ISSUE 28
08 - 14. 05. 2023
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- Security situation update
- "Peace" initiatives of the Kremlin's friends in Europe
- How many Ukrainians will there be after the war: demographic crisis or catastrophe
- Chinese investments: advantage or harm for Ukraine?
- Ukraine's recovery going digital: what to expect?
- Change of perceptions and narratives about Ukraine in World War II
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You can find a PDF version of this issue suitable for printing at the bottom of the newsletter.
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SECURITY SITUATION UPDATE |
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Since the beginning of May, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have regained some positions around Bakhmut, forcing Russian military units, including the 72nd brigade of the Russian Armed Forces, to leave the territory they occupied, on 9 May. Since then, the Ukrainians have carried out a series of counterattacks recapturing some blocks within the city and expanding the buffer along the Khromove road. The spokesperson of the Eastern Grouping of Forces of the AFU Colonel Serhii Cherevatyi stated on 13 May that Ukrainian forces had liberated 17,3 square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut direction over three days of counterattacks. On Sunday 14 May, Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Maliar stated that the AFU had captured more than ten Russian positions in the north and south of the outskirts of Bakhmut. They cleared a large area of the forest massif in the Ivanivske district, capturing occupiers. The fight for Bakhmut has become the war’s single longest and bloodiest battle. Although the Ukrainians are making small gains, Russia still controls about 90% of the largely ruined city. Mykhailo Podolyak, Advisor to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, believes that the eventual liberation of the eastern city of Bakhmut will be a "prelude" to the expected Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Bakhmut remains the most intensive area of the 1500 km-long frontline, with AFU countering approximately 50 Russian attacks daily, both in Eastern and Southern directions. Russia also continues to use intensively strategic aviation, S-300 rocket systems, artillery systems, and kamikaze drones to target Ukrainian civilian and military infrastructure every night. Thus, a massive air raid was registered during the night of 13 May, with Kyiv and several other oblasts targeted in the period between 02:30 a.m. and around 5 a.m. In the Khmelnytskyi region (West of Ukraine) critical infrastructure had been hit by a Russian missile causing a big fire, as well as damage to educational and medical institutions, administrative buildings, industrial facilities, multi-story buildings, and private homes, as reported by the Khmelnytskyi Oblast Military Administration. More than twenty civilians were injured.
The attacks also damaged railway infrastructure, delaying several trains. On the night of 14 May, at the time of the Eurovision Song Contest finals, Russia attacked again, across the whole territory of Ukraine. The Russian invaders attacked Ukraine from various directions with Shahed-136/131 strike drones, Kalibr missiles from ships in the Black Sea, and Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles from Tu-95ms strategic aircraft. As reported by the Air Force Command of the AFU, three cruise missiles and 25 drones were destroyed during the night attack. Several missiles, however, reached their target in Ternopil, hitting a civilian logistics center for humanitarian aid run by the Charity Foundation “Light of Reformation”, and several private facilities, which were described by Russian command as the “location of accumulation of Ukrainian military personnel and armaments”.
On the night of May 16, 2023, Russians attacked the Kyiv area again, from the north, south, and east with 18 air, sea, and land-based missiles of various types. Six Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missiles were launched from six MiG-31K aircraft, 9 Kalibr cruise missiles were launched from ships in the Black Sea, and three land-based missiles (S-400, "Iskander-M"). All 18 missiles were destroyed by Ukrainian air defense. In addition, the enemy attacked with drones of the Shahed-136/131 type and also conducted aerial reconnaissance with three operational-tactical drones - of "Orlan-10" and "SuperCam" types. Russians claimed that they managed to destroy the Patriot system, but these reports were not confirmed, nor denied by the Ukrainian air forces spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat.
On 13 May, Ukraine allegedly conducted an effective operation against Russian aviation over Russia’s Bryansk region, 50 km from the Ukrainian border. Two Mi-8 military helicopters and two fighter jets — a Su-34 and a Su-35 — suffered crashes according to reports by Russian state media and pro-Kremlin bloggers. Nine crew members of the aircraft reportedly died. Yuriy Ihnat reported that three helicopters, not two, were shot down in the Bryansk region, but claimed that it was a result of a massive dysfunction of Russia's own air defense.
