We have the honor of sharing an evening with Alison Smith, and Craig Laforest. Alison from the UK, Craig from AU, Sacha is from Mexico, and I am in Boston MA US. Across the globe the facts are shared, the many will listen, and learn of Our plight. The plight of Targeted Individuals. SHOW MORE
Fraud allegations fly in dispute over brain-scanning tech made famous on Netflix’s ‘Making a Murderer’
Neuroscientist Larry Farwell doesn’t read minds, but he can usually catch a liar.
For decades, Farwell refined and promoted a system that measures brainwaves to see if someone recalls a specific piece of information. Using sensors set in a headband and visual prompts flashed on a screen, the Seattle-area scientist contends he can show whether, say, a murder suspect has been at a crime scene.
Farwell imagines a day when brain fingerprinting is standard practice in criminal investigations and counter-terror operations. It’s a dream Farwell effuses about even as he’s locked in a legal nightmare.
A 2016 falling out between Farwell and his former business partners has spilled into court in at least five jurisdictions, including Seattle’s federal court. Locked in a fight ostensibly centered on four expired patents, Farwell and his ex-partners at Massachusetts-based Brainwave Science have repeatedly accused one another of fraud.
It’s a spat that Farwell fears may undermine his life’s work.
“Brain fingerprinting is a technique for discovering the truth and proving it,” the 71-year-old said by phone. “In this country certainly and in most places, there’s a high correlation between truth and justice. If you find out the truth, it’s going to serve the cause of justice.”
Farwell was a founding member of Brainwave Science, which is now controlled by his former business partner, Krishna Ika, the corporation’s chief executive officer and chairman.
The men intended to use Ika’s entrepreneurial skills to sell Farwell’s science overseas, targeting European, Middle Eastern and south Asian intelligence agencies.
Instead, the company suffered in the spotlight that fell on it after a onetime board member, former Trump administration National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, was accused of lying to the FBI. Scrutiny flowing from Flynn’s role in the company resurfaced an espionage scheme involving a key investor, Subu Kota, a prominent Boston businessman convicted of providing classified technology to the KGB late in the Cold War.
As that scandal unfolded, Farwell, by then ousted from Brainwave Science, began claiming the company was pushing “counterfeit” brain fingerprinting tech that its employees lacked the expertise to operate. Grinding, and at times bizarre, legal machinations have been underway since.
Use of deception detection techniques remains divisive
Attorneys for Brainwave Science claim that the company paid Farwell for key brain fingerprinting patents when he and Ika formed the company, but that the patents had already been transferred to other companies tied to Farwell. Farwell has denied having control over those other firms.
Brain fingerprinting’s usefulness depends on broad acceptance that has proved elusive, all the more so as two of its chief evangelists have been fighting to discredit each other in court. Farwell worries that the legal fight, and, in his view, Brainwave Science’s continued promotion of technology that can’t deliver, will undercut the technology’s reputation.
The underlying technology isn’t pseudoscience. While there are disagreements about the accuracy of brain fingerprinting and competing systems, the neuroscience underpinning them is generally accepted as valid. Most of the observational techniques make use of advanced medical equipment to measure patterns of brain activity long recognized by the scientific community.
What’s lacking is broad agreement on how much the deception detection tech can reveal, said James Giordano, chief of the neuroethics studies program at Georgetown’s Pellegrino Center for Clinical Bioethics.
Giordano said that the tools won’t see broad use in American courts until there’s scientific agreement about best practices in testing and the tests’ accuracy rates. No consensus exists.
“It’s not that the tools are ineffective tools,” Giordano said. “Their value at this point is less than complete because there still is room for criticism of the technique.”
In the rapidly developing world of neuroscience-based investigatory tools, brain fingerprinting is old school.
During an examination, the test subject dons a headset that can gauge electrical activity in their brain and is then shown a series of words or images. Examiners watch how their brain responds, looking for brainwave patterns that show whether the subject has memories of a sight or idea.
In the model scenario, a murder suspect is shown images familiar only to investigators and the killer. The suspect’s brain response, monitored through the headset, then indicates whether they have memories of the crime scene, results that bolster or undermine suspicions against them.
Brain fingerprinting has its limitations. Tests can only show whether the subject is familiar with specific information or images, Farwell said, not how they came to be so.
The telltale brainwave, the P300, was identified in the early 1960s, and has been considered for deception detection since. Having started refining the science in the 1980s, Farwell credibly claims to be the world’s foremost brain fingerprint expert. He’s also its leading promoter.
To Farwell’s frustration, brain fingerprinting’s use in the courtroom doesn’t extend much farther.
Ethical questions unresolved as tech sprints forward
Surveying federal agencies in 2001, the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of the U.S. Congress, found limited interest in brain fingerprinting. Leaders at the CIA, Department of Defense, Secret Service and FBI all said the technology wasn’t particularly applicable in their work. At the time, an FBI assistant director opined that Farwell “did not conduct research that met the FBI’s standards … nor did his research demonstrate the usefulness of this technique.”
The technology has made only “meager incursions” into the legal system, Giordano, the Georgetown neuroscience professor, and co-author Calvin Kraft put it in one 2017 paper. EEG-based investigations, they found, are “typically discounted by judges for (their) lack of general acceptance” within the scientific community. FMRI-based deception detectors – tech a generation newer that uses magnetic resonance scanning to gauge whether parts of a subject’s brain associated with lying are activated by a question or prompt – are used even less frequently, due to similar concerns.
Writing in the academic journal Cognitive Neurodynamics, Ewout H. Meijer, a professor of neuroscience at a prominent Dutch university, faulted Farwell for overstating the depth of research done to judge brain fingerprinting’s accuracy. In other research, Meijer argued newer technologies share many shortcomings with century-old polygraph tests.
Restrictions on the use of neuroscientific tools to examine or even shape minds are rare in much of the world, Giordano said. Vast technological capabilities exist today, capabilities that are only increasing.
Electrodes implanted in the brain are already being used to treat epilepsy, obsessive-compulsive disorder, chronic pain and a host of other medical conditions. Initiatives like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Next-Generation Nonsurgical Neurotechnology effort and Elon Musk’s Neuralink will make it even easier to shape brain functions and pass information directly to and from a brain.
Compared to changing minds, reading them is fairly straightforward. Putting that information to work, though, remains a challenge.
In national security, Giordano said, neuroscience-based investigative tools can help create a multifaceted profile of a target like a suspected terrorist. Investigators considering neurological information alongside genetic data, medical records, purchase histories and social media trails could build a “meta-informational construct” enabling them to assess the risk a target poses.
Short-lived partnership spawns enduring feud
Unable to use his technology widely in American courts, Farwell says he spent much of his time working for foreign security agencies. In statements to the court, Farwell describes himself as having extensive connections worldwide, particularly in the Middle East and Asia. It was in part through that work that Farwell connected with Ika, the Massachusetts entrepreneur and Farwell’s foil in the ongoing legal fights.
Farwell and Ika went into business together in June 2012. The firm they created, Brainwave Science, aimed to sell brain fingerprinting hardware and knowhow abroad.
The relationship swiftly soured. By August 2016, Farwell had been forced out after an associate of his sent a letter to Kota, the Boston entrepreneur and investor in Brainwave. The letter’s writer accused Brainwave Science of claiming patents Farwell sold off a decade before, and claimed Ika was at risk of criminal prosecution for fraud.
In this country certainly and in most places, there’s a high correlation between truth and justice. If you find out the truth, it’s going to serve the cause of justice.
Kota’s role in Brainwave Science, like so much else in the feud, is disputed. He’s described in court papers as an investor in the corporation to which Farwell was a party, Brainwave Science LLC. Ika is referred to in court papers as the sole owner of a new corporation — Brainwave Science Inc. — created in 2016, in which Farwell holds no ownership interest.
The intense scrutiny directed at Flynn and by extension Brainwave Science stoked interest in a mid-1990s prosecution that saw Kota convicted on fraud charges after being caught up in an FBI sting operation targeting a KGB spy ring that sent U.S. defense technology to the USSR in the Soviet Union’s waning days. According to Defense Department statements, Kota and another man met Russian agents in Bermuda, Switzerland and elsewhere, and agreed to sell them information about American missile defense and stealth aircraft technology.
