ISSUE 21

 20.02. - 05.03.2023

• Security Update
• The Ukrainian government finally approves the State Anti-Corruption Program
• Ukraine's search for more Allies
• The economic recovery of de-occupied territories
• The sudden resignation of Ukrainian Railways' Head
• Children of war: how to return young Ukrainians home

The Russian Armed Forces (RAF) concentrate on offensive actions in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Shakhtarsk directions. In the Vuhledar area, due to painful failures, the enemy shifted its efforts to the east of the city. In view of the possible encirclement of Kupyansk, the Kharkiv Oblast Military Civilian administration announced the partial evacuation of the local population from the city. The RAF use Terminator self-propelled artillery and T-90M tanks in the Kreminna direction, which indicates that the Russian military command prioritizes this direction.

The enemy reduced activity on the northern and southern flanks to surround Bakhmut and simultaneously increased its efforts to push the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) out of the city. The RAF are increasing the intensity of air attacks using aircraft in the frontline zone. Also, the bridges in Bakhmut, including a vital bridge linking the city to the town of Chasiv Yar, Bakhmut’s last major supply road, were destroyed at the beginning of March, making Ukraine-held resupply routes out of the town increasingly limited.

Operational situation in Bakhmut as of 4 March 2023, with destroyed bridges marked. Source: https://twitter.com/War_Mapper/status/1631813160763006977/photo/1

Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) and RAF continue to make incremental advances on the northern outskirts of the town still controlled by Ukraine but vulnerable to Russian attacks on three sides. On 4 March, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu visited the combat zone in Ukraine for “inspections” of the RAF, to hear reports and discuss the supply of troops. His visit came amidst the ongoing tension with Yevgeniy Prigozhyn, head of Wagner PMC, who claimed that the retreat of his troops from the city of Bakhmut would cause a collapse of the entire front, including Crimea, and that Russia would then blame the mercenaries for defeat in the war. 

The enemy pays significant attention to its logistics/communication capacity in the Crimean direction; additional crossings are being built around Brylivka and Ridne villages. The RAF are creating an anti-aircraft defense post in the Kakhovka area (Kherson Oblast). As of the morning of 4 March, the enemy had at least 52 Kh-101/Kh-555, Kh-22, 3m14k/3m14t (Kalibr) cruise missiles at ready. The AFU are observing the preparations for possible targeted missile attacks on Ukraine, Natalya Humenyuk, head of the United Coordination Press Center of the Defense Forces of the South of Ukraine, said.  

ANALYSIS

In the coming weeks, Russians will try to disrupt the stability of the defence of the Joint Forces Command of the AFU in the area of Bakhmut and push them out of the city. Ukrainian military analysts speculate that the AFU have started to conduct a planned organized retreat. The intensity of fighting will continue in Kreminna and Vuhledar areas. In the short term, we should expect an increase in the intensity of hostilities in the Kupyansk direction.  

The Russians are preparing a massive missile attack on the infrastructure of Ukraine. Notably, a few weeks ago, Russian troops used a new and rather dangerous weapon against Ukraine for the first time – UPAB-1500B (index K029B) gliding bombs. The first use of this type of bomb was recorded a few weeks ago against one of the objects in Chernihiv Oblast. This munition is intended to engage small-size semi- and full-hardened ground and surface targets. Weighing 1,525 kg, the guided bomb carries a 1,010 kg concrete-piercing high-explosive (HE) warhead coupled with a combined navigation unit (an inertial measurement unit and a satellite receiver) and a contact fuse with three time delay modes. The munition can be dropped from an altitude of up to 15 km at a range of up to 50 km with a circular error possible (CEP) of up to 10 meters. 

In general, the scale of the war, even with the frontline relatively stabilized, remains unprecedented. According to General Christopher Cavoli, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Russia has lost more than 2,000 large battle tanks so far. More than 200,000 Russian soldiers and over 1,800 officers have been killed or wounded, he said. On average, the RAF fire more than 23,000 artillery shells per day. According to Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov, the AFU fire around 3,600 155-mm projectiles per day, and up to 11,000 including other calibres. If the AFU were not limited to this number, the entire ammunition that the Ukrainian military could release on the occupiers per month would amount to 594,000, therefore the supply of munitions remains a critical factor for future developments of this war.

