UKRAINE WATCH BRIEFING #2 |
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This newsletter was prepared by Ukrainian experts working at Information Defense Hub in Prague.
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- Russian war in Ukraine
- Ukraine efficiently uses new weapons provided by international partners
- Fuel shortage in Ukraine
- War crimes in Ukraine and a special tribunal for Putin’s regime
- Orthodox Church
- Culture and war
- Russia is losing its export potential in the arms market
- Russia-driven military pact celebrates 30th anniversary and questions internal unity
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The Russian Armed Forces (RAF) continues its offensive in eastern Ukraine. As of today, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) control about 40% of the administrative part of Donetsk region and 10% of Luhansk. According to the head of the Military-Civil Administration of Luhansk Region Serhiy Haidai, the cities of Popasna and Rubizhne have already been completely destroyed, and the enemy seeks to “turn Severodonetsk into the second Mariupol.” All critical infrastructure in Severodonetsk has been destroyed, and the bodies of killed civilians cannot be removed from the streets due to constant shelling. With the onset of warmer weather, it threatens a humanitarian catastrophe.
This has already happened in Mariupol. According to the mayor’s adviser Petro Andryushchenko, the occupiers tried to restore water supply to the houses, but because they did so unskilled and the communication system was significantly disrupted, the water washed away temporary graves in homes, playgrounds and parks. It was there that the people who died under the shelling were buried. At present, the remains of their bodies - even without special packages - have been taken to one of the city's shopping centres.
According to the General Staff of AFU, as of Monday morning, 30 May, the RAF is transferring equipment and preparing for the offensive in the area of Slovyansk, Izyum and Lyman. All three cities in the Donetsk region are important for controlling the route leading directly to Kharkiv. They also have important railway junctions which, if the operation is successful, will provide logistical support to the RAF from the rear.
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The short-term goal of the RAF is to capture the city of Severodonetsk and to reach the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. If achieved, this would boost RAF morale following heavy losses during the first phase of the war. In this context, we expect new attempts to return to a negotiation table. The first signals are already there. According to Presidential Spokesman Sergii Nykyforov, Volodymyr Zelenskyy may agree to tripartite talks with the Presidents of Turkey and Russia, “if Vladimir Putin is ready to take part in them”.
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UKRAINE EFFICIENTLY USES NEW WEAPONS PROVIDED BY THE PARTNERS |
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On 28 May, the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported on a new episode of combat involving the 155mm CAESAR self-propelled artillery units. A group of three CAESAR SPGs efficiently destroyed two Russian tanks, two BMDs and one ammo truck. Ukrainian servicemen reportedly mastered the new system within a few hours of training. According to the Defence Minister of Ukraine Oleksii Reznikov, three types of 155mm artillery are already working successfully on the front lines: M777 howitzers, FH70 howitzers and CAESAR SPHs. Ukraine has also received M109 SPHs in one of its modifications, which was supplied following cooperation between several countries. The same approach of cooperation between Denmark and Great Britain was used to equip Ukraine with Harpoon missiles, critically needed to repel Russian attacks from the Black Sea.
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Acquisition of the NATO-type weapons and equipment by Ukraine is a result of the work of the good will coalition of the more than 40 partners established on 26 April, 2022 at Rammstein Air Base. On 23 May, an online meeting of the Rammstein group was held to discuss the timing, transition and coordination of the supplies, and it was announced that more than 20 states will be supporting Ukraine with weapons and munitions. Amongst the urgent needs of Ukraine remain multiple launch rocket systems with a firing range of over one hundred kilometres. They may change the worrisome dynamic on the battlefield in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where Ukrainian Armed Force is gradually retreating with heavy losses. In the near future, escalation is expected in the Southern part of Ukraine, where Ukrainian defenders are countering Russian attempts to extend the occupied territories, making the supplies of such systems even more critical. The latest reports indicate that the provision of these systems by the USA is very likely. Another urgent need of Ukraine is air defence capability. Russia in three months has used 2,400 different-type missiles against Ukraine targeting civil infrastructure facilities, enterprises, warehouses (storing food), residential houses and railway infrastructure.
