ISSUE 7
25. 07. - 07. 08. 2022
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- Massacre of Ukrainian Prisoners of War in Olenivka
- Amnesty International Controversy
- So-called “Referendums on joining the Russian Federation” in newly occupied territories
- The situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP
- Will Ukraine restore its position in the agricultural market after the war?
- Key Developments of Ukraine’s European Integration
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MASSACRE OF UKRAINIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN OLENIVKA |
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On 29 July, Russia and the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic claimed that Ukraine’s military (AFU) used US-supplied multiple rocket launching systems (HIMARS) to strike the prison facility in Olenivka, a settlement in the territory of Donetsk region controlled by Russian-backed separatists. According to separatists, the attack killed 53 Ukrainian Prisoners of War (POWs) and wounded another 75, most of whom were captured during the battle for Mariupol and are known as defenders of Azovstal (Azov Steel Plant).
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The AFU immediately denied carrying out any rocket or artillery strikes at or around Olenivka. The released video and photo materials from the scene also raised doubts among the international community that the HIMARs were used. Experts noted visible signs of an intense fire, which is at odds with damage caused by the most common HIMARS warhead. The destruction of the barracks could have been caused by the inside mining and following use of the thermobaric weapons, Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) claimed. The UN is setting up a fact-finding mission to investigate the killing, but so far it has limited access of to the site. The International Red Cross Committee (ICRC) has also neither been granted access to the POWs affected by the attack nor been provided with security guarantees to carry out this visit. Therefore, any collection of evidence or fact-finding missions will be too delayed, allowing the separatists to fabricate the case. According to the recent findings of HUR, the aim of this massacre conducted by the Russian military was to disrupt the supply of weapons to Ukraine, as well as to emotionally destabilize Ukrainian society. Before being killed, POWs had been interrogated and tortured. This, as well as released videos of torturing Ukrainian POWs the days before, prompted Ukrainian leadership to raise questions about the role of international organizations such as the ICRC, which allegedly guaranteed the safety of the POWs when negotiating the deal with Russia at the last stage of the Mariupol battle. ICRC immediately denied providing any guarantees, stating that the ICRC facilitated the safe passage of combatants out of the Azovstal plant, and this was done on the understanding that the ICRC would later be allowed to visit these POWs. But this access to many such facilities located in the Russian-controlled territory, including Olenivka, has not yet been granted.
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AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSY |
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Amnesty International Human Rights Group (AI) released a report on 4 August claiming that the Ukrainian army (AFU) is endangering the life of civilians by deploying themselves in residential areas. According to AI, AFU were using schools and hospitals as bases, firing near houses and sometimes living in residential flats. The report concluded that this meant in some instances the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) would respond to an attack from such places and eventually target residential areas – putting civilians at risk and damaging civilian infrastructure. The head of AI Ukraine’s office, Oksana Pokalchuk, wrote on Facebook that her office disagreed with the report, stating that the report was based on incomplete evidence compiled by foreign colleagues and lacked official comments from the Ukrainian authorities. Later she announced her resignation due to “contradictions in values”. Ukrainian officials, including President Zelenskyy and Foreign Minister Kuleba, also slammed AI for “creating a false balance between the criminal and the victim”. In response to widespread criticism, including by prominent Western analytics and international lawyers and diplomats, AI stated that it regretted the distress and anger caused by the report, but it had demonstrated its solidarity with Ukraine by “interviewing hundreds of Ukrainian victims whose stories illuminate the brutal reality of Russia’s war of aggression”.
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The situation around AI’s report, as well as previous controversy with the role of the ICRC in guaranteeing the security of Ukrainian POWs, contributes to the widespread pattern of the unpreparedness of international organizations to act accordingly in times of military aggression by the state, which is part of the UN Security Council. Ukraine has been advocating for the reshape of the UN since 2013, so far without success. The position of the UN, ICRC, and even OSCE during the Russia-Ukraine war, raised questions about their effectiveness in responding to the security challenges of such scale, as well as about their mandates and methodologies used in approaching such conflicts. Many Ukrainian experts share the belief of alleged infiltration by the Russian Special Services into the international human rights groups, which cause the biased perspectives. In general, the trust towards such international organizations in Ukrainian society has significantly decreased, and this trend continues.