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Ukraine continues to accumulate the necessary systems and weapons to plan its counter-offensive. One of the largest military aid packages was announced by Germany during the visit of President Zelenskyy to Berlin on 14 May. The AFU will receive more Leopard 1 main battle tanks, more Marder infantry fighting vehicles, and IRIS-T systems, according to Chancellor Scholz. The package will include 20 more Marder IFVs, 30 Leopard tanks (reportedly, 1A5 version), 4 IRIS-T fire units, and more. Military experts agree that one offensive might not be enough to regain control of all the territories occupied by Russian forces in Ukraine, so it will be a combination of several operations. Ukraine’s military leadership is closely monitoring the situation to find the proper momentum to ensure that acquired capabilities are used most efficiently.
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"PEACE" INITIATIVES OF THE KREMLIN'S FRIENDS IN EUROPE |
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On 10-11 June, the International Summit for Peace in Ukraine, organized by the International Peace Bureau, will take place in Vienna. The official goal of the event is to adopt a global appeal, the Vienna Declaration of Peace, calling on political leaders to take immediate steps regarding a ceasefire, and peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow. According to the published program, the summit will be followed by a march to the embassies of NATO member states, Russia and Ukraine, as well as the offices of international organizations in Vienna to hand over the manifesto. The event will begin with a video message from Noam Chomsky, a prominent American philosopher with pro-Russian views, and Brazilian President Luiz Lula da Silva, who the White House recently criticized for "Russian and Chinese propaganda" regarding the war against Ukraine. The conference will include pacifist speeches by peace activists from around the world, particularly representatives of Russia and Ukraine. Among the speakers of the event are many activists with openly pro-Russian views. However, there are no representatives of Kyiv's official position. Meanwhile, the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Oleksiy Danilov, said that “a large-scale campaign had been launched worldwide to bring Ukraine to the negotiating table on Russia's conditions”.
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The summit scheduled for June is one of the largest events involving well-known peace organizations. However, despite perhaps good intentions, the promotion of "peace talks" is now working simultaneously with a Russian propaganda campaign to persuade Kyiv to negotiate on terms favorable to Russia. Kremlin politicians and propagandists declare their readiness to negotiate an end to the war through all possible communication channels. At the same time, they are using loyal foreign politicians, NGOs, and civic activists to their advantage. However, the so-called "peacekeeping" rhetoric contradicts the Kremlin's real actions - almost every day, Russian missiles fire at civilian objects in Ukraine and blackmail Western capitals.
This summit confirms Russia's targeted activity in this area and has the following risks for Western countries and Ukraine:
- the activities of the so-called anti-war movements intensify protests in Western countries, which undermines the security situation there and polarises the societies of democratic states;
- "Protest campaigns", a tool of hybrid warfare, can be used against decision-makers in Brussels and Washington, intensifying internal disputes and dividing allies;
- the slogan "stop the war now" is aimed mainly against providing military support to Ukraine, an outcome which is in Moscow’s interest. Reducing arms supplies could lead to a protracted war and unpredictable consequences if Russian troops advance;
- participation of Ukrainian representatives in the summit could provide Russian propaganda with a significant media option to promote the Kremlin's narrative that there is a demand for "peace talks" in Ukrainian and Western European societies;
- the summit is planned to be held during the expected active phase of the AFU counter-offensive and is likely to be used as an additional tool to spread the Kremlin's nuclear blackmail.
Despite speculation about "peace talks," it is unlikely that they will occur soon. Negotiating with the Kremlin now means giving the Russians an operational pause to rebuild their army and accumulate resources to escalate the conflict further. This scenario is not favorable to Ukraine. Besides, Kyiv has its own position on peace in Ukraine, enshrined in the "Peace Formula," and has already been supported by many of Ukraine's partners. This step would also be rejected by Ukrainian society. 71.8% of Ukrainian citizens believe that the war can only end if Russia is defeated and that compromises with the aggressor country are impossible, according to recent polls.
Sooner or later, this war will end with diplomacy. However, it is too early to sit down with the Kremlin at this stage.
