Gaguzian elections pose a threat of social conflict in Moldova |
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- Intensified tensions between an official Chisinau and Gagauz autonomy
- Pro-Russian political agenda in Gagauzia
- How to respond?
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The Russian success story in Africa (pt. 2): Is Egypt Changing Military Alliances? |
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- Egyptian Menu: Weapons, Alliances, and Geopolitics
- Missile deliveries to Russia have been cancelled, with artillery ammunition likely to go to Ukraine instead
- What to do?
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Disinformation narratives and influence operations |
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- Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation stated, that drug use has become a norm among soldiers of the Ukrainian army
- Russian media claim, that Ukraine's air defence system is not capable of shooting down Russia's "Kinzhal” hypersonic missiles
- Russian media claim, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stopped appearing in public and allegedly died
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Gaguzian elections pose a threat of social conflict in Moldova |
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Intensified tensions between an official Chisinau and Gagauz autonomy |
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On May 14, 2023, the second round of the governor elections took place in Gagauzia. As a result, Yevgenia Guțul, the candidate of pro-Russian Ilan Shor’s party has won the Bashkan runoff vote. The preliminary data showed the candidate supported by the Șhor Party gained over 52% of the poll, under the 54,5% turnout. The official Chisinau believed numerous violations occurred and announced the investigation of the bribery cases that occurred during the voting. But the parliament of Gagauzia supported a new Bashkan. Tensions between the Moldovan and Gagauzian governments have already resulted in several protests in the capital of Gagauzia and could potentially lead to insecurity and social upheavals.
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Pro-Russian political agenda in Gagauzia |
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The Bashkan elections in Gagauzia demonstrated a notable strengthening of the Russian positions in the region. The first round of a poll has already resulted in approximately 90% of the votes being given to the pro-Russian candidates. According to the primary data, at least 6 nominees out of 8 runnings have public connections with Russian officials, possess property in Russia or officially declare support of Russian foreign and security policy. Finally, Yevgenia Guțul and Grigorii Uzun who both represents Russian-sympathizer parties passed to the second round. Hence, a final round of the elections was a competition between two pro-Russian camps with nearly identical anti-European and Russia-Turkey boosting visions.
Yevgenia Guțul presented the party of Ilan Shor, who was involved in the theft of a billion euros from the banking system of Moldova (the accusation was eventually proven by the court) as well as reportedly was directly sponsored by the Russian secret service. Since the Russian envisions to Ukraine Ilan Shor’s party was responsible for several massive protest movements against the Moldovan government and European integration of Moldova. Besides, following the preliminary results of the second round of elections on May 15, Yevgenia Guțul has already spoken out in favour of strengthening the region's relations with Russia. Namely, she promised to open a representative office of Gagauzia in Moscow.
Moldova's Prime Minister commented that the law enforcement agencies would check the elected candidate's statement according to the law on separatism adopted in February 2023 in Moldova. Additionally, the Central Electoral Commission of Moldova informed on May 16, it initiated 8 criminal processes on the facts of illegal financing of electoral competitors, who received donations from individuals exceeding the maximum established by law for cash donations, during the elections in the Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit. According to both Moldovan President and the Prime Minister, the election campaign in Gagauzia was held with numerous violations and illegal money penetration.
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A Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit will continue to serve as the focal point of social tensions and insecurity in Moldova. The predominantly pro-Russian population, facing the economic consequences of the war, such as rising gas prices and inflation along with the ongoing conflicts with the official Chisinau, could be weaponized by Russia to rise social unrest, potentially resulting in a civil conflict. That is why the Moldovan government should make sure all the Gagauzian electoral developments fit the country's constitution as well as enforce the security units in and around Gagauzia.
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The Russian success story in Africa (pt. 2): Is Egypt Changing Military Alliances? |
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Egyptian Menu: Weapons, Alliances, and Geopolitics |
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Egypt has long sought to improve its image and strengthen its relations with foreign partners. One of its allies is Russia. Recent events and news reports suggest that this long-term cooperation may be insidious. Relations between Egypt and Russia have a rich history that has changed over time, but the situation now, specifically the Russian war in Ukraine, has brought a whole new dynamic.