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SO-CALLED "REFERENDUMS ON JOINING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION" IN NEWLY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES |
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Information about the preparation of a so-called “referendum” by the Russians in the newly occupied territory of Ukraine (de facto annexation) first appeared at the beginning of March. In May, ballot papers were even printed in the print houses of Nova Kakhovka. However, they were not used. This was due to the lack of support for the idea of “joining Russia” among the local population. Currently, Russians said that a “referendum” can be held in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions on 11 September (the so-called “single voting day in the Russian Federation”). But even this date is not final.
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Why hold a referendum at all? The logic is simple. It is impossible to fully monitor the course of such a “plebiscite” under conditions of occupation and the absence of international observers. Therefore, its results can be considered falsified in advance. At the same time, according to the laws of the Russian Federation, if the residents of a certain territory speak out in favor of joining the Russian Federation, it means that they will be a part of the Russian Federation with all the rights of a new “subject of the Federation”. This is important for future developments, as if/when the AFU liberates the occupied (and annexed) regions, the Kremlin may claim it has the right to defend them as a legitimate “territory of Russian Federation”.
Such a “referendum” was held in Crimea in 2014, which resulted in Russia recognising Crimea as a new subject of the Russian Federation. This completely contradicted the Constitution of Ukraine, which forbids resolving issues of territorial integrity by means of a local referendum.
According to Russian media reports, these “referendums” were planned to be held after the complete capture by Russia of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Currently, Russian troops already control a large part of these territories, but full control has not yet been achieved.
The prospects for holding “referendums” in the temporarily occupied territories completely depend on the security situation in general. Ihor Zhovkva, deputy head of President Zelenskyy’s Office, believes that the messages regarding the holding of “referendums” are aimed mainly at a domestic Russian audience.
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THE SITUATION AT THE ZAPORIZHZHIA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT |
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On 6 August, the Russian occupiers once again fired rockets at the site of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which is the largest in Europe, and the city of Enerhodar (Zaporizhzhia region). They hit directly next to the spent nuclear fuel storage. Enerhoatom, the operator of Ukrainian NPPs, believes that they targeted containers with spent nuclear fuel, which are stored in the open air next to the firing sites (174 containers). As a result of rocket fire, three radiation monitoring sensors around the site were damaged. Because of this, timely detection and response in case of deterioration of the radiation situation is currently impossible. Also, 800 square meters of window surfaces in the station buildings were damaged, and station staff were injured. All the Russian military personal (about 500 people), as well as the staff of the Russian Rosatom, who have been at the ZNPP since its capture in March, hid in advance in the plant’s bunkers. Ukrainians working at the ZNPP were not allowed by the Russians to seek shelter in the bunkers. Instead, employees of the ZNPP were trying to mitigate the consequences of the attack (in conditions of high danger).
On 5 August, during the shelling, the Russians hit the high-voltage line of the 330 kV autotransformer of the ZNPP. Several other hits were recorded on the ZNPP site, near one of the power units where the nuclear reactor is located, also damaging the nitrogen-oxygen station and the auxiliary building.
Earlier, the Russians brought weapons and explosives to the ZNPP. According to a representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR), the Russians mined the gas, electricity and water supply systems. The occupiers also placed military equipment including weapons and explosives in the machine rooms of two power units of two nuclear reactors, and also mined the coastline of the ZNPP along the line of the cooling pond and the adjacent shore of the Kakhovka reservoir.
The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, said that the threat to the ZNPP justifies sanctions against the entire Russian nuclear industry, and Zelenskyy’s adviser accused Russia of “dangerous provocations”, calling on the IAEA and the UN to demand that control over the NPP be transferred to a special commission.
