ISSUE 24

 03-16.04.2023

• Security situation update
• Russia's cyber-war methods
• The arrest of Metropolitan Pavlo 
• Macron's Visit to Beijing: Results and Risks of Rapprochement with China
• Parallel imports help Russia continue its war against Ukraine
• Gender Lens of Russian War on Ukraine

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After months of fighting, Russia allegedly made significant gains in the city of Bakhmut. According to military analysts, Russians captured parts of the city center, consolidated these gains, and pushed even further, forcing Ukrainian defenses back. At this point, Ukraine only has a secure hold over areas west of the rail line which separates the city center of the city from the west side of the city. According to foreign intelligence, Ukrainian troops have been forced to withdraw in an organized way from some territory in the battlefield city of Bakhmut as Russia mounts a renewed assault there, though the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence has never confirmed these reports. PMC Wagner assault groups continue to conduct the main advance through the center of the town, while Russian airborne forces (VDV) have relieved some Wagner units securing the northern and southern flanks of the operation.

The Russian military concentrates its main efforts on offensive actions in the Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Maryinka directions. In the Avdiivka direction, the Russian military deployed and brought into operation the main forces of the 8th and 58th Army and the 1st Army Corps, in the Lyman area - only the 2nd Army Corps. The Russian troops previously deployed in the Avdiivka direction were reinforced by military units of the 58th Army, which was deployed in the Melitopol and Berdiansk directions. This indicates the exhaustion of combat potential of the 8th Army troops and a lack of combat-ready operational reserves. The Russian forces operating in the Avdiivka-Maryinka area have a very powerful artillery group. The Russian Air and Space Force, however, remains capable of establishing at least temporary superiority in the air at certain areas of the front. The enemy is trying not to use its regular forces, waiting for the end of the battles for Bakhmut and Avdiivka.

ANALYSIS

The Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to experience a critical shortage of electronic warfare systems, anti-aircraft defense systems, artillery shells, and heavy infantry weapons (mortars, automatic grenade launchers, large-caliber machine guns). This may be the main reason for delaying the expected Ukrainian counteroffensive until May, as temperatures continue to rise, rainfall reduces, and the muddy ground hardens. Russian forces have been consolidating their captured territories by developing defensive fortifications a few kilometers behind the current front-line, in preparation for an expected Ukrainian counter-offensive. However, Ukraine’s counteroffensive could be very difficult without air superiority. Ukraine desperately needs more fighter jets for successful breakout operations, experts believe. Besides a lack of air superiority, Ukraine has other constraints to overcome in order to succeed during the much-anticipated counteroffensive. Hence, Ukraine has high expectations for the next “milestone” Ramstein task force meeting planned for 21 April 2023.  Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov met with his counterparts in Greece, Cyprus, Spain, and Romania, and reinstated priorities for the discussion: protecting the sky, creating an “armored fist,” and providing ammunition. 

Recently, a journalist investigation based on leaked documents called “Vulkan Files”  revealed information on Russian cyber warfare operations. The investigation revealed how one of the Russian IT companies working for GRU and other special services developed software for tracking, cyber-attacks, control of the internet, and functioning of “bot factories” before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Apart from these tools, Russian cyberwarfare units have been conducting their activities in coordination with the activities of the conventional military.  

ANALYSIS

In addition to special cyber warfare units of the GRU, FSB, and foreign intelligence service, there are also outsourced companies engaged in Russian cyber warfare. As a contractor working for Russian Ministry of Defense, the company Vulkan created tools for the Russian state to detect security vulnerabilities at target institutions, plan attacks against infrastructure, conduct surveillance, censor, share disinformation, and create fake profiles en masse. Some projects were developed to control the internet at a specific territory, block users' access to certain websites, or promote content created by bots; other projects focused on targeted attacks on critical infrastructure, including train and air traffic, electricity, and water supply.  

Other files demonstrated some of the mapped potential targets - critical infrastructure in the European states and the US. Founded by two Russian military professionals, the company has not been sanctioned by the US or the EU. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, its employees traveled around Western Europe attending  IT and cybersecurity conferences. It was identified that some of its former employees currently live in EU countries and work at global IT and tech companies, including Amazon Web Services which is used to store critical data, Siemens, Booking, and Trivago. This demonstrates how easy it is for Russian cyber security experts to get into large Western companies that provide a variety of services and hold large amounts of data. 