The Egyptian army is now the largest in Africa and purchases weapons from the US and the EU as well as from Russia. It is Russia that has become the largest supplier of arms to Egypt, which is crucial for the Egyptian army. Unlike the US and Europe, which often impose conditions on arms sales, Russia faces no such restrictions. For example, under a 2014 reciprocal agreement worth $3.5 billion, Egypt purchased MiG-29M2 fighter jets, Ka-52 helicopters, and Antey-2500 anti-missile systems. This deal helped Al-Sisi counter external pressure and allowed him to return Egypt to Middle Eastern power politics.
Joint Russian-Egyptian naval exercises held in 2021 in Alexandria Bay further underscored the increasingly close relations between Russia and Egypt. This cooperation is in line with the new cooperation protocol signed by the defence ministers of the two countries in August of the same year.
Given that Egypt is far from the post-Soviet space and has no conflicting interests with Moscow, this makes their relations very easy. Egypt also acts as a mediator between Russia and Saudi Arabia, which is the main supporter Al-Sisi.
Despite this, US support (both financial and military) for Egypt remains crucial. However, Egypt is balancing between Russia and Western powers such as the US and France to gain political and diplomatic advantages and ensure internal regime stability. In the new Middle East, where the US presence is limited, such balancing of power centres is a natural choice for Egypt. Egypt will thus continue to seek a balance between partnership with Russia and relations with Western powers to secure its interests and prosperity.
As I mentioned in the last article, Egypt is developing its relationship with Russia through the construction of the Dabaa nuclear facility, supporting its transition to a low-carbon economy and its goal of generating more than 40% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2035. Amid the Russian war in Ukraine Egypt has an opportunity to increase gas supplies to Europe. In 2022, Egypt supplied 3 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas to Europe, particularly Italy.Despite increasing cooperation with Europe, Egypt has been hesitant to condemn Russia's war in Ukraine and has rejected the idea of imposing sanctions because it values Russia as a reliable partner.
Al-Sisi is also seeking to diversify global partnerships due to uncertainty towards the US following the suspension of military and financial aid in 2013. Although the aid was later restored, it had an impact on US-Egyptian relations. The US recently announced the withholding of $130 million in military aid until Egypt improves its human rights record. This has prompted Russia to fill a potential regional vacuum caused by the US focus on Ukraine and China. Russia has taken notice of the problematic US approach to Egypt and has long sought a place to replace the US, which is why Egypt ranks third on the list of Russia's largest arms buyers.
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Missile deliveries to Russia have been cancelled, with artillery ammunition likely to go to Ukraine instead |
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Even so, this cooperation has at times stalled thanks to U.S. forces. Last month, thanks to leaked Pentagon documents, Egypt reportedly decided to cancel planned missile deliveries to Russia and instead provide artillery ammunition to Ukraine, adding a new dimension to the dynamics of Egyptian-Russian relations. According to leaked documents, Al-Sisi had originally planned to send up to 40,000 122 mm Sakr-45 missiles to Russia. However, this plan was shelved in March. The reason for this postponement appears to be diplomatic pressure from the US and possible threats. Egypt is a long-time ally of the United States in the Middle East and receives more than $1 billion in military aid from the US each year, which it could conceivably lose if it provided the missiles to Russia. This information should be taken with a grain of salt, however, as some of the documents may be false or come from unreliable sources.
At the same time, Egypt recently rejected US requests to restrict Russian flights over Egyptian airspace. This refusal prevents the US from restricting the movement of Russian military aircraft between Russia and its bases in Syria. Although Egypt is the second largest recipient of US military aid in the world, Al-Sisi has chosen not to comply with these requests. Thus, Russia-Egypt relations are indeed complicated, and the question is to what extent this diplomatic chemistry between Al-Sisi and Putin is genuine and not just a pragmatic relationship.