Kota did not return requests for comment.
Farwell’s falling out with Brainwave Science solidified in March 2018, when he offered a declaration filed with a U.S. District Court in Delaware as part of a dispute between Brainwave and a company contracted to sell its services in the United Arab Emirates. The lawsuit was sent in to arbitration, which attorneys for Brainwave Science have said did not result in a judgment against Brainwave.
In his declaration, Farwell accused Brainwave Science of pushing “counterfeit” brain fingerprinting technology using Farwell’s name. Among other claims, he contended that Brainwave Science’s products, unlike his own, have not been subjected to peer-reviewed studies or tested by the FBI and other federal agencies.
Fraud claims fly in fight over expired patents
Brainwave Science has roundly denied Farwell’s attacks on the company’s technology. In a collection of legal actions, the company has also answered with fraud claims of its own. The company’s attorneys have asked a New York state court to permanently enjoin Farwell from deriding Brainwave Science’s products.
The $10 million fraud and defamation claim notwithstanding, Brainwave Science’s litigation against Farwell has centered on four patents, all of which are expired.
In lawsuits currently before the federal court in Seattle, Brainwave Science claims Farwell essentially sold those patents to the LLC when it was formed. But U.S. Patent and Trademark Office records show Farwell didn’t personally hold any of the patents by the time he and Ika formed Brainwave Science.
Farwell, who is acting as his own attorney, secured three of the patents in the mid-1990s and then sold them to other companies with which his associations are disputed. A fourth patent was issued in 2010 and transferred shortly thereafter to one of those companies, American Scientific Inc. Patent Office records indicate the newest patent expired in 2018 due to lack of payment; the older three expired in 2013 and 2014 after hitting their 20-year retirement date.
While expired patents don’t restrict the use of a technology, they aren’t without value, said Saurabh Vishnubhakat, a professor at Texas A&M University’s law and engineering colleges specializing in intellectual property. A patent holder can sue for infringement even after the patent expires.
“The patent owner can still bring a lawsuit up to six years after the infringing actions took place,” Vishnubhakat said by email. “So for a patent that was infringed up to and including its final days, the lawsuit may indeed come years later — even though, by the time of the lawsuit, the patent will have expired.”
Contacted for comment, a Brainwave Science attorney declined to say why the company has gone to extraordinary lengths to gain the expired patents, or discuss any aspect of the controversy.
In court, the company’s attorneys said Farwell promised to transfer the patents to Brainwave when he was hired, an assertion Farwell disputes. Both sides agree that, in June 2013, papers were filed with the Patent Office that attempted to transfer ownership of the patents from Farwell to Brainwave Science.
Writing the court, Farwell contends those filings were made in error and were unenforceable as neither he nor his company, Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, held the patents.
The patent dispute was already before a New York state court in January 2020 when Farwell entered into binding arbitration with Neuro Science Technologies, an Edmonds, Wash.-based firm created months earlier after obtaining the patents from another firm. Brainwave Science has since sued Neuro Science Technologies and its president, claiming it is a “shill” company created in a “ludicrous attempt” to hold onto the patents.
Neuro Science Technologies representatives contended in court that the company held the patents, which had passed through at least two other companies since Farwell secured them. The arbitrator ordered that Farwell pay $300,000 for his “willful attempt” to transfer patents he didn’t own while finding that Farwell could use technology covered by the patents.
Brainwave Science was not included in the Seattle arbitration proceeding, even though the company and Farwell were already litigating the patent dispute in New York. The arbitration award was certified in early February 2020 by a federal judge unaware of Brainwave Science’s interest in the matter. That certification, contested by Brainwave Science’s attorneys, was thrown out in December.
In court papers, attorneys for Brainwave Science contend the Seattle arbitration was a farce, and that Farwell has a hidden interest in Neuro Science Technologies. Farwell, Neuro Science Technologies and Life Science & Technology, another entity that previously held the patents, were “orchestrating a manufactured and non-existent ‘dispute,’” attorney Brett Wieburg said in court papers.
Excerpts of depositions given by Farwell appear to show him admitting to ghost writing letters for executives at Life Science & Technology, one of whom now serves — unpaid, according to Farwell’s statements — as president of Neuro Science Technologies. Neither company has a significant online presence, and attempts to reach company executives were unsuccessful.
For his part, Farwell in court papers described Brainwave Science’s claims as “entirely without merit” and reiterated assertions that Brainwave Science Inc. and Ika are subject to fraud investigations in Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand and elsewhere. Farwell took the unusual step, in a proposed “global settlement,” of challenging Ika to travel to Pakistan or South Africa where Farwell would “sign any documents” Ika provided.
Attorneys for Brainwave Science have denied Farwell’s claims related to criminal investigations. They have not yet responded to the settlement proposal.
If, as Farwell claims, the legal actions are simply meant to drain his resources, they appear to be succeeding. In court papers, Farwell said he lacks the financial wherewithal to cover arbitration costs let alone any judgment against him. Pandemic travel restrictions mean he can’t practice his craft overseas, his primary means of support.
Farwell nonetheless describes the patent fight as a distraction.
“What does matter is ensuring that brain fingerprinting is practiced by people who are competent to do it, and that government agencies are not defrauded,” Farwell told GeekWire in a phone interview.
Lawsuits are pending in New York state court and U.S. District Court in Seattle.
Levi Pulkkinen is an independent journalist based in Seattle. His work appears in U.S. News & World Report, The Guardian, Ozy, and select regional publications, and on the wall of at least one brewery bathroom. He previously served as senior editor at SeattlePI.
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1Program of Liberal Studies, Neuroscience and Behavior, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, United States
2Departments of Neurology and Biochemistry, Pellegrino Center for Clinical Bioethics, Georgetown University Medical Center, Washington, DC, United States
Advances in neuroscientific techniques have found increasingly broader applications, including in legal neuroscience (or “neurolaw”), where experts in the brain sciences are called to testify in the courtroom. But does the incursion of neuroscience into the legal sphere constitute a threat to individual liberties? And what legal protections are there against such threats? In this paper, we outline individual rights as they interact with neuroscientific methods. We then proceed to examine the current uses of neuroscientific evidence, and ultimately determine whether the rights of the individual are endangered by such approaches. Based on our analysis, we conclude that while federal evidence rules constitute a substantial hurdle for the use of neuroscientific evidence, more ethical safeguards are needed to protect against future violations of fundamental rights. Finally, we assert that it will be increasingly imperative for the legal and neuroscientific communities to work together to better define the limits, capabilities, and intended direction of neuroscientific methods applicable for use in law.
“Mind reading” by government agencies is classic fodder for conspiracy theorists (see Constantine, 1995). But what makes this so evocative? The particular unease produced by imagination of such scenarios seems to be drawn from an intrinsic idea that the contents of thought are—and ought to be—private. Farahany (2012) has referred to these notions as “intuitions about mental privacy and autonomy of self” (354). The Supreme Court case Stanley v. Georgia (1969), among others, legally reinforced some of these intuitions, with Justice Thurgood Marshall stating that citizens should be “generally free from governmental intrusions into one's privacy and control of one's thoughts” (394 U.S. 557). Based on this doctrine, it would seem that thought is not criminalized in the American justice system. Yet this conclusion is complicated by the fact that the exploration of mens rea is a major pillar of due process. Terms like “intent,” “knowingly,” and “purposefully” figure prominently in courtroom decisions, and have alternately served to extenuate or implicate countless individuals (see Morissette v. United States, 1952 or Durham v United States, 1954). Thus a puzzling dialectic has evolved: on one side is the assurance that the courts have no business examining mental processes; on the other is that neuroscience is being increasingly used to generate inferences about private thoughts and motivations.
The resulting ethicolegal conundrum is a classic result of law incorporating insight from adjacent disciplines (see Goodenough and Tucker, 2010). In fact, the advent of “modern” neuroscience is only the latest instantiation of law encountering brain science. As Shen (2016) has shown, medical perspectives from early psychophysiologists have been influencing legal paradigms since the mid-nineteenth century (670); in particular, investigations into the material correlates of mental phenomena have instituted new schools of legal thought regarding definitions of guilt, criminal responsibility, and personhood (see Kolber, 2015; Morse, 2015). Perhaps the most visible example of law's incorporation of neuroscience has occurred in the past few decades—as the use of neuroscientific evidence in court becomes more and more common.
