Underpinning the idea that the United States and China have incentives to decrease geopolitical risk and bilateral tensions are the 2024 U.S. elections and the Chinese economy. While the elections are just under 1 year away, the Chinese economy is beginning to reflect the government stimulus that has been rolled out piecemeal over the last year. Estimates for 2023 growth are now firmly around 5-5.5%, largely on the back of consumer spending, as real estate and global trade continue to suffer. The domestic market has struggled, leading many Chinese to not feel the better-than-expected growth numbers. Policymakers are hoping that private sector and foreign investment will rebound following the bilateral U.S.-China meeting just weeks ago and President Xi’s promises to maintain a more open business environment.
That said, portions of the Chinese economy continue to struggle—most notably the property sector and industries connected to it. Just this weekend, Chinese regulators opened an investigation into Zhongzhi and its investment subsidiary, Zhongrong—both of which are part of the country’s shadow-banking sector and both of which have missed payments this year. In an investor letter last week, Zhongzhi indicated that it has over $35 billion more in liabilities than assets at present. The government is also rolling out plans to help the real estate sector, including by increasing credit to developers, but it will take time to impact the economy.
The Taiwan election next year will offer increased geopolitical risk as well, as it becomes clear that the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has a good chance of winning in January. This is in large part due to the failure of the 2 opposition parties to coalesce around a joint ticket. During a press conference, Kuomintang’s Hou Yu-ih and the Taiwan People’s Party’s Ko Wen-je had a public argument that led to both men filing separate presidential bids. The collapse of the pro-China ticket gives the DPP candidate, Vice President Lai Ching-te, a better chance for the Presidency. A Lai presidency would likely be pro-U.S., following the precedent set by current President Tsai Ing-wen and with Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s former envoy to the US, tapped as the running mate. This increases the chances that China responds antagonistically in the lead-up to, and following, the election. Incentives for cooperative behavior remain and will continue indefinitely, but irritants like the Taiwan election will pose challenges to the relationship.
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