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HOW MANY UKRAINIANS WILL THERE BE AFTER THE WAR: DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS OR CATASTROPHE |
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The demographic situation is a topic that has recently been very popular in discussions in Ukraine. Data on how many people currently live in Ukraine, how many are waiting for the end of the war abroad, how many will return, and how many will not, differ. According to Academician Ella Libanova (Head of the Institute of Demography and Social Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine), Ukraine is facing a significant demographic crisis, but not a catastrophe. After all, there are still chances to influence the situation.
According to the State Statistics Service, as of 1 January 2022, 37.3 million people lived in Ukraine (excluding the territories of Crimea and Donbas temporarily occupied by Russia), according to the data of mobile operators - 36.6 million. On 1 January 2023, according to the data of mobile operators, there were 31,6 million people. That is, the reduction amounted to 5.5-6.2 million. According to the UN Population Fund, the number is 36.7 million people (including Crimea and Donbas temporarily occupied by Russia).
According to the UN, as of March 2023, there are about five million externally displaced Ukrainians (war refugees) in other countries (excluding Russia and Belarus). In addition, according to the UN, there are about 2.9 million Ukrainians in Belarus and Russia (these numbers are very dubious because they are based on data from Russia itself).
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The most interesting question today is how many Ukrainians will return home. Currently, 25% of Ukrainians have changed their place of residence, of which 9% have already returned. The experience of the Balkan countries showed that a third of those who left returned after the war. In Ukraine, more is predicted (over 60%). But it is difficult to estimate because polls have a large margin of error - people with feelings of patriotism tend to talk about a return, even if there is no particular personal reason for it. And there is a global trend: the longer the war lasts, the better people adapt abroad, the less likely they are to return. According to the latest polls, about 80% of refugees (both internal and those who are abroad) plan to return. But 48% of them say that they will do it only after the end of the war, 11% when their city or village is rebuilt.
And 12% do not plan to return. Half of those indicate that they like their new place of residence better and say that they do not see prospects in the previous place of residence, or feel unsafe there. The main factors for returning home are safety in the region (70%), availability of housing (34%), work (27%), having relatives there (21%), stable electricity, heat and water supply (19%), and a stable economic situation (17%).
In fact, several categories of people remain abroad: those who have nowhere to return (due to occupied territories, destroyed homes); those who worry about the psychological state and education of children; those who did not have "anchors" in Ukraine in the form of a stable job, permanent housing, income, and now they got a chance to live in a prosperous country where humanitarian aid or low-paid work is enough for them. There are also relocated IT specialists who, in general, are not connected to a specific place to live and work; as well as students who successfully entered foreign universities and will study there at least until the end of the war. There are also families with disabled people who have received the opportunity for free treatment or rehabilitation abroad.
Longing for home and family members, as well as sadness for the usual way of life, prompt people to return. This is especially characteristic of those who had a good financial and social status in Ukraine.
There are certain demographic tendencies and phenomena during wartime. For example, in the first weeks of the war, 200,000 working men returned to Ukraine from abroad to defend the country. 70% of Ukrainian women who fled abroad from the war have higher education, and 40% of those who fled are children. School-age children in the EU are closely monitored by the host states (as of May 2022 there were 480,000 of them), and much attention is paid to them. Many children of primary and secondary school age have mastered the language of the country where they are within one year. Such attention from neighbor states to children is not only due to care, but also part of state policy: they are interested in Ukrainian women and children staying there (women are qualified and educated, active, and children are the future). For example, Germany needs an additional 400,000 people every year, so Ukrainians are seen as an excellent resource. Poland, for example, recently extended programs of preferential housing loans to Ukrainians. The fact is that Ukraine is losing young, efficient, and promising people - both at war and abroad.
The main demographic problems of Ukraine are the same as in other European countries - aging and depopulation. The population is shrinking not only because of the war but also because of the global competition for labour, that is, for people. In addition, people now study longer than before and start working later.
A demographic crisis in Ukraine is inevitable, as there will be large population losses, including due to unborn children. The aging of the rest of the population leads to an increase in the financial burden on the existing labor force, paternalistic attitudes, and a reduction in the ability to gain new knowledge and professions.
After the war, a labor shortage is expected. In particular, there will be a great demand for construction workers - those who will rebuild Ukraine. And many of them have been working abroad in recent years. A decrease in population density, especially in certain areas, as well as a deterioration in the educational level of the population and a decrease in the number of the most active part of the population are expected.