New techniques and tools of neuroscience now produce results purportedly indicative of the workings of cognitive processes, or what may commonly be regarded as the “mind”: whether it be recognition of a certain piece of information and/or a neural “signature” of having been in a certain place at a certain time; and whether or not one is engaging in deception (Fang et al., 2003; Davatzikos et al., 2005). These techniques remain tentative outside of laboratory settings, but still have triggered debates about the validity, ethicality, and legality of such procedures should they be introduced into the court (Keckler, 2005; Meegan, 2008). Currently, the use of neuroscientific evidence by the defense is somewhat in vogue; it is frequently used to assert diminished capacity, insanity, and/or plead for mitigation (Brown and Murphy, 2010; Farahany, 2016). This development has led to increased scrutiny around the effects of technological change on legal definitions of guilt (Greene and Cohen, 2004; see section Looking Forward). In contrast, the successful use of neuroscientific evidence by the prosecution to assert guilt remains lacking (Giordano et al., 2014b)—most likely because forensic methods in neuroscience have not yet met admissibility standards of the court (Alexander, 2007). This latter point brings to the fore a key issue: namely, that the orientation and goals of legal neuroscience are not yet clearly defined, and the law may need to clarify what exactly it is asking from neuroscience (Shats et al., 2016).
In this light, the focus of this paper can be summarized by a single question: Does the modern use of neuroscientific evidence in criminal courts pose challenges to the rights of the individual? This query may be broken down into three parts: (1) What are the rights of the individual vis-à-vis the acquisition and use of neuroscientific investigation? (2) Is (and how is) neuroscientific evidence currently accepted and used in criminal courts? and (3) Are the ethical injunctions established in (1) violated by uses outlined in (2)?
Regarding the rights of the individual, we will use the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights as primary reference, given that this document has become a benchmark for basic constructs of human rights in modern democratic societies. We also review a number of landmark court cases that have helped to elucidate how these rights have been interpreted. For the second question, we will inquire into the most viable neuroscientific techniques currently projected toward—or employed in—legal use. Finally, we address whether current protections are likely to persist despite technological change, and how the neuroscientific and legal communities can (and perhaps should) work to safeguard the rights of the individual.
“Neuro-Rights” in the Modern World
What precedent is there for establishing the “neuro-cognitive” rights of the individual? Shen (2013) has commented that the growing capabilities of neuroscience have spurred a kind of “mental privacy panic” (668); in the wake, there have been numerous attempts to create a framework for protecting these rights. Boire (2001) and Greely (2006) were among the first to investigate how these rights are linked fundamentally to the human person. Kostiuk (2012) has suggested that current United States law inadequately protects the use of neurological information, and to that end has proposed legislation to establish a Neurological Information Non-discrimination Act (NINA), which is modeled on the Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act (GINA) of 2008. But NINA would only address potential misuse by employers and other private entities. How would individual “neuro-cognitive rights” be protected in the American courtroom? Many have looked to the Constitution of the United States as a foundation for these rights (see Boire, 2005; Tovino, 2007; Shen, 2013). Of course, the rights defined by the Constitution do not immediately seem to approximate intuitions about the sanctity of thought—and it is unlikely that the framers of the Constitution were prepared to consider mental processes as being externally assessable. Yet a possible framework for the preservation of what Boire has called “cognitive liberty” (2001) may be found by interpretation of key aspects of the Bill of Rights.
First Amendment: The “Double Aspect”
The First Amendment does not seem to allow for protection of the workings of the mind, but rather affords rights for the outward expression of those processes. Yet, in Jones v Opelika (1942), the court inextricably linked the two, writing that “freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion all have a double aspect—freedom of thought and freedom of action” (316 U.S. 618). A similar argument is expressed in Palko v. Connecticut (1937), in which Justice Cardozo asserted that “freedom of thought and speech” is the “matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom” (302 U.S. 327). It is notable that these decisions assert not only that thought should be inviolable, but that it inherently is—for instance, the Opelika decision claims that “freedom to think is absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward workings of the mind” (316 U.S. 618). Techniques for (blunt) external modulation of cognitive processes—ranging from the pharmacological (Wright, 2005) to the surgical (Faria, 2013)—were available even then, and seem to belie the notion that processes and mechanisms of thought are untouchable. As such, the relevance of these decisions is called into question, especially in light of today's increasingly sophisticated and non- (or at least minimally) invasive technologies (e.g., transcranial magnetic and/or electrical stimulation; see Narayana et al., 2017).
The aforementioned invocations of the First Amendment only apply to government interference with cognitive processes, rather than mere observation (Tovino, 2007), so perhaps in this case the First Amendment lacks precision and therefore value in engendering fair protection. Still, it might be successfully argued that the mere knowledge of the judicial use of neuroimaging could exercise a “chilling effect” on the freedom of thought, just as phone conversations might become more guarded in a country where wiretapping is legal and widespread. This is especially true if individuals begin to consider that their thoughts might later serve to incriminate them.
Fourth Amendment: Protecting Privacy
The Fourth Amendment has long been used to justify the preservation of a personal, private sphere where government may not intrude. Schmerber v. California (1966) asserted that “the overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State” (384 U.S. 767). In the case of collecting neuroscientific evidence, it is the amendment's “search and seizure” clause that is most relevant (Boire, 2005; Shen, 2013). The question is whether gathering neuro-cognitive evidence constitutes an overly intrusive search of an individual's person. For instance, in Winston v. Lee (1985), the court argued that an invasive procedure, like surgery, violates reasonableness standards established by prior decisions (470 U.S. 753). The court also rejected warrantless searches of the kind conducted in Kyllo v United States (2001), in which a thermal-imaging device was applied to a suspect's home (533 U.S. 23); this kind of device, which gathers information about the internal state of a private space without physical intrusion, might be analogized to certain forms of neuroimaging (Boire, 2005). Boire uses this case to argue that a “head” should have even more protections than a “home,” and that informed consent—not just a warrant—should be a requirement for any scans (i.e., “searches”) of the brain.
Recently, rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment have been curtailed in significant ways. In 2013, the court ruled in Maryland v King that collection of DNA samples upon arrest is a constitutional procedure (133 S. Ct. 1958). That case further reinforces the notion from Schmerber that not all biological evidence is sacrosanct (384 U.S. 757). But it also includes the justification that since DNA samples can help determine an individual's criminal history, their collection serves “legitimate government interest” in determining whether an individual might pose a danger to society (133 S. Ct. 1959). This argument seems to open the door for other procedures that would establish the level of danger an individual poses to society; procedures that might eventually incorporate neuroimaging and perhaps other forms of neuro-cognitive assessment. Such decisions seem to reflect a desire to balance the rights of the individual with concerns about the safety of the society (for further discussion, see Giordano et al., 2014b; Giordano, 2015a). Nowhere is this trend clearer than in the institution of the Patriot Act in the United States after the attacks of September 11, 2001, when privacy expectations from the Fourth Amendment seemed to be superseded by an overarching imperative for public safety (Osher, 2002). Might changing standards in modern society impact notions of what constitutes an acceptable reason for invasion of privacy, and could this impact the criminal courts?