The Russian media and authorities wrote that the shelling has being carried out by the Ukrainian side. However, military experts agree that it is Russia’s actions that pose the threat. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said that the shelling of the ZNPP indicates a real risk of a nuclear disaster. The European Union condemned Russia’s actions.
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We wrote two months ago about the significance of the ZNPP. The main purpose of the seizure of the ZNPP by the Russians is to disconnect it from the Ukrainian energy system and connect it to the Russian energy system in order to supply electricity to the Russian-occupied territories of southern Ukraine, and Crimea in particular. Currently, the energy system of Ukraine is synchronized with the European one, and switching is a complex process that requires a lot of time.
The artillery shelling of the ZNPP is aimed at destroying the station’s infrastructure, damaging the power lines through which electricity is supplied to the energy system of Ukraine, and cutting off electricity in the south of the country. Therefore, the Russian military aimed and hit transformers and high-voltage lines. Representatives of Rosatom, who are at the station, coordinate a special program to disconnect the ZNPP from the Ukrainian energy system. The Russians now consider the ZNPP theirs, have transferred it to control of Rosatom, and are preparing to fully switch the ZNPP to a single electricity network of Russia.
The Russians are apparently mining the station and “filling” it with weapons and explosives before the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). This is a traditional tactic of the Russians - to shoot from critical infrastructure objects, thus depriving the AFU of the opportunity to shoot back. The occupiers are trying to do everything possible so that the AFU hit back, which would be the cause of international condemnation or a nuclear incident.
The Russian Armed Forces (RAF) are shelling Nikopol, Marhanets and other Ukrainian cities from the territory of the ZNPP in Enerhodar. The location can be called a “safe zone” for the RAF, and they have no plans to abandon it. It will be very difficult for the Ukrainian military to drive them out without risking the above mentioned consequences. The RAF have switched to a new scenario - destruction, which creates a high threat of a nuclear and radiation incident at the ZNPP. According to some military experts, the most effective tactic of the AFU in neutralizing the RAF stationed at the ZNPP would be to cut off and surround Enerhodar. Such a threat could force the Russian troops to retreat from the city itself. Enerhodar is located in a small “pocket” near the Dnipro River, with the city located on a ledge. If Ukrainian troops advance on occupied Melitopol, then Enerhodar will be on the right. The grouping of Russian troops in Enerhodar will either be forced to leave or be surrounded. But in that case, the actions of the Kremlin command may be even more unpredictable and risky.
Russia is obviously turning the ZNPP into a military base for nuclear terror. This can only be prevented by the decisive and coordinated actions of security organizations, in particular the UN, IAEA and WANO, as well as constant pressure on Russia from the international community to withdraw the military from the largest nuclear facility in Europe and its complete demilitarization. It is necessary to restore the status of the ZNPP as a peaceful civilian object, which it was before the Russian invasion. Only this will now guarantee the safety of the ZNPP and prevent a global nuclear and radiation catastrophe.
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WILL UKRAINE RESTORE ITS POSITION IN THE AGRICULTURAL MARKET AFTER THE WAR? |
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Before the war, Ukraine supplied 46% of sunflower oil exports, 9% of wheat exports, 17% of barley exports, and 12% of corn exports to global markets. Currently, about 22% of all Ukrainian agricultural land is occupied by Russians. In addition, evidence is increasingly appearing that the occupiers are purposefully destroying the country’s agro-industry. The Russians are shelling silos and agricultural enterprises, carrying out mass animal killings on farms and burning fields. Kherson police have already opened criminal proceedings regarding the destruction of crops by Russian troops.
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Currently, there are relatively optimistic forecasts for this year’s harvest. By the end of 2022, farmers are expected to harvest about 70 million tons of grain and oil crops. This is more than 66% of 2021 harvest, which was very good year for Ukrainian farmers. This figure may change because active fighting and shelling continue in the south and east of the country.