What measures should the Ukrainian authorities take for people to return? First, they should maintain links with those who are abroad. During the time of the mass labor migration of Greeks to other countries, Greece carried out mass work in this regard, in particular, informational work. For example, in airports and train stations, there was massive social advertising: "Compatriot, come back! The motherland is waiting for you!" It worked. People want to be in demand, to know that they are expected, that they are an integral part of the country. In the case of Ukraine, it is necessary to stop blaming those who are currently abroad. There should be a clear message that Ukrainians should be saved as a nation, and it doesn't matter who is where now, the main thing is that these people save themselves and their children, and then return.
It is necessary to invite as many people as possible to rebuild destroyed cities and villages with decent wages, possibly by shift method. This might be through a kind of "Big Construction 2" with the involvement of Ukrainian specialists and Ukrainian materials. A promising direction is the construction of medical hubs because Ukraine has the necessary resources and potential for this. Of course, a comprehensive plan is needed not only to rebuild the country but also to revive the economy and attract investments. Payments to women who give birth to children can play a role in increasing the birth rate. The demographic situation might also improve due to the influx of foreigners expected after the war.
It is also necessary to improve the educational process. All countries emphasize the high level of knowledge of Ukrainian children. But the current trend of reducing exact and natural sciences in schools may become harmful. In addition, the level of knowledge is decreasing due to the online format of education over the last three years and the orientation of schools only on knowledge, and not on the personal development of the children. This is what is very attractive to Ukrainian children abroad: there they feel valued, in contrast to the entrenched traditions of post-Soviet education in Ukraine.
The Czech Republic and Poland stabilized the demographic situation after events similar to those in Ukraine, but incomparably smaller in scale, the Baltic countries did not. Ukraine must succeed at this. But at the same time, it needs to address problems in two directions - those related to the war and those generated by pre-war processes. In the event of an optimistic near-future scenario (victory of Ukraine, return of its 1991 borders, and gradual economic recovery with the support of partners), the vast majority of Ukrainians will return. If security, economic growth, the availability of work, and quality education are dreams that are constantly postponed, people will grow more and more rooted in the countries where they are now. And when the time comes when families can be reunited (men aged 18 to 60 are now prohibited from leaving Ukraine), it is not a fact that they will be reunited in Ukraine.
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CHINESE INVESTMENTS: ADVANTAGE OR HARM FOR UKRAINE? |
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For the first time since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine, it is proposed in the EU to introduce sanctions against Chinese companies that help the Russian Federation. In addition, the democratic world is reviewing its financial relationship with China and working on plans to reduce Chinese economic influence on countries. At the same time, Ukraine continues to wait for "a powerful impetus to the development of bilateral relations" with Beijing.
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In 2021, China's direct investment in Ukraine increased by more than 23%, amounting to about $111 million. Although this amount is not huge, such dynamics demonstrate China's interest in Ukraine. Chinese companies often work with Ukrainian state enterprises, primarily in energy and agriculture. These industries are critical for Ukraine. The presence of Chinese investments and influence in such sectors is unacceptable in the conditions of a full-scale war. Currently, Kyiv has another problem related to Beijing's financial footprint. The 2023 budget does not include the amount to be paid for old debt obligations to Chinese creditors. This particularly concerns the debt of the Ukrainian state grain trader, which we already wrote about in January 2023. Such cooperation with China does not develop the Ukrainian economy and creates new problems for the state budget.
In public access, you can find many statements by representatives of Ukrainian local and state authorities regarding projects that China plans to finance. However, there is almost no information about whether this money has been received and how the preparation and implementation of these projects are progressing. All this is happening due to the requirements of the PRC regarding the non-disclosure of the cooperation terms. Such a system prevents civil society from effectively controlling the current work and financial processes. Corruption and unprofitability accompany Chinese money around the world.
This is a reason for the Ukrainian authorities to develop clear criteria for attracting international investments that would not allow the PRC to use debt instruments. Ukraine has already had a negative experience of having assets and influence on its territory from an authoritarian state - namely the Russian Federation. Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale war, this influence has begun to decrease. It is essential not to repeat these mistakes with China and to be more careful with foreign investments, especially from aggressive regimes. Foreign direct investment screening for possible harmful interference can help in this matter. However, political will and legislative changes are needed to implement this process.