Fifth Amendment: Against Self-incrimination
In one of the more famous court decisions of US history, (Miranda v Arizona, 1966), the courts ruled that an individual has the “right to remain silent,” in order to uphold the “privilege against self–incrimination […which] is the essential mainstay of our adversary system” (384 U.S. 460). With this decision, the courts were drawing upon centuries of legal scholarship with roots in Hobbes' “right of nature” (1651), which contended that each person is naturally free to act in their own self-interest. This right is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment's provision that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
The legal definition of “self-incrimination,” however, has proven to be somewhat ambiguous. One early challenge to the principles of Miranda came in Schmerber v. California, in which the defendant was compelled to provide a blood sample to verify his level of intoxication (384 U.S. 757). The court ruled that the use of this evidence, although taken from the defendant's own person, did not constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment protections, because the evidence was not “testimonial or communicative” in nature (384 U.S. 761). In that same decision, the court remarked that “to compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment” (384 U.S. 764). While this assertion was ostensibly directed toward the contemporary use of the polygraph, it seems to have serious implications for use of (newer, valid, and more accurate) neuroscientific methods of deception detection in the courtroom.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Due Process
One of the most fundamental provisions in the Bill of Rights is the “due process” clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; it assures the right to a fair trial and stipulates that no individual may be convicted or otherwise deprived of “life, liberty, [or] property” without proper procedure. The “due process” clause has been flexibly interpreted to incorporate basic principles of common law, which include stipulations about the kind of evidence that should be admissible in court. For instance, in State of New Jersey v. Michaels (1994), the court explained that it “has a responsibility to ensure that evidence admitted at trial is sufficiently reliable so that it may be of use to the finder of fact who will draw the ultimate conclusions of guilt or innocence. That concern implicates principles of constitutional due process” (136 N.J. 316). That same decision cited (Manson v Braithwaite, 1977), which declared that “reliability is the linchpin” in determining the admissibility of evidence (432 U.S. 98). Such concerns about the probative value of evidence seem to be central to the maintenance of a fair and functional legal system.
It is by this foundational principle that the edifice of evidence law is justified, along with the landmark decisions of Frye v United States (1923, 293 F. 1013) and Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993, 509 U.S. 579). These two decisions are especially relevant in the case of neuroscientific evidence, because they established a framework by which the admissibility of expert testimony in this field might be judged. While this framework is not completely standardized across state lines, it has been codified at the federal level in the revised Rule 702 (Bernstein and Jackson, 2004; Shats et al., 2016). Its stipulations regarding the relevance, validity, and reliability of scientific evidence are essential in the preservation of due process (see Keckler, 2005; Alexander, 2007).
In another invocation of due process, some have argued that neuroscientific evidence has a tendency to exercise an undue influence on juries out of proportion to its probative value (McCabe and Castel, 2008; Brown and Murphy, 2010). In such cases, Brown and Murphy (2010) argue that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 should be applied, which provides against “unfairly prejudicial” evidence (1188). However, others have contended that there is “little empirical support” (716) for claims that neurological evidence is inherently prejudicial (Farah and Hook, 2013; Shats et al., 2016).
Neuroscience in Legal Contexts
We now briefly review two examples of neurotechnology currently being oriented toward legal use—specifically, for deception detection. While these techniques do not constitute the majority of neurological evidence being used in today's courts, they are unique for the potential challenges they may pose to individual rights.
ERP: Recognition and “Guilty Knowledge”
One possible source of neurological evidence in the courtroom is from information obtained through the use of event-related potentials (ERP) measured by electroencephalography (EEG). Most of these techniques center on the detection of “guilty knowledge” via P300 recognition signatures (Rosenfield et al., 1988). Essentially, the test relies on a well-documented neurological response to recognized information, which might be used to determine whether an individual has intimate knowledge about a crime (Rosenfield et al., 1988). P300 markers have been a staple of neurophysiological research for over half a century (Sutton et al., 1965); this, along with the fact that such markers appear reliably across subjects, represents this method's primary strength as a potential legal tool.
However, the regular appearance of such P300 markers does not mean that their functional correlates are well understood. As Meijer et al. (2012) noted, P300 responses have been identified with a range of responses that are similar only in their violation of expectation; this hardly denotes the functional specificity of an unambiguous “deception detector.” As such, ERP techniques often engender many of the same issues as other forms of “lie detectors,” which suffer from a lack of—or excessive ambiguity in—direct connection between the physical response and its interpretation (Meijer et al., 2012). It is also unclear if these methods are as reliable in the field as they are in the laboratory (Wolpe et al., 2005).
A form of ERP analysis that can be used for deception detection has been patented and marketed as “brain fingerprinting” (Farwell and Donchin, 1991; Farwell, 2012). While promising, this method has received censure from some in the scientific community for lack of transparency and overstatement of effectiveness (Wolpe et al., 2005; Meijer et al., 2012). To date, the use of this technology has made meager incursions into the legal system—for example, the case of Harrington v Iowa (2003; see Farwellamicus curiae brief of 2002)—but is typically discounted by judges for its lack of general acceptance (Wolpe et al., 2005).
fMRI: Descriptive Challenges
Because functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) provides a three-dimensional image of both cortical and sub-cortical activity of the brain (unlike the summative cortical responses assessed by EEG), it has greater descriptive potential. However, fMRI is also constrained by practical parameters (e.g., speed, variable correlative reliability of individual to group and group to individual comparisons) that impair its descriptive capability and power (Wolpe et al., 2005; Logothetis, 2008). Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen (2013) have noted that “nearly every article” expounding on the potential of fMRI lie detection techniques has a section about “issues yet to be resolved” (594). Nevertheless, these issues have not prevented the emergence of commercial entities purporting to provide reliable fMRI-based deception detection (Cephos1; No Lie MRI, Inc.2).
Modern studies of deception detection using fMRI technology rely on subtle changes in the blood-oxygenation level of specific areas in the brain, generally, the fronto-parietal lobes and loci and networks of the limbic system (Hakun et al., 2009; Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen, 2013). Such studies often claim accuracy rates of ninety percent or greater (Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen, 2013; for an example, see Vartanian et al., 2012). These studies, however, are conducted under controlled conditions, with willing and reasonably relaxed subjects. Actual conditions in the context of a criminal investigation are likely to vary widely from those of the laboratory setting; such use would be further complicated by the fact that fMRI deception detection can be intentionally countered by “experienced” individuals with intent to deceive (Ganis et al., 2011). Wolpe et al. (2005) have noted that while within-subject reliability might be high, the true indicator of fMRI's value as a deception detector is its predictive power for use and applicability in the wider population—that is, its ability to determine whether a particular individual is lying, by using data obtained from previous subjects. Finally, Spence (2008) noted that experimental paradigms vary widely among contemporary peer-reviewed studies, with differing methods that employ differing tools, such as guilty knowledge tests, reviews of episodic memory, malingered memory impairment, etc.
As a result of these concerns about validity and reliability, fMRI-based deception detection has been used less frequently than ERP-EEG (Brown and Murphy, 2010; Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen, 2013). Perhaps the most high-profile legal use of fMRI for deception to date is the case of United States v Semrau (2012), in which the defendant tried to introduce supposedly exonerating evidence performed by a company specializing in fMRI-based deception detection; the court ruled that the evidence failed to meet the standards of general acceptance and known error rates outlined by Daubert (14–16), and it was disallowed from the proceedings (Miller, 2010). Nevertheless, these early stumbles in judicial use of fMRI have not been altogether discouraging. Bles and Haynes (2008) acknowledged formidable obstacles while also carefully describing field studies that could increase the external validity of fMRI-based techniques (89–90). Langleben and Moriarty (2013) conceived of a “public funding initiative” and “peer-reviewed translational research program” that might provide the impetus to introduce rigor and widespread acceptance of fMRI deception detection techniques (231). And Hyman (2010), writing 5 years after the seminal paper by Wolpe et al. (2005), noted that computational analysis of fMRI data had made great strides since the publication of their earlier appraisal of the field.
The most common current employment of neuroscience in the courts is not related to deception detection, nor to any kind of forensic application; instead, the most frequent use of neurological evidence is by the defense (Shats et al., 2016), usually arguing for diminished capacity, insanity, or pleading for mitigation (Seiden, 2004; Farahany, 2016; Shen, 2016). Indeed, some have noted that the presentation of structural brain scans (i.e., to demonstrate neurological abnormalities that might have influenced the commission of the crime) at sentencing is “now almost invariably present in capital cases” (Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen, 2013). Since such evidence is intended ostensibly to support the defendant's case, it is unlikely it would represent a threat to individual liberties as long as valid, reliable techniques and technology are used.
Liberties at Risk: Freedom of Thought
As we have previously noted, “freedom of thought” as described by the courts seems to refer strictly to the unfettered exercise of thought without fear of external interference or punishment. Since the ostensible goal of deception detection technology is to determine what an individual has done, and the US legal system is not structurally oriented toward punishing individuals for their thoughts alone (see the court's formulation of mens rea in Morissette v. United States, 1952), it does not seem that this particular sense of cognitive liberty is directly violated by the current developments in neuroscience.
