ISSUE 23

 20.03. - 02.04.2023

• Security situation update
• Aircraft deliveries
• Ukraine's anti-corruption efforts
• Ukraine's EU Association progress
• Development of green energy in post-war Ukraine

Following the first month of spring, Russian, Ukrainian, and Western analysts generally concluded that the Russian winter offensive has failed to achieve the Kremlin’s goals of seizing the Donetsk and Luhansk oblast administrative borders by 31 March. Throughout March, the Russians increased the area of land they control in Ukraine by approximately 70km². This means that a total of ~16.68% of Ukraine is being occupied by Russian forces, a 0.01% increase since the end of February. This increase, however, was reached with significant losses in personnel and weapons systems.  

The changes in control of territories each month of the full-scale invasion so far. Source: https://www.warmapper.org/stats

Currently, the Russians continue to focus on conducting offensive actions in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Maryinka directions. The Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut remains strategically reliable. The Ukrainian Defense Forces prevented a direct threat of the encirclement of their Bakhmut garrison and stabilized their flanks to the north and south of the city. The enemy lost the opportunity to advance simultaneously in this area and in several other directions. 

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) remain determined to continue the defensive operation in Bakhmut. The rationale was outlined by President Zelenskyy in his interview with Associated Press: if Bakhmut fell to Russian forces, their president, Vladimir Putin, would “sell this victory to the West, to his society, to China, to Iran […] If he will feel some blood — smell that we are weak — he will push, push, push,” Zelenskyy said.  

The situation remains tense near Avdiivka, with Russian forces trying to complete a breakthrough into the Orlivka – Lastochkyne – Sieverne – Tonenke area and advance to the outskirts of Stepove. If his goal is achieved, the situation in Avdiivka will turn out to be like in Bakhmut, leaving the command of the Joint Forces with a choice of which city to leave, because fighting two major defensive battles at the same time is impossible due to the lack of resources.  

The development of the situation in the areas of Bakhmut and Avdiivka will impact the further course of the war for both sides given the scope of hostilities and the exhaustion of resources. 

Russians also intensified attacks on the Kherson region. On 1 April, the Russians attacked the Kherson region 60 times, killing a civilian, as Oleksandr Prokudin, Head of Kherson Oblast Military Administration, reported. Also, following the pattern in the Eastern frontline, the Russians have increased the use of aviation in the South of Ukraine as well, according to Natalia Humeniuk, Head of the United Coordinating Press Center of Security and Defense Forces of the South of Ukraine. 

ANALYSIS

It is assessed that Russia would lack the combat power necessary to sustain more than one major offensive operation in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and ongoing recruitment campaigns in Russia and occupied Ukrainian territories may indicate that Russia is preparing for reserve shortages. The Russian forces will try to develop their tactical success north of Bakhmut into an operational one.  Meanwhile, Ukraine is preparing for a counteroffensive in several directions, according to Ukrainian military and political officials.  

Briefing the delegation of the European Union's Political and Security Committee on the situation at the front, Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov emphasized the need for professional training of Ukrainian soldiers abroad. “For [a counteroffensive], Ukraine needs, first of all, heavy equipment and prepared reserves. We are interested in training the Ukrainian military at all levels: from individual soldier training to collective training of brigade-level units. I have personally witnessed that Ukrainian defenders have high morale. I can say with confidence that our guys and girls are ready to continue fighting for Ukraine,” Reznikov emphasized. 

Also, Ukraine strategizes the liberation of Crimea, according to the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC), Oleksiy Danilov, who published 12 steps for this goal. “A detailed and legally verified program is being developed by the NSDC Apparatus of Ukraine with the involvement of a wide range of specialists and experts, which will be reflected in the new edition of the Crimea Deoccupation Strategy”, Danilov said. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov suggested that Ukraine can return Crimea without a fight against the background of the internal crisis in the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, Russia is preparing for the defense of Crimea and massively building defense structures. 

On 22 March, French news reported that a group of Ukrainian pilots was undergoing training on Mirage 2000 fighter jets in France. However, the spokesman of the Air Force Command of the AFU, Yuriy Ihnat quickly and concretely disproved this information. Another French media outlet later reported that Ukraine is expecting its international partners to greenlight the transfer of at least 40 French-made Mirage 2000s. Earlier in February, the French minister of defense Sébastien Lecornu said there is a possibility of supplying Ukraine with Mirage 2000 fighter jets, suggesting the training of pilots can take place in Poland.  