On 4 March, at its extraordinary meeting, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the State Anti-Corruption Program for 2023-2025 (SACP). Considering the length of time it took to approve the program and the opposition from the most corrupt spheres, this decision is extremely significant. 

The program is a key tool for the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2021-2025, adopted by the Parliament in summer 2022. The strategy was adopted due to pressure from international partners, where G7 ambassadors played a particularly important role. 

The program is designed to increase the effectiveness of the corruption prevention system in various spheres of public life, to form a negative attitude towards corruption in society, and to ensure inevitable punishment for acts of corruption. In particular, the program envisages measures in the field of justice, state regulation of the economy, customs affairs and taxation, the public and private sectors of the economy, construction, land relations and infrastructure, the defense sector, health care, social protection, education and science.

ANALYSIS

On 20 June 2022, the Parliament adopted the Anti-Corruption Strategy - this was one of the requirements for granting Ukraine EU candidate status. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), which is responsible for the formation of the anti-corruption policy of the state, was tasked to prepare and submit to the Government a draft of the SACP for its implementation by 10 December. The NACP drafted the document with the participation of experts, public organizations, and all relevant bodies. The draft SACP was highly praised by international partners, particularly the Delegation of the European Union in Ukraine. Overall, 11 public discussions were held, and the project was approved by 128 bodies and institutions. On 10 December, the NACP submitted the draft SACP for consideration by the Government. On 9 January 2023, the specialized government committee considered the draft SACP, but due to the comments of certain bodies (in particular the law enforcement sector, the judiciary, and the antimonopoly committee), additional coordination procedures began. On 25 January, the NACP sent the revised draft of the SACP for reconsideration. On 30 January 2023, the G7 and EU Ambassadors stated that they expect the restoration of electronic declarations and the approval of SACP by Ukraine. On 1 February 2023, the Government Committee approved the SACP and recommended that it be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for consideration. On the same day, the NACP sent the finalized draft of the SACP to the Cabinet of Ministers. And again, for inexplicable reasons, the SACP, as the head of the NACP said, simply lays on the Prime Minister's desk for more than a month. Final (very compromising) edits were made on the eve of approval. The full text of the SACP has not yet been published on the Government's official website, but it is available on the NACP website. 

The adoption and implementation of the SACP is a crucial step for the European and Euro-Atlantic future of Ukraine, as well as for transparent post-war reconstruction. But above all, it responds to society's demand for law and justice. According to a sociological survey commissioned by USAID, before the war, only 40% of Ukrainians believed that corruption could not be justified under any circumstances. Now it’s 64%. Before the war, only 44% of citizens were ready to protest against corruption, today the figure is 84%. Ukrainians have become less tolerant of corruption. Studies also show that during the war, corruption in Ukraine decreased. Only 34% of respondents claim that they or their loved ones experienced corruption in 2022 (49% in 2021). 29% of respondents are sure that the level of corruption has decreased over the past 12 months. However, the issue of corruption remains the second most important problem for citizens (33%), with Russia's war against Ukraine being problem number one. According to Ukrainians, in addition to strengthening the country's defense capabilities and restoring its infrastructure, the fight against corruption should become the main post-war priority for the state. The implementation of the approved SACP, which consists of more than 1,700 measures in 15 areas, should provide an answer to this public demand. 

Unfortunately, according to some sources, the Government, which was forced to accept this document due to pressure, intends to remove the measurability indicators. One of the key elements of the SACP is a system of indicators that allows real-time monitoring and assessment of progress in achieving strategic results provided for in the Anti-Corruption Strategy. Planned activities must be carried out in accordance with clearly defined deadlines, expected results, and the financial resources necessary for their implementation. Therefore, the next stage will be the development of a public online system that will allow anyone to track the progress of the implementation of the document by area. 