But are challenges to freedom of thought looming in the near future? Modern techniques do not seem to be apprehending “thought” by its typical definition (see Illes, 2007), and neurotechnology is unlikely to have a “chilling effect” on freedom of thought until it is able to definitively link observable brain states with complex cognitive processes. Along these lines, Gazzaniga (2005) has argued extensively against what he calls a “slippery-slope” fallacy that equates techniques like detection of (face or object) recognition with mind reading (xvii). Similarly, Meegan (2008) has likened guilty-knowledge technology at its best to a black-box camera that only indicates when a duplicate picture has been taken (16). Logothetis (2008) has stated somewhat more bluntly that: “…fMRI is not and will never be a mind reader” (869).
Yet this final claim may be called into question by a more integrative approach to development and use of neuroscientific techniques and technologies, as well as a more detailed philosophical examination of what the concept of “mind reading” really entails and obtains. In the past decade, advances in systems and computational neuroscience have enabled increasingly detailed reconstruction(s) of subjects' visual experience (Nishimoto et al., 2011), as well as description of the semantic content of viewed images (Huth et al., 2016), and prediction of narrative thinking (Wang et al., 2017) based on fMRI scans of various regions and networks of the brain. The technology seems to be toeing a line that many had considered unreachable. So, when we say that someone is “reading our mind,” do we necessarily mean that our thoughts are being understood in the exact form that we subjectively experience them? Or perhaps more appropriately, is it more realistic (and perhaps valuable) to consider reading in the literal sense: as “apprehend[ing] meaning by perceiving…form and relation…interpret[ed] in a specified manner determined by consensus” (Funk and Wagnall's, 1967)? By that definition, neuroscience may be poised at—and moving closer toward—the threshold of at least rudimentary “mind reading” capability. Given such advancements, might even a fuzzy approximation of the visual and/or semantic content of thoughts (with a known error rate) violate constructs of cognitive autonomy? New methods in neuroscience are both re-defining concepts of consciousness, as well as providing ways that subjective experience can be accessed, obtained and interpreted by others (Evers and Giordano, in press). Kolber (2014) has also noted the state's significant powers of subpoena in regard to memories. The question then arises: to what ends?
Invasions of Privacy
So while acquisition of neurological evidence cannot yet be likened to a “search” of an individual's thoughts, the capability to perform such a search is waxing into the realm of possibility—and the court has done little to concretely define the private sphere as it relates to neuro-cognitive liberty. What precedent there is regarding the use of private papers as evidence is tenuous and inconsistently applied across circuit courts (Farahany, 2012, p. 384). A substantive challenge to Fourth Amendment protections is suggested by the recent Maryland v King (2013) decision. If “legitimate government interest” in the safety of society serves as a justification for collecting DNA upon an individual's arrest, might a cursory neuroimaging scan to detect potentially dangerous anomalies of structure and/or function be similarly justified? In this scenario, the widespread references to frontal lobe damage by defendants to argue for sentence mitigation may be indirectly curtailing individual rights.
In a similar vein, Wolpe et al. (2005) suggested a hypothetical situation that might trigger Fourth Amendment protections, where “imaging for a non-medical indication could reveal medically relevant information” (46; see also (Wolf et al., 2008) for more commentary on incidental findings). For example, if a defendant willingly subjects her/himself to an fMRI deception evaluation, as in Semrau, and the fMR images reveal a brain tumor, are the images (still) admissible in court? Such problems are inherent to a technology that provides more information than is warranted by the legal system.
The determination of whether neurological evidence constitutes a violation of Fifth Amendment protections hinges on the classification of such evidence. As Farahany (2012) has argued, Schmerber established precedent for a tendentious dichotomy between “physical” or “biological” evidence and “testimony”. In its place, she proposed a spectrum of evidence, beginning with “identifying” information like height and appearance, and ranging through “automatic,” “memorialized,” and “uttered” domains (368–389). Where would neurological information fall on the spectrum? Given that complex ideas and semantic information cannot currently be reliably detected by available neurotechnology, neurological evidence probably would not be in the “uttered” category. Deception detection methods would produce evidence in the “memorialized” category, while basic structural information about an individual's brain would fall in the “automatic” category. Using this approach, she concluded that the extant legal framework protecting against self-incrimination would produce a result that is “deeply unsatisfying and at odds with ordinary intuitions about mental autonomy” when applied to memorialized neurological evidence (389).
Farahany's argument might be considered conjectural, since the only current instances of neurological deception detection in the United States have been conducted with the consent and cooperation of the subject. However, societies do not make identical judgments, and India has reportedly embraced court-mandated ERP-based deception detection techniques (395; Ghiridharadas, 2008). In the United States, the advancement of neurologically-based deception detection in legal contexts has heretofore been largely halted by evidence law (see following section), but recent advancements approaching the “horizon of potentiality”3 might make it prudent to create more stringent ethico-legal safeguards, perhaps along the lines of the French Civil Code, which has recently been updated to stipulate that any neuroimaging must occur with the express consent of the individual, which may be revoked at any time (Article 16–14, as noted by Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen, 2013). A possible route for requiring informed consent for deception detection techniques may be analogized from the current admissibility standards for the traditional polygraph in the United States. While United States v Scheffer (1997) set a precedent for excluding polygraphic evidence in federal courtrooms, the states have inconsistently followed its example: twenty-nine states have banned such evidence outright, but the remaining states do not exclude it per se, provided that both the prosecution and the defense consent to its use (Shniderman, 2012). However, despite recent calls for ongoing protection of individuals who consent to the use of novel neurotechnologies, and the information they may yield (Giordano, 2015a,b,c, 2017), at present there are no policies in place that would provide for such safeguarding (thereby fortifying the importance and need for some form of “NINA”; see above).
We have demonstrated how the use of current neurotechnology may be constrained in producing valid and reliable inferences about a defendant's cognitive processes, but also have noted that commercial entities exist for apparently detecting such processes in judicial settings. To preserve due process, then, we posit that a reliable “gatekeeper” is needed. The aforementioned Daubert and Frye standards have proven adequate to the task (Brindley and Giordano, 2014). As an early example, in People of NY v Weinstein (1992), a judge cited the Frye standards when disallowing expert testimony that an arachnoid cyst near the frontal lobe may have caused the defendant to murder his wife, stating then that it was not “generally accepted” that such cysts are responsible for acts of violence (156 Misc.2d. 34). A more recent example of gatekeeping in action is the previously mentioned United States v Semrau (2012), in which fMRI-based deception detection was excluded from the case on grounds that the technology was untested in “real world settings,” pursuant to FRE 702 (6; Miller, 2010).
Based on cases like these, it has been concluded that the Daubert standard (and related guidelines) present a formidable challenge to legally-oriented uses of neurotechnology. Keckler (2005) and Alexander (2007) extensively reviewed neurological deception detection and affirmed that, barring future (and significant) advances in validity and reliability, such evidence would likely continue to be excluded from legal consideration. Shats et al. (2016) came to a similar conclusion, while providing caution that the character of neurologically-based evidence requires that “the court… be particularly vigilant to ensure that the experts are being asked the appropriate questions, and that… they remain within the confines of the role of expert witnesses” rather than acting as judge or jury in themselves (722). With the possible exception of an unduly prejudicial effect from neuroscientific evidence, the current iterations and use of neurotechnology do not appear to threaten due process.
But with technological advancements and shifting cultural perceptions, will the rights outlined here face greater threat in the future? For their part, the rules of evidence, especially at the federal level, will most probably continue to preserve due process to the extent that they have since the Daubert case. Their stipulations continue to align well with basic principles of “good” science, and will reject inadequate methods and technologies (e.g., of neuroimaging and/or neurogenetics) just as effectively as Frye v United States (1923) rejected specious blood pressure data nearly a century ago (293 F. 1013). Barring any fundamental changes in the philosophy of science, the integrity of evidence and court proceedings in general are duly preserved by the gatekeepers of the court. Yet, if (and arguably when) forensic neuroscience eventually meets the standards for admission of evidence, it is unclear if other rights will be so carefully safeguarded. Technological advances in the past decade suggest that the challenges to reliable detection of mental states are not as insurmountable as previously regarded. More than ever, the inviolability of the mind as outlined in Palko v Connecticut and Jones v Opelika appears to be a moral, rather than a natural, imperative.