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There has been a shortage of fuel for cars (petrol and diesel) in Ukraine for almost a month now. Most gas stations are closed, some have long queues, there are restrictions of 10 to 20 litres per car, and prices have doubled (from 1 to 2 euros per litre). The import of fuel to Ukraine before the war exceeded 80% (more than 60% from Russia and Belarus, 10% from Lithuania by sea, and 10% from other countries). The rest was provided domestically. Kremenchuk refinery (18% of production) was bombed by Russian forces three times. Shebelinsky and Lysychansk refineries (2%), as well as oil depots, are malfunctional as a result of Russian shelling. These damages plus a rapid return of Ukrainians to their homes and seasonal works in the agricultural sector have been the main causes of fuel shortage in Ukraine. Another factor causing the deficit was the government's restriction of marginal fuel prices (cancelled only on 17 May).
Last week, the Ukrainian government decided to change the order of purchases of fuel under martial law, making the state-owned JSC Ukrzaliznytsia a customer that will buy oil products under foreign economic agreements. These oil products will be aimed at the primary needs of the state and to increase the state reserve.
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The current fuel shortage could have been easily predicted from day one of the Russian invasion. Overdependence on deliveries from Belarus and the lack of diversification of suppliers inevitably accelerated the crisis. Incentives for market operators that were introduced (reduction of excise duty and VAT on fuel) proved insufficient. Moreover, Ukraine failed to create strategic petroleum reserves (as stated in the Association Agreement with the EU). It is difficult to find new suppliers and quickly establish a new logistics of supply from Europe, especially now when EU is dealing with its own fuel crisis. Europe is not ready to supply the necessary volumes of fuel to Ukraine. For illustration - before the war, Ukraine consumed one million tons of diesel, gasoline and liquefied gas per month.
Ukraine is now building a new infrastructure of oil supplies. Deliveries are slowly growing. Approximately 350-420 thousand tons of fuel are expected by the end of May. The most promising solution is an import of diesel fuel through the existing pipeline from Hungary (reverse supply), and a launch of a “green lane” for fuel trucks on the Ukrainian – Polish border.
Fuel shortage negatively affects Ukrainian farmers. Currently there is no fuel for agricultural machinery. The fuel crisis must be resolved by July since it is the beginning of the main harvest period. The optimistic forecast suggests the situation for consumers will improve in early June, while the pessimistic forecast predicts that it will take two months.
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WAR CRIMES IN UKRAINE AND A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR PUTIN'S REGIME |
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On 23 May, a Ukrainian court sentenced a captive Russian soldier, Vadim Shishimarin, to life imprisonment for killing a Ukrainian civilian. This is the first verdict in the case of war crimes committed by Russian military personnel in Ukraine. According to the Prosecutor General of Ukraine Iryna Venediktova, as of 23 May, approximately 13,000 cases of possible war crimes of the Russian Federation are being investigated. Ukrainian officials have a list of around 600 suspects thought to have engaged in war crimes. Two cases involving three individuals are already being heard by the courts.
Ukraine has significant international political support: two PACE resolutions, a resolution of the Parliament of Republic of Lithuania, and a resolution of the European Parliament. The EU, the United States and the United Kingdom recently announced the creation of a group to coordinate efforts to bring the crimes committed during Russia's war against Ukraine to justice. Also, 42 countries supported Ukraine in the case against Russia in the UN International Court of Justice.
Also, on 26 May an independent legal analysis was presented by The New Lines Institute and Raoul Wallenberg Centre, which concluded that there is undoubtedly a very serious risk of the genocide of Ukrainians by the Russian state, triggering the states’ duty to prevent such a scenario under Article I of the Genocide Convention. This legal analysis may also be used in support of Ukraine’s case in international courts.
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Russia’s aggression is considered a gross violation of international law which has led to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Ukraine. Ukraine is seeking the legal accountability of Russia by the UN International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ICC has already launched an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine. However, due to legal restrictions, the ICC in the Hague cannot deal with the crime of aggression. Ukrainian national courts can also open criminal proceedings against Russian military personnel, but cannot initiate a case against the Russian president, the head of government or foreign minister given their personal official immunity.