Vulkan has also been linked to Sandworm - one of GRU’s hacker groups which has been conducting cyber-attacks for a decade. Since 2014, Russia has targeted Ukraine with cyber-attacks and released new ransomware that infected hundreds of organizations across Ukraine and around the world. The Kremlin’s hacker groups have been responsible for cyber-attacks on a range of targets: the Ukrainian power grid in 2015 and 2016, the Democratic National Convention in 2016, the Republican National Committee in 2021, and attempts to cause a power blackout in Ukraine in 2022. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, approximately half of the Russian cyber-attacks against Ukraine were conducted against government institutions, one-fifth on IT and communications, and one-fifth against the energy sector. Other targeted spheres have been media, transportation, healthcare, the military, and the defense industries. Most targeted countries after Ukraine have been the US, Poland, and UK, as Russia has noticeably carried out cyber-attacks in retaliation for moves that harmed its ability to wage war against Ukraine. But Russia’s cyber-attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure didn’t produce the intended results, as many of Russia’s cyber capabilities have been overestimated, and Ukrainian capabilities have been underestimated. Importantly, the Ukrainian government’s cooperation with the private sector in many ways has increased its resilience and helped fight against cyber-attacks. But Russia continues to release new ransomware, some of which, for example, was deployed against Ukraine and Poland in the autumn of 2022. It is expected that Moscow will continue conducting cyber and espionage attacks and use cyber operations to create networks of (bots) to influence public opinion. One of the recent hack-and-leak operations by Russia contributed to the destabilization of the political situation in Moldova. Russia’s intelligence services also seek to gain access to government and defense-related organizations in the West and extract data to identify and target people. 

Russia pairs its cyber-attacks against Ukraine with missile strikes, to increase civilian suffering. These are coordinated cases - cyber and physical military, targeting civilians and having direct and clear physical results. Therefore, Ukraine advocates that cyber-attacks targeting civilians launched in coordination with and supportive of kinetic military attacks are considered war crimes. For example, shelling and cyber-attacks on governmental institutions' websites, internet service providers, IT infrastructure, power grids, telecommunications, and critical infrastructure affect civilians' lives. The Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC at the Hague was asked by a group of legal professionals and academics to add cyber-attacks to their investigations into the war against Ukraine. The example provided by the experts was the Sandworm group and two of its cyber-attacks on electricity systems in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016, which affected civilians. Ukrainian officials have been gathering evidence of cyber-attacks linked to military strikes and carried out against critical systems by Kremlin-linked hackers to present them to the ICC. If the legal definition of aggression (first defined by the UN in 1974) is changed to include the use of cyber weapons, which are part of a war in the 21st century, cyber-attacks can be included in the investigation into Russian war crimes and perpetrators can be convicted as war criminals. This would be supplementary and should not divert efforts from original investigations, as part of the whole efforts to seek justice. This would be crucial to deter future cyber-attacks against critical civilian infrastructure around the world, as currently there is a lack of mechanisms to hold the perpetrators accountable. 

It has been reported that Russia is now providing Iran with cyberweapons in exchange for military drones, a sign the two countries are deepening their anti-Western cooperation. Meanwhile, the US has imposed new cybersecurity regulations on oil and gas facilities and suggested the creation of a virtual rapid response mechanism at NATO to defend against such attacks. Ukraine advocates for increased cooperation and collective response and has proposed creating a single global organization to help share threat information and prepare for future attacks. Yurii Shchyhol, the head of Ukraine’s SSSCIP stated there is a need for a hub or a venue, a “one cyberspace” shared by countries of the “civilized world” where they can interact, exchange information, and support each other. Russian methods and targets are known and predictable, and Russia will continue its cyber-attacks against Ukraine and the West, so the relevance of strengthening cyber defense and resilience against surveillance and disinformation attacks remains crucial. 

On 1 April 2023, the State Security Service (SBU) of Ukraine issued a suspicion notice to Petro Lebid - Metropolitan Pavlo of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and the governor of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. He is charged with committing crimes against Ukraine's sovereignty and national security i.e. incitement to hatred on the base of religion, and distribution of materials, which attempt to justify Russian aggression. Petro Lebid, commonly known under his nickname "Pasha Mercedes", was sentenced to home arrest with the obligation to wear an electronic bracelet. The defendant, in turn, denies the allegations and insists his arrest is politically motivated. 

