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Alleged Russian jamming of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) is nothing new. Deliberate disruption of GNSS Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) signals came to light from 2015. That year, Russia deployed her forces to help shore up the embattled dictator Bashir al-Assad as Syria descended into civil war. Interference to PNT signals had been noted in the locale around Russia’s military deployment to Khmeimim airbase in northern Syria. Russian forces there appear to have deployed GNSS jammers as force protection assets. Surrounding the base with PNT jamming hampers any GNSS-guided weapons aimed at the base. The jamming may also help prevent Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) flying near the deployment. UAVs often use GNSS PNT signals to aid their navigation.
April saw an apparent uptick in reports of GNSS jamming in the Baltic. This is not new. The area has witnessed GNSS disruption which is thought to come from Russia’s Baltic Kaliningrad exclave. Once again, force protection appears to be the motivation. The Russian military is emphatic that strategic and military targets in Kaliningrad must be protected against GNSS-guided weapons and UAVs. This need has arguably intensified since Ukraine began striking targets inside Russian with UAVs. A second jammer has been traced by jamming experts to be in an area between the Russo-Estonian border and Russia’s northwestern city of St. Petersburg. In late April, the severity of the jamming caused Finnair to cancel flights between the Estonian city of Tartu, in the southeast of the country, and Helsinki.
That Russia wants to protect strategic and military targets against attack is understandable but becomes irresponsible when this protection could threaten civil aviation safety. So far, the jamming has caused some disruption and nuisance. Thankfully, airliners are not only reliant on GNSS for navigation. That Finnair cancelled services because of Russia’s actions indicates these are a cause for concern from a safety perspective. If, heavens forbid, Russia’s GNSS jamming cause a disaster this could potentially plunge an already strained Moscow-NATO relationship to new depths.
NATO, and the international community, must make clear to Russia that this irresponsible PNT signal jamming must stop immediately. Should it continue, and should the worst happen, Moscow must be under no illusion that this would warrant a response which could take several forms: For example, a devastating cyberattack may be able to put these powerful Tobol GNSS jammers out of action. Mr. Putin must also be under no illusions that the response could include conventional kinetic strikes against the jammers should this be deemed necessary.
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