Even the “intuitions” described by Farahany (2012) might not be immune to societal pressures. Kittay (2007) posited that the most significant hurdle to the use of fMRI for deception detection might not stem from legal or technological issues, but rather from negative public sentiment toward “mind reading devices.” But with continuing developments and use of such neurotechnologies, and the somewhat ubiquitous, although not always accurate presentation of neuroimaging findings in the public eye, might a gradual acceptance of such techniques leach into public perceptions? Numerous neuroethicists have argued that cultural expectations could shift—or might already be shifting—amidst a preponderance of neuroscientific information: in definitions of personhood, guilt, and free will (see Greene and Cohen, 2004; Santosuosso and Bottalico, 2009). One of the most significant sources of this type of change may be the neuroscientific evidence already in courts—that is, the use by the defense described by Farahany (2016). Employment of this tactic might not only lead to a normalization of neuroscience in the courtroom, but could also cause deterministic paradigms to leach into legal conceptions of culpability (see Greene and Cohen, 2004; Mobbs et al., 2007). It is unclear if traditional rights and liberties would still be relevant in the deterministic plane—though some assert that social intuitions about guilt are little affected by metaphysical conditions (Roskies, 2006; Nahmias et al., 2014). Another change in cultural perceptions might be revealed by the recent trend favoring collective benefit over individual privacy, as demonstrated by Maryland v King, the Patriot Act, and the rising calls for, use and discussions of “big data” (Giordano et al., 2014b; DiEuliis and Giordano, 2016).
Finally, although equating any modern technology to a “search of an individual's thoughts” might be an overstatement, the court has yet to address significant ambiguities in its definition of the private sphere and what exactly constitutes “overly invasive” use of neuroscientific tools and techniques. assessment Farahany's (2012) of the Schmerber guidelines also elucidated vulnerability in the Fifth Amendment protections, namely, the inadequacy of the physical/testimonial dichotomy. As previously mentioned, the court has also yet to explicitly address the matter of informed consent for the gathering of neurological data—and with the new standard of Maryland v King, the only limitations to compulsory brain scans upon arrest seem to be technological.
What Can Be Done?
We assert that such vulnerabilities should prompt the legal and neuroscientific communities to take action. On the side of the courts, the decision must be made as to whether the vulnerabilities described in the previous section are to be treated casuistically, as per tradition, or perhaps more prescriptively, as in the case of France's updated Civil Code. Additionally, judges and lawyers should remain abreast of developments in neuroscience and technology so as to properly consider admitting or excluding neurotechnologically-derived evidence (see Goodenough and Tucker, 2011). This does not mean, as Justice Rehnquist suggested in his dissent to the Daubert decision, that judges are required to become “amateur scientists” (509 U.S. 600), but rather that they should foster a working relationship with subject matter experts in neuroscience, in order to maintain an understanding of the limits and capabilities of contemporary tools and methods of brain science.
This also invokes obligations of the neuroscientific community: to be aware of the potential use (and misuse) of the techniques that are being developed; to develop an understanding of the legal and ethical limitations on broader applications of brain science; and finally (although not at all least), to work to avoid misrepresentation of neurotechnological capabilities to the public (Morse, 2011; Giordano, 2012a). Commercial ventures in neuroimaging and neurogenetics, while seemingly inevitable in a capitalist system, can be problematic in that they may foster public misconceptions about the state of the field. The potential of neurological evidence to have an “undue influence” on a jury (Brown and Murphy, 2010; Shats et al., 2016) is partly due to such sensationalism on the part of popular science. Neuroscience must not succumb to such aggrandizement if it is to figure legitimately in judicial proceedings.
As neuroscientists and legal scholars respond to changing technology and work increasingly in tandem, there will inevitably be growing pains as the principles and methods of science are confronted with the different standards of the legal paradigm (see Garland and Glimcher, 2006). Therefore, it is important that these experts become well aware of such differences and philosophical misalignments. For instance, it is not the role of the neuroscientist as expert witness to offer an opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of an individual, and to do so is to violate the legal prerogative of the jury (see General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 1997 and US v Scheffer). Rather, expert testimony should simply provide evidence that will assist the judge and/or jury in their final decision (Jones et al., 2013; Shats et al., 2016). Jones et al. (2013) noted “…science [is] about facts and law [is] about values” (731). This means that in law, unlike in science, “there are no maybes” (731), and that a court must reach a decision within a reasonable period of time in order to fulfill its obligations as a resolver of disputes. But if neuroscience is to be used in legal proceedings (and there is both a “push” and “pull” for such use; Giordano, 2012a, 2015a), then it is—and will be evermore—important to be aware of the changing capabilities of neurotechnology, and the demands presented (Goodenough and Tucker, 2010). In short, we believe that the question should not be “what can current neuroscience and neurotechnology do for law?” but rather, “what will the law demand of new developments in neuroscience and neurotechnology?” (Giordano et al., 2014b; Shats et al., 2016). In this light, the use of a directed, advanced integrative scientific convergence (AISC) approach might aptly meet the needs defined and called for by the law (Giordano, 2012b).
Until neurotechnology can validly link brain states with complex ideas and experiences, there are three main threats to individual rights that arise from the use of neurological evidence: (1) the ambiguous definition of the private sphere; (2) the lack of clarity in the Schmerber dichotomy; and (3) the lack of guidelines on informed consent for the use of neurological evidence. Less clear but equally pertinent is the effect of use of such evidence by the defense on legal definitions and social intuitions of guilt. In reaching this conclusion, we have not developed a conception of individual “neuro-cognitive rights” beyond those outlined in the US Constitution, nor have we thoroughly examined the state of affairs in countries other than the United States. These ventures require a broader philosophical outlook, extensive research in international law, and have been well engaged by others (see Church, 2011; Spranger, 2012; Picozza, 2016).
Scientific methods and social norms are constantly changing. And it may be that such international perspectives, discourses, guidelines and laws will need to be considered and engaged if and as brain science continues to be advanced, and to be proposed for use in legal processes. Perhaps then the integrative approach should encompass not only a scientific and ethical effort (Giordano, 2012b), but a focal orientation toward defined applications in the courts in order to “explicitly orient and align the capabilities of the brain sciences with the goals and limitations of the law” (Shats et al., 2016, p. 723). For while Justice may be blind, she must remain vigilant, in order to insure that novel technology does not circumvent the mandates of law, and that law does not misconstrue the capabilities and/or limits of technology.
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Here is the prayer below. It is recommended to hold the prayer position while praying and shut your eyes as this actually helps focus and helps direct the energy better. Please note it is written in the past tense as if it has already happened as that is the best way to manifest things now. As you read it, see, hear and especially feel it as true now to help manifest this as quickly as possible…
Please pray for 20 minutes on this (or whatever you can)…
“ALL Targeted Individuals have been recognized globally & freed from the crimes against humanity which affected them. This happened from the ‘top down’ globally in the quickest, most efficient way for ALL affected. Targeted individuals globally are now ALL freed from all Directed-energy weapon assaults, electronic torture, mind control technology assaults, chemical/biological assaults and multi-person stalking. ALL forms of mind control and Frequency/ quantum or AI weapon assaults on planet earth (whether mass or individual) have been COMPLETELY stopped REGARDLESS of the source of them!WE LIVE IN A WORLD FREE FROM MIND CONTROL. Targeted Individuals have been helped by the UN, governments globally and the military and intelligence agencies globally as part of a takedown operation of these crimes and they continue to offer their assistance ongoing in the most helpful and effective ways. The global press played a huge role in exposing Targeted Individuals crimes ultimately. They revealed to the public that this is happening globally to civilians and not just US Diplomats! As part of the global takedown, Targeted Individuals were (and still are) helped by human rights groups, the police, The council of Europe, the EU, UK parliament and Parliaments globally, the US Senators, The US Senate intelligence committee, the White House and many other groups globally who all got on board to help! The ICATOR lawsuit and the international email campaign were also incredibly successful and influential (in the best way) in helping to stop these crimes.This means this problem has now been eliminated completely! Targeted Individuals globally are now protected and healed through official testing programmes, radiation measurement centres, tracking centres, jamming equipment, shielding rooms, radiation police and a whole host of other one-to-one therapies and other protective or healing measures. Targeted Individuals are now treated with compassion and understanding by people globally and measures and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that citizens globally will always remain free from these remote threats. This includes appropriate safeguards on Artificial Intelligence (both generally and for the use of this technology). The technology is now publicly illegal globally as worldwide legislation has now come into place by governments globally as the norm. Targeted Individuals are now so happy, loving, joyful, peaceful, safe, secure, connected, successful and much much more. They have wonderful relationships with friends and family and wonderful free lives. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN HELPED IN A ‘REALISTIC’ WAY TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DAMAGE, TRAUMA AND PHYSICAL DAMAGES THEY RECEIVED DURING THEIR TARGETING. The appropriate Justice has now happened with regards to those who committed these crimes globally who have received the appropriate justice from legal systems globally. They have been used as a ‘severe’ example to ensure that we ALWAYS remain free from these crimes. We as humanity are now in a much better place now ALL Targeted Individuals have been freed globally. Justice has been served. Peace reigns in the world. Thank you god/ universe, thank you god/ universe. Thank you god/ universe and so it is.