This was followed by the intensification of parishes transferring from UOC-MP to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). In December 2018  the Unity Council of the Eastern Orthodox Churches of Ukraine declared the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, by merging Ukrainian Eastern Orthodox churches. On 6 January 2019, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I signed and presented the tomos of autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to Metropolitan Epiphanius I (Serhiy Dumenko) who was elected as the primate of OCU. The period from 6 January to 30 April 2019 was characterized by a high transition activity as 488 out of 563 church communities (parishes) previously affiliated with UOC-MP that transitioned to OCU from December 2018 to October 2021, did it within the four-month period outlined above. The next peak of the transition wave started at the end of February 2022, after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 1275 church communities in total had transferred as of April 2023. According to the survey provided by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in August 2022, the share of people identifying themselves with the UOC-MP, decreased from 18% to 4%, in comparison to 2021. 

It is worth mentioning that despite the abovementioned development, all the main sanctuaries – Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, Pochaiv Lavra, and Sviatohirsk Lavra – have remained under the Moscow Patriarchate’s influence. 

ANALYSIS

In November-December 2022 SBU conducted searches in various locations of UOC-MP within the context of national security measures. Apart from propaganda literature, weapons, Russian passports, and Russian symbols - e.g. Russian tricolor or medals for the capture of Crimea - were found. It should be added that it is not the first time that UOC-MP has been used as a weapon against Ukraine. In 2018, Ihor Hordiychuk, Major General and Hero of Ukraine informed in an interview for ATR, that via radio interception he had received evidence of Sviatohirsk Lavra's cooperation with the Russian terrorists in the Donetsk region. In particular, the clerks of Sviatohirsk Lavra provided Russians with the premises of the tunnels and caves for military use, including weapons deployment. Later, Russian ex-colonel of the FSB and war criminal, Igor Girkin stated that his guard during the seizure of Sloviansk consisted fully of the Sviatohirsk Lavra monks. 

Religion has always been tightly bound up with Russian politics and ideology, starting with the concept of Moscow as a Byzantium successor (“the Third Rome”), justifying the politics of foreign expansion - the “Russian World’/Russkiy Mir” concept. Even during the Soviet Regime, when officially religion was persecuted, the Russian Orthodox Church was accountable and subordinated to the KGB, and priests were obliged to serve as agents. Religion in Russia has penetrated the national ideology and become a synonym for patriotism. Russian clerks have been consecrating weapons and tanks before the Russian military uses them in its war against Ukraine, while Russian President Vladimir Putin justifies the military invasion in Ukraine with the defense of Orthodox faith and convinces the Russian population that this war is “sacred”. “It is impossible to understand the current version of Russian political mentality and strategic culture, and consequently the security theory and practice, without the clerical and theological components”, states Dmitry Adamsky in his “Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy”.  

It is noteworthy that Russian officials blame Ukraine for “believers’ rights violations”, when in fact, Russia uses repression against religious groups in Ukrainian territories it occupied. According to the data of the Institute for the Study of War, the cases of religious repression are part of a campaign of systematic eradication of “undesired” religious organizations and promotion of the Moscow Patriarchate. 

In January 2023, Draft Law No 8371 was registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Its main task, outlined in the Explanatory Note, is to exclude the activity of religious organizations with a managerial center outside of Ukraine, in a country leading an armed aggression against Ukraine. 

Another important issue is the fact that bringing a high priesthood official to justice could be a precedent, as previously, representatives of this group avoided responsibility and remained "immune". Thus, this case might be a signal to the entire UOC-MP clergy. The arrest of Metropolitan Pavlo, along with the issues described above, is considered by the Ukrainian expert society as a liberation from the “Russian world” delusion and moving toward spiritual liberation. 

From 5-7 April, French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attended an official visit to Beijing, where they met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The main topics were Russian aggression in Ukraine and the EU-China relations. Macron has urged his Chinese counterpart to help stop Russia's war in Ukraine. "I know I can count on you to bring Russia to its senses and bring everyone back to the negotiating table," he told Xi in Beijing. In turn, the Chinese leader did not condemn the Russian war against Ukraine, emphasizing only the need for peaceful dialogue, respect for the parties' interests, and compliance with the rules of warfare. A delegation of 60 French business leaders arrived in China with Macron.