The fact that the final text of the program has not been made public, but according to the Prime Minister was adopted with "amendments", has alarmed anti-corruption activists. Any such last-minute changes would mean that SACP would not only miss the criteria of Art. 6 of the UN Convention against Corruption, the Anti-Corruption Strategy itself, and the Law “On the Prevention of Corruption”, but will also be completely emasculated in terms of monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the SACP implementation. Enforcement of this document can change the country and solve many problems. One changed word in a document can turn an effective anti-corruption weapon into a toothless tool. 

Experts explain that opposition to the adoption of the SACP has been demonstrated by the sabotage by representatives of the most corrupt spheres, who will have to take unpopular steps and close corruption loopholes. The strengthening of the influence of anti-corruption structures can also be observed - these structures were created in Ukraine at the request of foreign partners, and the Ukrainian authorities are doing a lot to delay important decisions regarding them.  

For example, it took two years to elect the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau has been without an appointed head for almost a year. Electronic asset declaration was stopped in 2020 by the decision of the Constitutional Court (though it was later reinstated). And currently, due to the war, officials don’t have to submit electronic asset declarations. The draft law on the reintroduction of asset declaration, as well as on the renewal of inspections of political parties, has been in the Parliament since October 2022 - obviously, without pressure from international partners, it will not be adopted either. 

On 24 February, President Volodimir Zelenskyy held a press-conference marking one year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine’s foreign policy was the key topic. The President announced that Ukraine is opening new embassies in Africa and that he would like to organize a Ukraine – South America summit. He also mentioned some improvements in relations with Israel, but said that naming exact achievements could be damaging. Zelenskyy said he would like to meet with Xi Jinping and his response to “China’s peace plan” was extremely balanced. “I really want to believe that China will not supply weapons to Russia” – he said. The President praised the role of Western partners, including Japan and Italy, as well as Germany’s contribution. Zelenskyy also mentioned he does not see any prospects for negotiations with Russia.

ANALYSIS

Ukraine’s strategy can be described as “involve everyone, and no to negotiations with the aggressor”. Zelenskyy acknowledged past mistakes of ignoring the Global South. His messages imply that Ukraine is now trying to build bridges with those countries and trying to pull them away from Russian influence – not an easy task since Russia has been infiltrating those countries for years. With Ukraine’s ambitious tasks at hand - establishing an international tribunal for Putin, Russian asset recovery for the needs of Ukraine, and further isolating Russia from the civilized world - gaining support of those who have been “neutral” will be key. On the eve of 24 February, the UN General Assembly supported a resolution on “Zelenskyy’s peace plan” with an overwhelming majority of 141 countries in favor. A few days later, China and Russia blocked a joint statement about the war in Ukraine at the G20 summit.  

Some commentators compared China’s peace plan to “a speech at a beauty contest”. While China supports the protection of civilians, and condemns attacks on nuclear power plants, the plan does not name who the aggressor and the victim are, and condemns the unilateral use of sanctions. Leaders of the EU and NATO have criticized China’s plan. For example, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said “China doesn’t have much credibility (…) they have not been able to condemn the illegal invasion of Ukraine”. However, Zelenskyy’s comment about the plan during his press conference was extremely balanced and diplomatic. He remains hopeful for a dialogue with China, and moreover, for China’s support of Ukraine. Despite the news about Beijing’s alleged plans to supply weapons to Russia, Zelenskyy wants to keep the door open for communication with Beijing. In response to Zelenskyy’s proposal to meet with Xi Jinping, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson mentioned that “China has always maintained communication with all sides including Ukraine”. Recently, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi met Sergei Lavrov in Moscow. On 23 February he visited Budapest for a meeting with Hungarian top diplomat Peter Szijjártó. The meeting in Hungary is a further attempt to destabilize the West by pressing on its weakest point. The last meeting between Chinese and Ukrainian foreign ministers was held by phone in April 2022 where they agreed that “ending the war against Ukraine is in the interests of peace (…) and international trade”.  

At the end of November, the Office of the President of Ukraine reported that 1,886 settlements had already been de-occupied. At the same time, approximately the same number of cities and villages remain under occupation. The country has an approved plan for emergency measures to restore the de-occupied territories. It consists of 131 points for reviving the life of liberated settlements. These measures aim to stabilize the situation and to ensure the urgent needs of communities and their residents.