Many thousands joined the prayer campaign and prayed 3 times daily for 20 minutes at the set times to finally end these crimes globally! Many thousands of people globally also prayed on this prayer for VERY long periods as much as they could and whenever they could (i.e. 1,2,3 hours). Many thousands even prayed continuously for many full days, weeks, months and until freedom was achieved. We achieved 20,000 people praying daily on this prayer in an incredibly quick amount of time after it went viral in the truth community, media and general public!(repeat this last paragraph 3 times before going on to the last line of the prayer below - VERY IMPORTANT TO ACTUALLY DO THIS!!).
This prayer has now manifested in the way described above or a way that is even better and faster and so it is (repeat 3 times).
END OF PRAYER
PLEASE NOTE THAT IF YOU FINISH READING THE ABOVE SCRIPT WITH YOUR FOCUSED PRAYER THEN PLEASE THEN JUST START BACK AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SCRIPT UNTIL THE 20 MINUTES OF PRAYER IS FINISHED (20 MINUTES SHOULD TAKE UP ABOUT 2-3 READINGS THROUGH DEPENDING ON WHETHER YOU READ FAST OR SLOW). PLEASE PUT YOUR ENTIRE INTENTION AND FOCUS ON THE PRAYER AND MOST IMPORTANTLY…
VIEW THE RESULT AS ALREADY HAVING BEING ACHIEVED (LIKE IN THE WAY IT IS WRITTEN!)
Once again, please note that the prayer has been written as if it has already happened because that is the best way to write things so that they manifest easily with little resistance (even if you don’t believe it). When praying it is very important that you…
See, hear and feel the result as already having been achieved. Visualize the result, hear people in your mind’s eye talking about how Targeted individuals are free (or you saying it to yourself) and feel and know that it is already true now that Targeted Individuals are free now.
THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE PRAYER ARE DEVELOPING FAITH AND FEELING IT AS ALREADY HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AS THE WORDS SUGGEST. IT IS THE FEELING OF BEING DONE ALREADY AND FAITH THAT ADDS THE POWER TO THE PRAYER.
Every time you pray your faith and belief will get stronger so do not worry if the first couple of times that you do this that you hear that inner voice saying ‘This will never happen’ or ‘This will never be done.’
Congratulations if you have prayed for 20 minutes (or whatever) you have just helped collectively free us and build ‘energy’ that will allow this to manifest with MUCH greater ease to ensure our freedom!!
Much love and many thanks.
Please continue to pray for 20 mins (or whatever you can) at the following times daily for consistency…
9am UK time (UTC time). This is 3am Central Standard time (CST) (i.e. the time zone for the central States in the USA)
3pm UK time (UTC time). This is 9am CST
9pm UK time (UTC time). This is 3pm CST.
Here are some corresponding times in some of the main time zones around the world. Here goes:
Mark) London, England: 9:00 AM / 3:00 PM, / and 9:00 PM (UTC or GMT)
Paris, France: 10:00 AM / 4:00 PM / and 10:00 PM (Central european time)
Sofia: 11AM/ 5PM/ and 11PM (Eastern European Time Zone)
Moscow: 12PM/ 6PM/ and 12AM (Further Eastern European Time)
New York, NY: 4:00 AM / 10:00 AM / and 4:00 PM (Eastern Daylight Time)
Chicago, IL: 3:00 AM / 9:00AM / and 3:00 PM (Central Daylight Time)
Boise, ID: 2:00 AM / 8:00 AM / and 2:00 PM (Mountain Standard time)
Los Angeles, CA: 1:00 AM / 7:00 AM / and 1:00 PM (Pacific Daylight Time)
Honolulu: 11PM / 5AM / and 11AM (Hawaii standard time)
Adak: 12AM / 6AM / and 12PM (Hawaii-Aleutian Daylight Time)
Anchorage: 1AM/ 7AM/ and 1PM (Alaska Daylight Time)
Salt lake City: 3AM/ 9AM/ and 3PM (Mountain Daylight Time)
Beijing, China : 4:00 PM / 10:00 PM / and 4:00 AM (China Standard time)
Tokyo, Japan: 5:00 PM / 11:00 PM / and 5:00 AM (Japan Standard Time)
Bangalore, India: 1:30 PM / 7:30 PM / and 1:30 AM (Indian Standard Time)
Sydney, Australia: 6:00 PM / 12:00 PM / and 6:00 AM (Australian Eastern Time Zone)
If your time zone is not above then please adjust the time for your time zone/ country in this link below. You will need to adjust from UTC time which is the same as GMT or UK time…
After finding out the difference please write your 3 prayer times down and commit them to memory. Also, please put them somewhere you can see them to remind you to pray at these times (i.e. stick them on your wall!). Then please fully decide that you are going to pray at these 3 times daily and fully commit to doing so. Also, please set your alarm on your watch at these times just in case you forget. You can also set online diary reminders to pop up (e.g. on outlook or wherever). This is the way we will get results with an ‘army’ of fully committed prayers. Please do not ignore the above suggestions. They will really help us get to the point where we do not even need the reminders because we know that each prayer time is coming up! At that point please keep your reminders going (as we are all human and occasionally can still forget!). Commitment and remembering to pray yourself at these times are key.
I WILL ALWAYS SEND TWEETS OUT ON TWITTER AT THE ABOVE TIMES AS REMINDERS. PLEASE USE THEM AS A PROMPT TO JOIN IN AS I AM ACTUALLY PAYING FOR THIS SCHEDULING WITH A SCHEDULING TOOL (BUFFER). I WANT TO KEEP PAYING FOR THIS BUT IT DEPENDS ON THE SUCCESS OF THIS CAMPAIGN.
PLEASE CAN ALL TARGETED INDIVIDUALS AND MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC AROUND THE WORLD JOIN IN TO COLLECTIVELY TO PRAY AT THESE TIMES NO MATTER WHAT YOUR TIME ZONE. PLEASE MAKE AS MANY AS YOU ARE ABLE TO MAKE. If you miss one or are occupied then please pray at the next one later on or remember to pray as soon as you have finished what you are doing. Even if you are at work or busy you can still pray at these times when you are working by holding the intention/ prayer in your mind as you work and that will still make an effective difference. If you can stop what you are doing to focus your FULL intention on praying that will be better though of course.
Other time options for the prayer campaign…
On reflection, while I would like as many people to be praying together globally at the same time around the world I feel the best way moving forward is to encourage people to pray at the times which work for them. What I mean by this is that IT IS STILL ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT WE PRAY 3 TIMES A DAY FOR 20 MINUTES AS A VERY BASIS BUT THAT WE DO IT ULTIMATELY AT TIMES THAT WORK FOR US. This is because some time zones only have one or two of the 3 sessions that they would be able to join.
Here are some alternative methods to finding the right prayer strategy (and times) for yourself…
Pray at 9am, 3pm and 9pm for 20 minutes at your own country's time (wherever you live in the world). I.E. the same times but in your own country's time zone.
Pray at 3 times a day for 20 minutes at the 3 times that suit you e.g. 7am, 5pm, 9pm or whatever.