The democratic world has begun to think strategically and is trying to prevent interventions by authoritarian regimes in the future. China has repeatedly demonstrated its support for Moscow's aggressive actions. The reaction to this was sanctions and strict rules regarding Chinese projects. In 2022, Chinese investment in EU countries fell by 22%, reaching the lowest mark in almost a decade. Of the 16 investment deals signed by Chinese companies in 2022 in the technology and infrastructure sectors, ten failed to close. A similar practice already exists in the US and demonstrates its effectiveness. Given the current financial relations between Ukraine and China, it won't be easy to limit Chinese influence in the short term. However, it is crucial to start taking steps to reduce it now. Ukraine is currently working to harmonize its legislation and regulations with the EU. Verifying international investments and assets coming to the country should become another positive European practice implemented by the Ukrainian government.
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UKRAINE'S RECOVERY GOING DIGITAL: WHAT TO EXPECT? |
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The Ukrainian government, civil society, and international donors launched a Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management (DREAM). According to the government, DREAM will allow citizens, civil society representatives, international donors, and private sector investors to monitor all reconstruction projects at all stages, including the allocation and spending of reconstruction funding.
At the moment, the public interface of the project website functions as a communication platform, informing the public about the scope, guiding principles, and implementation timeline for 2023. Ukrainian governmental agencies, ministries, state enterprises, and local authorities can already submit their project proposals. According to the Ministry of Restoration, 5000 project ideas have been already submitted. Access to the existing project bank will be publicly opened at the Ukraine Recovery Conference, to be held in London on 21-22 June 2023.
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Who is in charge of the system?
The system was developed by the civil society coalition RISE, which focuses on the integrity, sustainability, and efficiency of Ukraine’s reconstruction in coordination with the Ministry of Restoration. Upon launching all processes and modules of the system, civil society will pass the platform to the Ministry of Restoration. Functioning and technical support will be provided by the Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development. The project was funded by Open Contracting Partnership with the support of the UK.
Therefore, DREAM is a joint venture by donors, civil society, and the government. Ukraine previously experienced quite successful cases of public-private partnerships on state digital tools and services, such as Prozorro. This type of cooperation seems to be preferred by Ukraine’s donors in order to ensure the sustainability, transparency, and usability of those tools.
How will the system work?
DREAM has two levels. At the first level, the system will merge existing public registries, such as the Registers of damaged and destroyed property, the Geoinformation system, the Unified State Electronic System in the field of construction (EDESSB), Prozorro, and Spending.gov.ua. The second level is an "umbrella" system that provides data collection from all first-level systems at each stage of the project and provides open access to them, as well as management and control tools. The system will cover the full reconstruction project cycle, including the following stages:
- fixation of losses,
- determining smart recovery plans,
- project initiation and preparation,
- filling the project bank,
- identifying project financing,
- implementing procurement,
- implementation,
- audit and control.
What is there for local communities?
DREAM will provide project templates and prompts for communities and local authorities which will be useful given the limited capacities at the local level. It is not clear yet how particular projects will be aligned with local development strategies. The law on regional development updated in July last year introduced a three-level planning system in Ukraine: national strategy - regional strategy - community strategy, which should be consistent with each other. Some rebuilding projects will be urgent, and will not wait until regional plans are approved. The condition regarding the inclusion of reconstruction objects in regional recovery plans will be applied only six months after the end of martial law.
Is digital equal to transparent?
DREAM system based on data and digital solutions, able to merge various registries and data sets, already looks impressive. With the successful experience of various digital state tools, from Prozorro to Diia and state registries, Ukraine is perceived to be a global leader in digitalization. But not in transparency, at least according to some donors. DREAM is definitely the right step in that direction. Experience with other digital tools, such as Prozorro, needs to be taken into account. In the past, it was possible to “fool the system”, for example, by establishing procurement conditions and terms in a way to fit only one preferred bidder; or applying several ways of disguising a large tender or complicating its procedures. “The computer does not take a bribe”, but those who control it do. The public monitoring system DOZORRO was launched in order to control PROZORRO. As with Prozorro, DREAM should ensure rigorous modules of public monitoring as well as participation in project design and project appraisal. And beyond that, illegal processes and procurements that were disguised should lead to the cancellation of tender results.