Even after the partial restoration of export sea routes, it is still impossible to transport pre-war quantities of agricultural (and other) products from Ukraine. As a result, many farmers will not be able to sell their produce, leading to financial losses and crop spoilage. Small farms feel the most significant impact of the war, as unlike large agricultural holdings, they do not have any financial reserves. In addition, small enterprises are primarily localized in one area. If hostilities occur on their territory, they cannot relocate their business to a safer location and are forced to cease their work.
Problems with exports, lost or filled capacity for grain storage from the previous harvest, and a drop in purchase prices for agricultural products pose significant risks to the financial condition of agricultural producers and, accordingly, for next year’s season.
The state is developing support programs for enterprises in the agricultural sector, with the government already extending the “5-7-9% Available Loans” program to provide financial support for planting. As part of this program, the state compensates entrepreneurs for part of the loan burden. As of the beginning of August, among all enterprises that receive such loans, more than half belong to the field of agriculture.
Another operational program, “eRobota”, provides grants for entrepreneurs, in particular from the agricultural sector, for the development or start-up of enterprises. The state also supports the development of livestock farming and the processing of agricultural products for both large enterprises and small-scale farmers.
Complete restoration of Ukraine’s agro-industrial complex and export capacities will not be possible until the war ends. However, supporting such enterprises will help maintain the domestic consumer market and create new jobs. This year, the decline in agriculture will lead to a reduction in GDP of about 3%. In addition to state aid, the complete recovery of agricultural business will require an additional $9 billion in external funding. Even with the necessary financial support and the war’s end, the harvest volume will increase only by 11-12% each year in the following years and remain lower than the pre-war level. Compensation for the losses suffered by farmers (land damage, stolen equipment, destroyed elevators, etc.) will take place gradually, and the full demining of the territories where hostilities took place will take years.
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION |
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On the eve of the meeting of the EU-Ukraine Association Council, the European Commission published its annual Report on the implementation of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union (AA). The document describes the implementation of reforms in 2021 (before the full-scaled Russian invasion). In general, the EU positively assessed the implementation of the AA. In particular, Ukraine has made the most significant progress in digital transformation and energy security. However, despite this positive dynamic, European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi noted that in the future, Ukraine will need to focus on reforms in the field of justice, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and fundamental rights.
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A month and a half have passed since Ukraine (and Moldova) were granted EU candidate status. Kyiv received seven recommendations from the European Commission, the implementation of which would make it possible to progress to membership negotiations. Brussels’ rhetoric is clear and unchanging – anti-corruption and judicial reform must work.
Ukraine is demonstrating considerable activity to fulfil its European partners’ requests. Finally, the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office was appointed. A competition commission for the selection of members of the High Council of Justice was created. The decision of the National Security and Defense Council on the creation of a register of oligarchs was put into force. Work on the draft law on media was completed and a bill on national minorities was also prepared.
Kyiv’s efficiency and progress can be explained by the government’s desire to complete the “homework” by the end of this year. The pace chosen by Kyiv in fulfilling the “European integration” tasks is a positive signal. However, the stated goal (end of 2022) remains ambitious and overly optimistic. Even if the necessary laws are ready now, their consideration, amendment, and adoption by the parliament could take months. For example, the draft law on minorities is currently at risk of being included in the legislative plan for 2023, because it requires the Venice Commission’s approval which means additional time.
The reason for the accelerated movement of Ukraine on the European integration track is the war and high public support for joining the EU. In the context of the struggle for statehood, Ukrainians want to see rapid progress towards the European dream in order to be as far away from the “Russian World” as possible. If, for Kyiv, Russian aggression is a motivating factor, it is a deterrent for Brussels. Even if Ukraine complies with all seven recommendations of the European Commission, the membership negotiation process is unlikely to begin during the war. The EU cannot negotiate the accession of a country governed under martial law. Therefore, the unpredictable situation at the frontline will also affect European integration. Nevertheless, Ukraine will continue to implement systemic reforms, and this autumn will be the time of adoption and implementation of dozens of European integration laws.
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CZK: Transparent account
AN: 2300405420/2010
VS: 2022
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