Thus, a possible solution could be a new body - an international military tribunal, which would have the jurisdiction to prosecute the crime of aggression of high-ranking officials of Russia and its military administration – much like the Nuremberg (1945-1947) and Tokyo (1946-1948) trials. The trials in the ICC and in the future special tribunal, being complementary, do not contradict or conflict with each other. Ukraine has already prepared projects to launch an international tribunal over Russia. The Office of the President of Ukraine expects that an international tribunal will be established by the end of the summer. The special tribunal may potentially play a historic role in international criminal law.
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On 27 May, the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine (UOC-MP) took place, which has already been called historic and at which a number of important decisions were made. The main one is the declaration of independence from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the complete severance of relations with it.
Why did this happen? With the beginning of large-scale aggression, the number of transfers from the UOC-MP in Ukraine to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) has increased significantly. Ordinary priests no longer wanted to have contact with the aggressor state. If in the last three and a half years (since the founding of the OCU) it was 700 parishes, in the last three months more than 300 have been added. It was necessary to somehow slow down the process. At the end of 2018, the Parliament of Ukraine passed a law that imposed a number of restrictions on the church, the center of which is located in the aggressor state. Currently, several more bills have been submitted, which could result in the UOC-MP being deprived of the right to occupy the Lavras (three in Ukraine - Kyiv-Pechersk, Svyatohirsk - in Donetsk region and Pochaiv in Western Ukraine). It was important for the UOC-MP to avoid this.
At the Council, absolutely all the items that connected it with the ROC were removed from the statute of the UOC-MP. The head of the UOC-MP, Metropolitan Onufriy, personally prepared the amendments. For the pro-Russian bishops of the UOC-MP, these amendments came as a surprise. According to the amendments, the UOC-MP becomes a self-governing church. In fact, it was like that in the past when in 1990, the ROC gave Ukraine a charter of self-government and broad rights. The UOC-MP appoints its own bishops, does not pay taxes to Moscow, and is not aligned with the Russian domestic policy. That is, in terms of formal status, nothing much has changed. Rather, it is a matter of reducing political ties. The UOC-MP does not and cannot acquire the status of an autocephalous church. It should also be noted that in canon law there is no such status as an “independent church”, as the UOC-MP now calls itself. Also, the church cannot proclaim itself autocephalous - recognition of world Orthodoxy is necessary. Therefore, its status is in fact uncertain. The UOC-MP confirmed the severance of relations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, thereby making the process of unification with the Orthodox Church in Ukraine virtually impossible.
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Church life in Ukraine has long ceased to be an internal affair of those directly involved, becoming a factor influencing national security and public policy more broadly. Further transformations within the UOC-MP are expected. The decisions made are aimed at “releasing a steam” of dissatisfaction among their own parishioners, slowing down the process of unification with the OCU and buying time. The top leadership of the UOC-MP is not ready for serious changes and prefers to wait for the end of “the great war”.
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The Cannes Film Festival ended on Saturday, 28 May. Many world cinema stars supported Ukraine, but there was a scandal caused by the performance of film producer Serhiy Loznytsia. Receiving the award for his contribution to the development of the film industry, Loznytsia called not to equate the crimes of the Russian regime with Russian culture and not to persecute its representatives. Loznytsia has Ukrainian citizenship and has received regular funding for his films from the state budget, but has lived in Germany for the past 20 years. He has now been expelled from the Ukrainian Film Academy. A similar position is voiced by Russian film producer Kirill Serebrenikov.
Such people have become known as “good Russians”. According to the concept of the “good Russians”, ordinary Russians (even if they voted for Putin and supported him for years), including cultural figures, are not responsible for the regime’s crimes. It is believed that the “good Russians” suffer in the same way as the Ukrainians now suffering from the Russian invasion. In fact, it is a manipulation to substitute concepts, an attempt to equate the executioner with his victim.
