 5NM. The MV activated its security measures and the speedboats retreated. Vessel and crew reported safe.

• Three incidents were recorded during the reporting period
• Continuous threat off Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana in addition to the coastlines of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

1. 25/01/2020. 0050 UTC. CRIMINAL BOARDING. 06:16:6N – 003:19E. NYA. Lagos SAA, Nigeria. One unidentified perpetrator boarded an anchored tanker vessel. The vessel’s ISPS watchman spotted the intruder on the bridge and raised the alarm. The perpetrator was alerted to the alarm and fled the tanker via a waiting canoe. A Nigerian security vessel was dispatched to the scene to conduct a search for the perpetrator. No vessel properties were reported stolen.

2. 21/01/2020. 0836 UTC. ATTACK. 04:04:02N - 005:47:6E. MDAT-GoG/NYA. 27NM W of Brass Terminal, Nigeria. A container vessel was attacked by a group of 15 armed pirates on board a black speedboat with a white flag. The crew raised the alarm and engaged anti-piracy measures. The vessel’s onboard AST opened fire on the attackers, causing the pirates to retreat. Non-essential crewmembers retreated to the vessel's citadel during the AST engagement. All crewmembers were reported safe and the vessel continued its transit towards Port Harcourt.

3. 20/01/2020. 2300 UTC. ATTACK. 05:30:00N - 003:40:60E. MDAT-GoG/NYA. 57NM S of Lagos, Nigeria. A group of five to six pirates on board a skiff attempted to board a tanker vessel underway from Port Harcourt to Lagos. The crew raised the alarm and began anti-piracy manoeuvres, increasing the speed of the tanker. The pirates attempted to board the vessel with a ladder but were unable to. The tanker continued towards Lagos at high speed and the pirates disengaged.

• There were two incidents recorded during the reporting period.

• Criminal boardings and boardings remain the primary threat to the region. However, the threat from Extended Duration Cargo Theft (EDCT) is present across the Malacca Strait and South China Sea

• Expect strong gusts in and around scattered thunderstorms throughout the Malacca Strait and the Andaman Sea due to funnelling effects and daytime heating.

1. 22/01/2020. 0001 UTC. CRIMINAL BOARDING. 03:42:06S- 114:25:02E. ICC-IMB. Taboneo Anchorage, Indonesia. The duty crew on board an anchored bulk carrier noticed that a lock on the vessel’s bosun store had been broken and that an undisclosed quantity of vessel properties habeen stolen. The theft was reported to the Taboneo Port Authority and Indonesian Maritime Police.

2. 20/01/2020. 2044 UTC. CRIMINAL BOARDING. 01:03:42N- 104:04:6E. NYA. Kabil, Batam,Indonesia. A group of four perpetrators boarded a tanker vessel. The vessel’s crew intervened andconfronted the assailants, arresting one. The three other assailants managed to escape. Onecrewmember was injured during the confrontation.Crewmembers alerted coastal police to theincident via VHF Ch.16. Location approximate.

On 24 January a MV underway sighted a suspicious fishing vessel located 293NM NE of Aldabra,Seychelles. The  fishing vessel followed the MV on a parallel course for approximately four hours before turning off its AIS, lights and reducing its speed. Soon after, two speedboats were launched from the fishing vessel and approached the MV within a distance of 5NM. The MV activated its security measures and the speedboats retreated. This incident marks the first of its kind deep offshore East Africa (EA) since 3 May 2019.

NYA Analysis:

According to NYA MarTrackTM data, a total of eight piracy incidents have been recorded deep offshore EA over the last 12 months consisting of five suspicious approaches, one pirate action group (PAG) sighting and two attacks. Reported at distances between 145NM and 415NM from shore, each of these incidents were likely orchestrated and launched from larger mother vessels that have increased capabilities to navigate significant sea swells and within deeper waters. While piracy rates in the EA HRA peaked in 2011 due to the presence of Somalia-based PAGs, the region’s maritime security environment has improved considerably over the last nine years leading to a significant and  sustained  decline decline in piracy related incidents. Due largely to international counter-piracy efforts directed under EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA, regional incidents decreased in each of the past three years - 2017 (76 incidents), 2018 (27 incidents) and 2019 (15 incidents). Despite this 80% reduction, the 24 January suspicious approach report highlights a persistent threat to vessels transiting EA waters.

On 21 January the South Korean Ministry of National Defence (MND) announced that it would temporarily expand and the operational remit of its Cheonghae anti-piracy unit from the Gulf of Aden to include the Strait Of Hormuz. The move comes amid ongoing efforts by the US to secure naval support from its allies in protecting oil tankers transiting the strait, following the significant escalation in US-Iran tensions in early January. However, the Cheonghae unit will not be joining the US-led International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) and will instead cooperate with the IMSC while remaining nominally independent.

NYA Analysis:

Despite its historical role as a prominent US ally, South Korea had, prior to this stage, refrained from direct engagement in the Strait of Hormuz due to domestic hostility towards further military contributions to US operations. The Cheonghae anti-piracy unit, initially deployed to the Gulf of Aden in 2009, will expand its patrol range by 251% from 1,130km to 3,966km by including the Persian Gulf in its operations. The remit’s expansion serves as a means for the MND to contribute to maritime security efforts within the Strait of Hormuz without requiring pproval from the South Korean parliament, which it would be unlikely to secure due to domestic hostility to further military deployments. However,  despite domestic criticism of Cheonghae’s operational expansion the unit is likely to remain in place over the medium term, as over 70% of South Korea’s oil imports transit through the Strait. Consequently, the redeployment of the Cheonghae unit is likely to represent the sole involvement of South Korean naval forces in the Strait of Hormuz in the medium term.

The report’s findings are predictive and estimative. To communicate these findings clearly and in order to accurately compare threat levels, the report uses a variation of terminology used by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

Piracy: CV/NYA uses a modified version of the definition of piracy adopted by BMP5. For the purposes of this report, the term ‘piracy’ includes all violent and non-violent acts against vessels, her crew and cargo occurring either in internal waterways, territorial waters or deep offshore. Based on this definition, CV/NYA classifies piracy incidents into six categories: 
Hijacking – Crew lost control of the vessel and / or pirates kidnapped at least one crewmember and / or passenger (s)
Boarding – Pirates successfully board a vessel with the intent to hijack it but their attempt to take control of the vessel or kidnap crewmember(s) and / or passenger(s) failed
Attack – Vessel was attacked with gunfire or RPG fire, no boarding was successfully completed
Pirate Action Group (PAG) – Sighting or reporting of firearms and boarding equipment on board a suspicious vessel or sighting of a confirmed pirate mother ship
Criminal boarding – Vessel boarded with criminal intent, theft does not have to occur
Suspicious approach – Suspicious activity reported (i.e. a vessel was approached by unidentified skiff(s) with one or more persons on board).

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