The alleged training of Ukrainian pilots in France was quickly shared by other news outlets. The officials confirmed the survival courses for aviators and training of Ukrainian air supporter controllers in France, but not of the flight crews. There was no official request from the Ukrainian side for the supply of these jets. The Mirage 2000, a French fourth-generation multirole fighter jet, has been in service since 1984 and is used by several other countries too. In the summer of 2022, France decommissioned 12 of its Mirage jets and began the process of replacing them with more modern Rafale jets. Paris has supplied Ukraine with Caesar self-propelled howitzers and AMX vehicles which are already used by the Ukrainian army on the frontline. This was followed by other Western countries sending tanks. 

ANALYSIS

Recently, Ukraine received four of the promised 13 Mig-29 jets from Slovakia, and Poland has expressed readiness to supply another 20 Mig jets. These jets can’t carry modern missiles, said Yuriy Ihnat. Kyiv reportedly sent an official request to Finland for the transfer of American F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets that Helsinki is planning to decommission and replace with F35s. This, however, is a long-term perspective. 

For the counteroffensive and air defense, Ukraine needs modern Western fighter jets that can hit both air and ground targets with a wide range of weapons. Jets such as Mirage 2000, Eurofighter Typhoon, Tornado, and F-4 Phantom have been discussed as those that Western partners can consider supplying to Ukraine. Ukraine has asked the US and other countries for F16s, and additional negotiations on the supply of alternatives are ongoing.  

The Air Forces of the AFU need a single multirole/multifunctional Western jet with modern high-precision air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons which, in the future, would replace the existing fleet of combat aircraft - Mg-29s and Su-24, Su-25, and Su-27. Lately, Russia has intensified its attacks on Ukrainian regions near the border by bombing the towns and villages with guided bombs from warplanes that fly outside the range of Ukrainian air defenses, and fighter jets would prove useful in defending Ukrainian territory from such attacks.  

The American F16 (Fighting Falcon) jets would also be highly efficient against cruise missiles that Russia has been firing at Ukrainian residential units and critical infrastructure. The challenges for the supply of fighter jets to Ukraine are firstly political and logistical but also relate to training and technical service, including repairs. F16s have modernized electronic radars and plane protection systems and can undergo technical checks in Ukraine’s neighboring countries which have these planes in their fleet.  

On 31 March, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence announced the list of 15 members of the public anti-corruption council under the Ministry of Defence (MoD). This body is being created to improve public participation in ensuring the assessment of corruption risks in the ministry and the development of relevant anti-corruption measures. Nationwide online voting for candidates to the Public Anti-Corruption Council under the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine took place on 24-25 March.

The Commission for ensuring the conduct of the competition has viewed the reports of the telecommunications company “Kyivstar”, the public organization “Electronic Democracy”, and the Directorate of Digitalization Policies, Digital Development, Digital Transformations and Cyber Security in the Defense Sector of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. However, several organizations claimed that there were manipulations, and the Ministry received more than ten written appeals with complaints. Appeals on the voting results were received from both 11 contest participants and public organizations.

The list of candidates that gained a sufficient number of votes included Bohdana Yarova, Tetyana Nikolayenko, Oleh Svirko, Anastasiia Shuba, Viktor Prudkovskykh, Vitaliy Kalnytskyi, Kostyantyn Piontkovskyi, Yevhen Hrushovets, Vitaliy Odzhykovskyi, Dmytro Ostapenko, Artak Hryhoryan, Vitaliy Masyuk, Hennadiy Kryvosheya, Oleksandr Herashchenko, and Olena Trehub.

Earlier in March, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine created the Department for Corruption Prevention. “We are overloading and enhancing the anti-corruption unit of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine at the moment. The status of the anti-corruption unit was elevated to the status of the Department, so we have expanded the staff. We will soon start looking for candidates for vacant positions at this unit. The task is to implement a principle of zero corruption tolerance. One of the elements of working at a systematic level is, as we can see, tighter cooperation with the public. The Defence Minister deploys a defense procurement reform; a decision on ensuring transparency in procurement has been approved”, the Ministry’s press center reported.

ANALYSIS

In January, Ukrainian media published information that Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence allegedly bought food supplies for the military at inflated prices, while the supplier companies were close to several MoD officials. The reaction of the government officials and the parliament was fast and firm. The Committee for National Security, Defense, and Intelligence decided to inspect the supplier companies and amend the defense procurement legislation. The Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy initiated a corresponding draft law which was developed with the help of relevant NGOs. In February 2023, the parliament adopted draft law No. 8381 making partial reporting on some defense procurement mandatory.  