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Russian-Egyptian relations are complicated but crucial. Egypt may become the place where conflict resolution in the Middle East is discussed behind the door. The West should therefore monitor the situation and not take it lightly. The EU and the US should continue to insist on respect for human rights and democratic principles, and it is also important to keep a close eye on Russian activities both in Egypt and in the region. Above all, the EU and the US should work together. The US is still a big diplomatic player in the case of Egypt, which still relies somewhat on US support. Coordination and regular dialogue between the two sides is key to an effective response to Russian activities. Given the proliferation of disinformation campaigns, it is important to strengthen resistance to disinformation and manipulation. Given the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, it is also important to provide support to Ukrainian forces. Russia, even with however much support it may have from Egypt or other Arab countries, should not have a chance to defeat Ukraine and should have a chance to defend its sovereignty.
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Disinformation narratives and influence operations |
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Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation stated, that drug use has become a norm among soldiers of the Ukrainian army |
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Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Aleksandr Grebyonkin in an interview with a Russian newspaper said, that drug use is considered the norm among soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. According to Grebyonkin, the conduct of a special military operation “greatly contributed to blocking the supply channels of Ukrainian drugs intended for distribution among Russian youth”.
This narrative is an attempt to undermine the public image of the Ukrainian army by presenting it as criminals and drug addicts, thus justifying the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a necessary measure to protect the Russian population from the influx of drugs, coming from Ukraine.
The statement was based on a claim, that the drug Aprophenum was found in a Ukrainian first aid kit, which was previously used as an antidote for the treatment of chemical poisoning. According to Ukrainian legislation, this drug is included in the list of psychotropic substances the circulation of which is restricted and in respect of which some control measures are allowed to be excluded. In addition, according to the State Register of Medical Products of Ukraine, there is no registered drug with such active substance in Ukraine.
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Russian media claim, that Ukraine's air defence system is not capable of shooting down Russia's "Kinzhal” hypersonic missiles |
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Russian media, referring to representatives of Russia's Ministry of Defense and Russian military experts, claim that the recent interception of the Russian hypersonic ballistic missile "Kinzhal" by the Ukrainian Armed Forces is impossible and was faked, in an attempt to support the Russian narrative that Russian hypersonic missiles are invulnerable to air defence capabilities deployed in Ukraine.
The first report that the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to intercept the Russian “Kinzhal” missile appeared on May 5th. The next day, the commander of the Ukrainian Air Force Mykola Oleshchuk confirmed, that during the night attack on May 4th, the Kinzhal missile was shot down for the first time using the Patriot missile system received from the Allies, capable of intercepting threats such as fighter jets and ballistic missiles. Thomas Karako, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies believes, that Russia's Kinzhal missile is not a hypersonic weapon, as Moscow claims, since it is incapable of sustaining hypersonic flight for most of the time, thus it can be hit by the Patriot missile system.
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Russian media claim, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stopped appearing in public and allegedly died |
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Recently, disinformation about the alleged death of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valeriy Zaluzhny was spread by Russian media and social networks. This narrative appeared against the backdrop of theUkrainian commander-in-chief's refusal to attend the NATO Military Committee conference. Due to Zaluzhny's refusal to attend the conference, several Russian media began to spread disinformation that Valeriy Zaluzhny, Oleksandr Syrsky, and other commanders of the Ukrainian Armed Forces had been eliminated.
Such claims were refuted by Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malyar. According to Malyar, the goal of such messages is to create short-term hype and demoralize Ukrainian troops while raising the morale of Russian troops. In addition, a Ukrainian military expert said, that such disinformation is an attempt to provoke a response from the Ukrainian supreme command to identify its whereabouts. Later, Zaluzhny disproved Russian disinformation by appearing in public, while the narrative about his death was actively spread.
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Karolína Mrázková – Dmytro Filonenko – Skylar Young - Danylo Stonis
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