In this context, it is also worth thinking about possible digital inequality and digital divides if public participation will be possible only online. Citizens especially in local communities might lack access to the internet, thus various alternative means of participation should be envisioned.
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CHANGE OF PERECEPTIONS AND NARRATIVES ABOUT UKRAINE IN WORLD WAR II |
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On 8 May, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy submitted a bill to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine proposing to set the 8 May as a Day of Remembrance and Victory over Nazism in World War II 1939-1945. Along with that, this year for the first time Ukraine celebrated 9 May as Europe Day and not as Victory Day. Symbolically, the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Kyiv and marked Europe Day there.
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These seemingly symbolic changes with regard to various celebrations on 8 and 9 May reflect a profound detachment of Ukraine from Soviet and Russia-dominated historic legacies and narratives. It was until 2023 that Ukraine observed the Day of Victory over Nazism on 9 May according to the tradition introduced by the Soviet Union. One of the first steps Ukraine took to distance itself from the Soviet ‘Great Patriotic War’ heritage was in 2015 when the naming of the war was brought into line with its official name - the Second World War. With the implementation of the Law on Decommunization, Stalin's term ‘the Great Patriotic War’, was no longer in use.
As a vital contributor to the Red Army and a key provider of industrial resources in the USSR, Ukraine paid the biggest price in the Second World War. The real role of Ukraine during WWII was rewritten during and after. Russia has claimed victory for itself and has officially denied the Ukrainian role in the fight against the Nazis, disregarding the fact that most of the battles on the Eastern front happened on the territory of Ukraine. “We would definitely have won without Ukraine as a member of the USSR because we are the 'winner state’, claimed Vladimir Putin in an interview in December 2010.
Meanwhile, according to the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, over six million Ukrainians fought in the Red Army, and the Ukrainian SSR was also the leading producer of aircraft, locomotives, turbines, and diesel engines for the Soviet navy. Between 22 June 1941 and 28 October 1944, out of 76 strategic and front-line offensive and defensive operations of WWII, 29 were held on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine’s human and material losses during World War II were enormous and much higher than those of Russia. Due to the intensity of the war and the Soviet scorched-earth policy, Ukraine incurred unprecedented losses, and the human toll might be comparable to the Holodomor 1932-1933 repercussions. The real number of victims during WWII is still not fully known, and the data varies between eight and 14 million Ukrainians killed, including more than five million civilians. However, only six million have been identified.
The assignment of ‘rights to the victory’ is a component of so-called memory wars - state-owned historical narratives, in the case of Russia enshrined in the concept of Great Patriotic War (GPW) and aimed to keep an image of a "Nazi defeated" and a "liberator of Europe". Deviation from the official narratives, or according to Article 354-1 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, ‘falsification of the history, e.g, ‘spreading of knowingly false information on the activities of the Soviet Union during World War II and veterans of Great Patriotic War’, in other words revealing the Russian Army’s war crimes or Soviet Regime executions, is prohibited and foresees criminal prosecution.
The attitudes of Ukrainians towards 9 May have been changing since 2014, however, the full-scale invasion pushed citizens to reconsider the events of the past. The full-scale war increased interest in what was happening in the context of Russian geopolitics and military policy, it encouraged people to gain a new awareness of the realities of both the war and the past. According to the latest (February 2023) survey of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the positive attitudes of the Ukrainians towards 9 May as Victory Day dramatically decreased from 58% (2010) to 30% in 2021 and to 13% in 2023.
Ukraine's decision to now celebrate the "European" Day of Victory on 8 May is not only a tribute to historical truth but also a testament to the extent to which the perception of WWII has changed. Moreover now, when the tragedy of war is unfolding today with Russia bombing Ukrainian cities.
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WAR IN UKRAINE: LESSONS LEARNED |
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Russia's current war against Ukraine demonstrated the readiness of the democratic world to unite in the fight for freedom and liberal values. However, there are democracies all over the world in need of protection against autocracies willing to challenge international order. One year from the start of full-scale invasion, we introduce you the report “War in Ukraine: Lessons identified and lessons learned“, which analyzes policies and practices that have impacted Ukraine’s resilience in key sectors. Outcomes of this research can be used as recommendations for other democracies building resilience against conventional, hybrid, or other threats (e.g., natural disasters), from Europe to the Pacific.
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