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The “Cancel Russia” movement continues in the world, in which Russian cultural figures who openly supported and support the Putin regime are fired from their high positions and their contracts are terminated. This applies to all areas - classical music, cinema, museum work, and literature. At the same time, Ukrainian artists refuse to perform on the same platforms with their Russian counterparts, explaining that such a combination is not possible. This happened, in particular, at a literary festival in Norway. Attempts to cultivate in the minds of the masses the idea that “good Russians” are not guilty of Putin’s crimes and suffer as much as Ukrainians are going to continue. The narrative “great Russian culture has nothing to do with the regime’s crimes” is misleading and manipulative.
However, it is right to help those Russians who have long been striving for democratic changes in Russia. For the real Russian opposition and human rights activists who have had to flee Russia due to persecutions, some EU member states have prepared a humanitarian visa program.
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RUSSIA IS LOSING ITS EXPORT POTENTIAL IN THE ARMS MARKET |
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Due to its constant failures in the war against Ukraine, the interest of the international customers toward Russia’s weapons is reportedly shrinking Russia’s foreign arms markets. For example, India has already "paused" a contract with Russia for the supply of 10 Ka-31 helicopters (AWACS) worth $550 million. The Czech Republic has closed the production of its L-410 transport aircraft in Russia, eliminating one of the “channels” for earning on defense exports. And the catastrophic losses of the occupiers in helicopters are literally “clearing” the Eastern European market for American helicopter companies, according to the portal The Drive.
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The following factors influence the decline in Russia’s export capacity. Firstly, the significant loss of armaments and military equipment (weapons) in Ukraine requires the military-industrial complex to refocus on the needs of the Russian armed forces, causing a deficit in the external supply of weapons. Secondly, the Russian and Belarusian defence industries are losing the time and quality of export products due to the loss of Western components and constituent units following sanctions. Thirdly, the vast majority of Russia’s military-industrial complex exports, from armored vehicles, combat aircraft and helicopters, naval boats and warships to air defence systems and electronic warfare have been widely negatively advertised abroad for significant losses and drawbacks. Finally, competitors at the best opportunity are ready to force Russia out the arms market. In the view of war dynamics and sanctions policy, traditional clients of Russian armaments are reconsidering their military providers. One of the examples is India, which allegedly can reduce Russian military imports due to sanctions against Russia. The displacement of Russian weapons from the market and possible restructuring of the international arms market may lead to Russia’s loss of strategic influence and leadership in the global arms market.
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RUSSIA-DRIVEN MILLITARY PACT CELEBRATES 30TH ANNIVERSARY AND QUESTIONS INTERNAL UNITY |
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On 16 May, the heads of states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an entity promoted by the Russian Federation as a counterbalance to NATO, gathered in Moscow to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Collective Security Treaty and the 20th anniversary of the organization. President Putin briefed members of the organization on his so-called “special military operation” behind closed doors, but public messages of the CSTO did not reflect this part of the discussion, ignoring the war in Ukraine. Observers noted attempts of the CSTO member states to distance themselves from the Russian policy objectives, which puts in question the unity of the bloc.
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Russia failed to create a NATO-type political-military alliance in Central Asia, and CSTO remains a formation, in which member states’ elites mostly count on the Russian support to secure a “firewall” to prevent outside forces from carrying out “color revolutions” in Central Asia. However, they are not interested in supporting Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, preferring silence. During a UN General Assembly in March when many members voted to approve a resolution denouncing Russia’s military operation in Ukraine, 35 countries abstained, including Armenia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. In general CSTO members have divergent national interests, as well as varying perceptions of threats. Kazakhstan, for instance, is engaged in a negotiations with the US on the strategic partnership with the US and talk to American partners so that the sanctions against Russia over Ukraine could be designed in a way that causes the “least collateral damage” to Kazakhstan. Being faced with “geopolitical loneliness”, which now is even is recognized on Russian television, Russia is likely to exploit its dependence of Belarus, and seek ways to avoid Western sanctions through friendly Central Asian governments, though these appear unprepared to interfere in the situation at this stage.
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CZK: Transparent account
AN: 2300405420/2010
VS: 2022
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