In addition, France and China reached agreements on developing cooperation in the military sphere. After a visit to China, the French president said that Europe must reduce its dependence on the U.S. and avoid being dragged into the China-US confrontation over Taiwan. Diplomats and lawmakers in the U.S. and European countries criticized Macron for such remarks, especially considering that Washington has been a die-hard supporter of Europe in its struggle with the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The day after the European leaders' visit ended, China sent warships and aircraft to the dividing line with Taiwan, demonstrating its willingness to "resolve the Taiwan case" by force.

ANALYSIS

The primary goals of the European leader’s negotiations – to attract Xi Jinping to a more pro-Ukrainian position and strengthen common European rhetoric – did not succeed in Beijing for several reasons. Firstly, Macron has not received any signals that China is ready to change its strategy in the context of Russia's war against Ukraine. In the Franco-Chinese declaration, the invasion of the Russian Federation is still called the "Ukrainian conflict" without identifying the aggressor. China is unlikely to change its diplomatic course of "moderate neutrality" and condemn the Kremlin for its criminal actions. Secondly, the visit proved significant political disagreements between European leaders in both the economic and security spheres.

Contrary to the intra-European position regarding the danger of excessive economic dependence on China, the French president is determined to develop bilateral trade widely. Thirty-six Chinese and French enterprises signed 18 agreements on expanding cooperation. Furthermore, the declaration on developing cooperation in the military sphere between France and China goes against the security interests of NATO allies. Macron agreed to deepen collaboration between France's Pacific Command and China's People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command, while the US is preparing to defend Taiwan in case of Chinese aggression. In addition, such a strengthening of Franco-Chinese friendship took place in the background of Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the US.

Apart from the failed EU “one voice policy”, Macron, during the visit, openly demonstrated his desire to stand aside from the United States. This urged Chinese and Russian propagandists to talk about an alternative position of the Europeans. The Chinese media interpreted his visit as "the beginning of the liberation of European politics from the American dictatorship."

Statements regarding the return to the idea of "strategic autonomy," and in its essence - the EU's foreign policy and security independence from the US, are dangerous for transatlantic unity. They can cause harm to security in Europe and complicate the development of a unified EU position towards China. For Ukraine, such French rhetoric presents several risks: losing unity among the allies can reduce political and military support and increase the pressure on Kyiv regarding negotiations with the Russian Federation on unfavorable conditions. In the face of numerous challenges and threats from authoritarian regimes, the unity of the West remains a crucial necessity. The ability of the Allies to unite will be decisive for successfully deterring the Russian and Chinese dictators.

Recently, German Economy Minister Robert Habeck said that the country's government should take stricter measures against German companies that circumvent EU sanctions against Russia by doing business with other countries. In addition, there have already been statements that the 11th package of sanctions against Russia will focus mainly on the fight against the circumvention of existing restrictions. Since the beginning of the full-scale war, Russia has significantly increased the volume of purchases from China, India, the Middle East, and other countries that did not join the sanction policy. They resell microchips, conductors, and other equipment which Russia cannot purchase directly from Western countries.

ANALYSIS

In recent months, the mass media has increasingly written about how Russia seeks to import sanctioned goods through intermediary countries. For example, it purchased microchips through Chinese companies. Such parallel imports are the best option for Russia to obtain the necessary spare parts to repair military equipment and at least partially reduce the deficit of Western goods in its market. Now it is possible to fight this through the imposition of secondary sanctions from the US on individual companies that carry out this trade. This method was used against the above-mentioned Chinese companies. Also, the US and the EU actively use diplomacy to persuade such countries to stop supplying dual-use goods to Russia. However, the last option has not yet demonstrated its effectiveness. After all, such countries have close trade ties with Russia and remain quiet when it comes to condemning Russian aggression. 

Cases of parallel imports into Russia do not indicate the ineffectiveness of sanctions—rather, the opposite. Thanks to ten packages of sanctions, the Russian economy has shrunk, despite the attempts by its government to stabilize the situation. Purchasing goods through intermediaries implies a 10-20% price increase, which is also affecting the financial capacity of the Russian Federation. 