Pray at one or two of the official times that we are all praying together globally and then just do the other one or two 20 minutes sessions that you have not done at the times that are convenient for you. It is important that if you do this you choose and stick to the same set times daily. (THIS IS A COMBINATION BETWEEN THE OFFICIAL GLOBAL TIMES AND THEN SETTING PRAYER SESSIONS TIMES AT YOUR OWN CONVENIENCE).
THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT WHEN YOU HAVE CHOSEN YOUR TIMES THAT YOU STICK TO YOUR ROUTINE AND DO NOT KEEP CHANGING. THIS WILL HELP YOU TO FORM AN ‘UNCONSCIOUS’ HABIT WHERE YOU JUST REMEMBER AND DO YOUR PRAYERS AT THESE TIMES NATURALLY WITHOUT STRUGGLE OR ‘RESISTANCE’. IF YOU KEEP CHANGING THE TIMES OR JUST GENERALLY HAVE A GOAL TO PRAY FOR 20 MINUTES A DAY WITHOUT HAVING ‘SPECIFIC SET TIMES’ TRUST ME IT WILL NOT WORK AND WILL BE MUCH HARDER TO MOTIVATE YOURSELF, REMEMBER AND DO.
So, to summarise the above, while there is power in collective praying globally at the same times, It is much more important that people just pray at the times that work for their schedule.
On top of the 3x20 mins per day (or as an even better alternative to this!) I am still encouraging many people to pray on this prayer for many hours and even for FULL days (i.e. 9am- 9pm or 9am -5pm). I HAVE DONE THIS MYSELF ALSO FOR DAYS AND MONTHS ON END SO IT IS POSSIBLE! If people are not working because of their targeting they could use this opportunity to literally view this as their full-time occupation to pray for this cause. They may do 9am - 5pm shifts of praying Monday to Friday with some break in between (structured like a working day!). The power of getting many people praying daily day-in-day-out on this prayer could not be underestimated! THIS IS WHAT WE REALLY NEED. Many other people who work Monday to Friday could spend 1, 2 or 3 hours in the evenings praying on this prayer. They could also choose to pray all day for both days at the weekend (i.e 9am-5pm or 9am-9pm) or choose one day to do so (i.e Saturday with Sunday off or vice versa). Please do whatever you can. GETTING SERIOUSLY COMMITTED AND ORGANIZED PRAYERS LIKE THIS WHO ARE PRAYING ON TOP OF THE RECOMMENDED INITIAL 3 X 20 MINUTES (OR EVEN BETTER MAKING IT PART OF THEIR DAILY AND WEEKLY ROUTINE BY PRAYING 9AM -5PM MONDAY TO FRIDAY/ SATURDAY/ OR SUNDAY) COULD BE THE DIFFERENCE THAT MAKES THE DIFFERENCE.
For most people it is probably going to be a good to aim to start to get into the habit of doing 3 x 20 minutes a day before going on for more, but not necessarily. Some people may just decide to go straight into it and do longer hours and days worth of praying. For some people just starting small and doing 5 minutes a day may be all they feel they can do or all they want to do right now. Some people may just work up to doing 20 minutes a day consistently at first. While I encourage people to AIM REALLY HIGH with this and aim to keep extending the amount of time that they pray per day and per week it is important that people just start praying and then take it from there. Also, if someone wants to just do 5 minutes a day and just keep it at that amount then that is still a help and is much appreciated by myself and the community.
So to summarise the above, while I would like as many people to pray as much as they can and increase the amount of time they pray with time, it is also important that we just get as many people praying as possible and that may mean starting small. It’s much better that someone is praying for 2, 5, 10 or 20 minutes a day and doing it consistently than not at all or trying to do too much and then just feeling like they cannot do any more and then stopping. That said the more people who can become full time/ extended prayers and ‘warrior’ prayers the better. WE NEED AN ARMY OF PRAYERS WHO CAN REALLY EXTEND THE AMOUNT OF PRAYING MINUTES AND HOURS TO ANOTHER LEVEL! #WarriorPrayers
AS A PROFESSIONAL LIFE COACH I PROMISE YOU THAT PRAYER IS THE ANSWER IF WE ALL GET INVOLVED. Our collective energy and intention of ‘freedom’ needs to be stronger than their energy of ‘oppression.’ IT REALLY IS THAT SIMPLE AS IN THE UNIVERSE EVERYTHING IS ACCOUNTABLE ENERGETICALLY AS WE ARE ALL ENERGETIC BEINGS INCLUDING OUR THOUGHTS AND EMOTIONS.
One advantage of prayer is it will reach places action cannot reach.
A huge thanks to all who have prayed especially any of the members of the public who have joined this prayer. God bless you are all true ‘saints’ and it is HUGELY appreciated!
Many thanks and much love to all,
Mark Williams (Life Coach and owner of Targeted UK)
Here is a personal development audiobook that teaches about the law of attraction so if you are undecided about whether to pray this will help you to understand how we use the law of attraction in everything we do especially in prayer and why prayer is therefore so important (prayer uses the law of attraction). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZUbfskQ-GAY&t=29040sPLEASE WATCH.
HDIAC Podcast - Weaponizing Brain Science: Neuroweapons - Part 1 of 2
11,336 viewsPremiered Jun 19, 2020
In part one of this two-part podcast, HDIAC analyst Mara Kiernan interviews Dr. James Giordano, a Professor in the department of Neurology and Biochemistry at Georgetown University Medical Center. The discussion begins with Dr. Giordano defining neuroweapons and explaining their applied technologies. He provides insight into the manner in which international weapons conventions govern the use neuroweapons and discusses the threats presented by neuroweapons in today’s environment. Dr. Giordano goes on to review the need for continuous monitoring, including his views regarding challenges and potential solutions for effectively understanding global developments in neuroweapon technologies.
China sees Starlink as military threat; Chinese COVID-19 test companies accused of fraud
52,557 views Premiered May 31, 2022
Special thanks to Shen Yun Performing Arts for sponsoring this video!
Use code CNINFOCUS to waive the ticketing fees for all U.S. performances through July 31, 2022.
Is Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite internet system on Beijing’s radar? Chinese researchers reportedly view the network as a possible military threat.
An American investment firm could be profiting from China's zero-COVID-19 policy, after investing millions into a Chinese PCR test manufacturer.
The accuracy of Chinese virus testing is being brought into question. Beijing took down three COVID-19 test companies in just ten days after accusing them of fraud.
Is Beijing becoming the next Shanghai? The capital city is tightening its anti-virus measures. But it’s causing delays for local medical care, a problem posing lethal consequences.
Actor Tom Cruise's long-awaited "Top Gun: Maverick" had a brilliant opening weekend for its global debut. The success came without China, the world’s biggest movie market.
Pink Noise, Black Screen 🌸⬛ • 12 hours • No ads
596,432 viewsDec 26, 2020
The pink noise in this video can help you relax and get some sleep. It's also great for babies and may alleviate the effects of tinnitus (in fact, I have personally used this sound for help with my tinnitus flare-ups, and found it to be incredibly helpful). Enjoy, and rest well.
Sweeping High Frequency Noise Ten Hours 10 - Tinnitus Relief - ASMR
(Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response)
661,726 viewsApr 26, 2017
Here is Seeping High Frequency Noise which slowly shifts frequency boosts and cuts in the Blue and Violet Noise range.
Sweeping Pink, White and Grey Noise has been popular on the channel, as well as Blue and Violet noise which focus on the high frequency spectrum.
The up down cycle moves at a period of one minute over the 10 hour video. I find it relaxing for sleeping.
Some listeners with tinnitus or hyperacusis feel relief by listening to noise and the high frequency sweep may to to their liking.
How do you like the noise?
The creation process involved a DAW (digital audio workstation), ProTools. A audio signal generator was utilized to create noise which is then equalized to create noise only above 5kHz. The audio is recorded from the generator for 10 hours. This audio has an equalizer inserted which I programmed with a mid-frequency boost and width of about 1/2 octave. This boost frequency was then programmed to shift over time with a reoccurring period around 60 seconds. The exported into a video editing program, Magix Vegas. A corresponding video is created with custom graphics I made in the video program. The visual is animated, then married to the audio and rendered out to the full length final video.
Find Cell Towers Around You Such as 5G, Any Antenna. "Click on Image"