Introduction of the martial law resulted in narrowing the possibilities for companies to participate in selection processes for defense procurement contracts as the announcements were no longer publicly available. The amended law on defense procurement specifies that state procuring entities should publish core information about direct contracts in the Prozorro system within ten working days from the date of its conclusion if the cost equals or exceeds UAH 200,000 for goods and services and UAH 1.5 million for work. 

The Ukrainian government published a report on its implementation of the EU Association Agreement for 2022. According to the government assessment, Ukraine has fulfilled 72% of its obligations under the EU Association Agreement. During the last year, Ukraine improved its progress by 9% compared to 2021, demonstrating the most significant improvements in the areas of intellectual property – 94%, statistics, and information exchange – 96%, justice, freedom, security, and human rights – 91%, public finance management – 90%. The least successful sectors are consumer protection – 48% and financial cooperation and combatting fraud – 24%.

ANALYSIS

Regular reports on EU association progress, a usual practice for the EU and the Ukrainian government, are intended to provide a helicopter view of the progress made and identify stronger areas and those where greater efforts are required. It is crucial to understand that the report published by the Ukrainian government shows how the Ukrainian government sees its advance in the EU association process, i.e. self-reporting.  

The EU itself also provides regular analyses of prospective members’ EU association progress. For example, before the EU-Ukraine summit on 3 February this year, the European Commission published its report on Ukraine’s approximation with EU acquis. Let’s compare both assessments within one area – environmental protection. The Ukrainian government assesses the level of implementation of the EU Association Agreement within the environmental protection area at 77%, noting the adoption of legislation on waste management, chemical safety, etc.  

At the same time, the European Commission assessed Ukraine’s approximation with EU acquis in the area of environmental protection at 1 within a 5-scale measurement (where 1 is the least aligned and 5 is the most aligned). First, it is important to understand that EU association commitments are not the same as EU acquis approximation. However, full alignment with the acquis will be needed on the way to EU membership. In this regard, the European Commission concludes that Ukraine needs further assessments of the adopted legislation on EU compliance, further effort in the areas of environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental assessments, waste management, etc.  

For example, despite the adoption of framework legislation on waste management, Ukraine needs to make significant further efforts on enforcement, especially in enacting the “polluter pays” principle that is central in the EU environmental legislation. A similar trend might be present in other sectors, where the adoption of Ukrainian legislation could mean partial rather than full alignment with EU acquis. It is important to ensure full alignment since the EU will have the last word in terms of opening negotiations with Ukraine.  

Another condition for opening negotiations is a fulfillment of seven EU recommendations provided with EU candidacy status. The EU requires their full implementation to open negotiations with Ukraine for EU membership. One of the decisions of the EU-Ukraine summit in February was that the EU will provide its oral assessment of Ukraine’s progress in the implementation of seven requirements for the EU candidacy in spring. For example, the EU is awaiting Ukraine’s amendment of legislation on the procedure of selection of the judges of the Constitutional Court which Olha Stefanishyna, the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, anticipates to be done by May. The overall assessment of the implementation of these seven recommendations will be provided with the EU enlargement report in autumn.

Russian military aggression showed Ukraine that renewable energy is a security issue. The Russian missile attacks made it clear that renewables are not just about “green transformation” or commitments under the Paris Agreement; it is about the security of energy supplies and the security of the entire state. 20% of the missiles and drones launched by Russia since 10 October reached their targets, resulting in 271 hits on the objects of the Ukrainian energy system. Even though the nuclear power plants produced enough energy, this energy could not be redirected to the affected regions with an energy deficit, while other regions had a surplus. As a result, it was even necessary to reduce energy production. Renewable sources, which can be created in different regions of the country, could be a better solution to improve the security of supply. Even from a military point of view, hitting such a large number of targets across the country is more difficult than hitting one large object.