Despite the difficulties, Russia continues to look for ways to circumvent sanctions and purchase equipment, which is used in particular to repair and create military equipment. In 2022, the UAE exported 15 times more microchips to Russia than the year before. Imports to Russia from Kazakhstan increased almost one and a half times (by 148%). The EU is already working on options for solving this problem, particularly through a request to third countries to stop such cooperation with Russia. It is essential to rely not only on diplomacy in this matter. It is necessary also to thoroughly check the counterparties with whom global companies work and to develop tools to prosecute those who trade directly with Russia. There are no specific "red flags" for companies regarding such trading. Introducing clear rules and outlining the economic consequences for their violation by private players and third countries will be able to influence this situation positively. It will not be possible to stop the parallel import completely. However, its volumes are now dangerously high and are supporting the continuation of military aggression. One of the goals of sanctions is to reduce Russia's ability to wage war. The Russians' lack of equipment for repairing and building new weapons will significantly help this.  

“War is an archaic phenomenon which turns men and women to traditional gender roles of warriors and protectors.” - stated Ukrainian human rights advocate Larysa Denysenko. The Russian full-scale war of aggression on Ukraine is exacerbating gender inequalities in Ukraine. According to the UN Women's rapid gender analysis, Ukraine is backtracking on gender equality since February 2022 in terms of an increase in gender-based violence (GBV), unpaid care burden, lack of women representation, etc. According to the research conducted by International Organization for Migration, 39% of Ukrainians stated they would agree to work “for free food and shelter if they move abroad” as the population becomes more vulnerable.  

ANALYSIS

Conflict-related GBV 

Russia is using rape and sexual violence as a tool of warfare. The nature of the military conflict makes women especially vulnerable to gender-based violence and exploitation. Since the full-scale invasion, rape, including gang rape, sexual torture, forced nudity, and other forms of abuse, has been documented by human rights organizations, journalists, and law enforcement bodies. According to YurFem NGO, the scale and number of cases of GBV by the Russian military toward Ukrainians are not known for several reasons. What is evident is that survivors of GBV reported poor quality of services provided as the Ukrainian health and social security system was not ready for such a challenge.  

Domestic violence and GBV 

Levels of domestic and gender-based violence, according to experts, are not decreasing due to the war. However, what can be observed in several cases following the full-scale invasion, is that a tendency has grown to publicly condemn domestic and GBV and demand investigations. One of the reasons is that Ukrainians try to reflect on violence committed by Russia and do not want to be associated with it. 

Traditional gender roles 

The war is reinforcing traditional gender roles and increasing the imbalance between men and women in unpaid care work. In difficult situations of evacuation, and starting life abroad, women are usually the ones to experience the burden of family care. Given the ban on men crossing the borders, women are often taking full responsibility for family care while men are in the army or critical infrastructure roles. 

As a result of war, the image of women as professionals and experts suffers. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian online media cite women experts in 16% of cases while male experts are cited in 84% of them. The number of female experts being cited has dropped by 7% since the start of the full-scale invasion, according to the Institute for Mass Information.   

Women refugees 

39% of respondents in Ukraine stated that they would agree to work “for free food and shelter should they move abroad”. Lack of security, including stable income when moving abroad, is likely to push women into unprotected informal job sectors which will make them vulnerable to gender-based violence and human trafficking. However, in many situations, women who moved abroad were able to realize their potential in a foreign country by starting their businesses, promoting Ukrainian culture abroad, learning new languages, and growing academically - opportunities that many Ukrainian men did not have.  

Women's representation and engagement of the international community 

Finally, women are underrepresented in decision-making on the issues of humanitarian protection, negotiations, and in political life. In 2022, Ukraine moved from 74th to 81st place in the Global Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum, especially lagging on political representation. Voices of women should be involved in the planning and implementation of post-war recovery which will become a basis for their return from abroad when the security situation allows.  

Ukraine needs to create better response mechanisms to gender inequality, including at the international level, to counter conflict-related and domestic GBV, and bring perpetrators to justice. Ukraine needs the experience of the international community, especially in conflict-related violence, to develop those mechanisms. 

Russia's current war against Ukraine demonstrated the readiness of the democratic world to unite in the fight for freedom and liberal values. However, there are democracies all over the world in need of protection against autocracies willing to challenge international order. One year from the start of full-scale invasion, we introduce you the report “War in Ukraine: Lessons identified and lessons learned“, which analyzes policies and practices that have impacted Ukraine’s resilience in key sectors. Outcomes of this research can be used as recommendations for other democracies building resilience against conventional, hybrid, or other threats (e.g., natural disasters), from Europe to the Pacific.

Thank you.

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