ANALYSIS

Ukraine plans to reach the share of renewable sources at the level of 25% by 2032. Before the war, this share reached about 10%, and Ukraine achieved the largest increase in solar and wind energy among the 17 countries of Central Asia and South-Eastern Europe, which are included in the UN study. As of the beginning of 2022, the capacity of “green” generation in Ukraine has approached 8.5 GW. The largest increase over the previous year was demonstrated by biomass power plants (their total capacity increased by almost 40% to 152 MW). The capacity of wind power plants in 2021 increased by 27.3% - up to 1,673 MW. The capacity of industrial solar power plants increased by 4.8% - up to 6,227 MW. The capacity of biogas plants for the year increased by 19.2% to 124 MW, and of small hydropower plants - by 3.3% to 121 MW. The largest installed capacities of wind power plants (WPPs) as of the end of 2021 were located in the Zaporizhzhia region where, in particular, Ukraine’s largest Botievsk WPP of the DTEK company is located, and Kherson region with several stations owned by the Windkraft company. The leading regions in terms of installed capacity of solar power plants (SPPs) are Dnipropetrovsk (in particular the Pokrovsk SPP of DTEK, which is the largest in Ukraine) and Mykolayiv region (the largest SPP in the region, “Progresivka” of the Norwegian company Scatec Solar operates there).   

As we can see, most of the solar and wind energy facilities are located in regions that are or were temporarily occupied by Russia or are under constant shelling. As of the autumn of last year, 90% of wind energy capacities and 30% of solar generation in Ukraine were out of operation. Parts of the stations in the liberated territories are currently being actively restored. For example, the DTEK VDE company is completing the construction of the first stage of the Tylihul WPP with a capacity of 114 MW out of the total declared 500 MW in the Mykolayiv region. 

The International Energy Agency’s Renewable Energy 2022 report suggests that wind and solar power could more than double over the next five years. The other day, the Council of the European Union agreed with the European Parliament on the need to accelerate the transition to renewable energy. An increase in the share of renewable energy sources is planned until 2030 at the level of at least 42.5% instead of the previous indicator of 32%. Accelerating the transition to renewable energy sources (RES) is crucial for Europe to become the world’s first climate-neutral continent by 2050, as it plans, and to deliver on the European Green Deal. 

Although Ukraine is not yet a member of the EU, it is part of the European continent and should move along the same path. This requires investment. The European Union has repeatedly stated that it is ready to support Ukraine with renewable energy sources during reconstruction. 

It's important for Ukraine to speed up its plans. Ukraine does not see the point in rebuilding old power generation facilities that run on fossil fuels. If nuclear energy is included in the “green” category, as the UK is doing, the prospects of Ukraine in this field seem promising. The Minister of Energy of Ukraine stated that the future energy mix of Ukraine should be as follows: 50% produced by nuclear generation (which currently produces more than half of all electricity in Ukraine), and the remaining 50% by renewable energy sources. 

In general, there are three types of risks for RES projects: technical risks associated with the possibility of connecting and balancing “green” capacities; economic risks due to lack of market predictability; and legal risks related to the legal uncertainty that has arisen regarding the regulation of the electricity market. To attract investments in RES, Ukraine should develop and implement risk mitigation measures for projects in this field. The situation will improve this year if the Verkhovna Rada passes a corresponding bill, which provides for the application of the Net Billing mechanism based on the experience of European countries. Therefore, consumers will be able to generate electricity with solar stations with compensation for unused (excess) energy for their own needs. This mechanism will be introduced to replace the incentive of a green electricity tariff for solar plants of private households. 

The serious question regarding the technical capacity of the energy system for balancing RES capacities has been raised (it is mainly about solar and wind projects with high investment attractiveness). Unlike traditional generation, their volumes of energy production are more difficult to forecast and balance. There is a financial deficit for payments for green electricity. The lack of funds to cover the difference between the green tariff and the market sales prices led to systemic state debts to renewable energy producers. 

In the near term, it would be expedient to ensure the conditions for the continuation of projects which were launched before the war. This is a matter of extending the terms of validity of the technical conditions for connecting such objects to electric networks. Starting in 2024, it will be necessary to ensure the implementation of measures for the further integration of the electricity markets of Ukraine and the EU. The demand for electricity from RES will grow, taking into account the long-term policy of European countries regarding decarbonization. It will be important to coordinate all conditions under EU legislation in the energy sector in advance. Consolidation of European-style market rules, as well as the expansion of sales opportunities for green electricity, will significantly increase the investment attractiveness of the RES sector in Ukraine. 

Russia's current war against Ukraine demonstrated the readiness of the democratic world to unite in the fight for freedom and liberal values. However, there are democracies all over the world in need of protection against autocracies willing to challenge international order. One year from the start of full-scale invasion, we introduce you the report “War in Ukraine: Lessons identified and lessons learned“, which analyzes policies and practices that have impacted Ukraine’s resilience in key sectors. Outcomes of this research can be used as recommendations for other democracies building resilience against conventional, hybrid, or other threats (e.g., natural disasters), from Europe to the Pacific.

Thank you.

UNSUBSCRIBE