ANALYSIS

The above-mentioned plan applies to all de-occupied territories. It includes priority steps to bring the de-occupied communities back to life: demining measures, re-establishing the law enforcement agencies and local councils, providing the population with food and medical care, etc. However, there are no plans for how to restore local economic activity. On the one hand, it is challenging to ensure this during active hostilities – the de-occupied territories continue to suffer from constant shelling by the Russian army. On the other hand, economic recovery is the key precondition for the return of the population. Also, it can encourage the attraction of domestic and international investments in the future. If the conditions for implementing these two points are not ensured, the territories will become subsidized and depressed burdens for the state without opportunities for further development. On 14 October, the Government adopted a resolution according to which local councils and regional administrations should analyse the impact of the war on their communities and develop a recovery plan, particularly on the socio-economic aspects. The document does not have specific dates for the start of this process. There is no requirement to involve experts. The public can participate in such planning only by submitting proposals after the draft of this plan is made public. In addition, it is unknown whether these documents will be taken into consideration during the reconstruction or whether the communities' vision regarding their post-war future is a formality that will remain only on paper. 

The reconstruction will occur with the help of Ukraine's foreign partners. Still, it will not be possible to see the population to the de-occupied territories return only by rebuilding housing and infrastructure. Among Ukrainian refugees abroad, older people are more inclined to return. This means that mainly the less economically active population in need of financial assistance from the state will return. Therefore, future plans should also include steps to bring back and attract business, and create jobs. The state should conduct consultations with businesses already represented in Ukraine and develop proposals and conditions which will encourage their return. Even though the full implementation of such plans is only possible after the victory of Ukraine, their preparation should already begin. 

The Head of Ukrainian Railways JSC “Ukrzaliznytsia” (UZ) Oleksandr Kamyshyn has resigned. This came as a surprise when “Ukrzaliznytsia” was reaching peaks of popularity. UZ became Ukraine’s backbone and a true symbol of the country’s resistance. UZ proved especially effective in evacuating civilians, providing safe travel to world leaders visiting Ukraine, and export transit lines. For example, days before Kamyshyn resigned, US President Joe Biden travelled to Kyiv by UZ. Beyond that, in 2022, 80% of trains arrived on schedule despite constant Russian missile attacks. UZ became the State Enterprise of the year. While the rest of the top management team allegedly remains, Kamyshyn will lead the Eurointegration office of the UZ, which currently exists on paper. Yevhen Lyashchenko, the first deputy head under Kamyshyn, became the acting head of UZ.  

ANALYSIS

There are two versions of Kamyshyn’s resignation. One is that his popularity became dangerous to those in power. Another one is that his resignation preempts the opening of investigations by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) against him. Appointing Kamyshyn back in 2021 was perceived skeptically as he used to work for SCM group owned by Rinat Akhmetov. However, when Kamyshyn became the director of UZ, the first thing he did was raise tariffs for business transits (30% of UZ business transits are purchased by Metinvest owned by Akhmetov), reports Forbes. As an acting head of UZ in 2021, Kamyshyn proved himself an efficient crisis manager as he got UZ out of debt. Oleksandr Kubrakov, minister of communities and infrastructure development, allegedly asked Kamyshyn to resign which was negatively perceived in the Office of the President, but approved. If true, it shows that reforms and proactiveness are not encouraged among Ukraine’s top leadership. Kubrakov is said to concentrate power in his hands and neutralize potential competitors.  

The core UZ team, as well as the projects initiated under Kamyshyn’s leadership, will remain. UZ also has an anti-corruption commissioner solely responsible to National Agency for Corruption Prevention (NACP). This invites optimism about future reforms at UZ. However, signs of the concentration of power remain alarming. Any facts surrounding a NABU investigation into Kamyshyn’s activities have not been made available.  

The European Commission, together with Poland and the United Nations, is launching an initiative of gathering evidence in search of Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia, Dana Spinant, European Commission Spokesperson, has informed. According to the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmytro Lubinets, about 150,000 Ukrainian children have been taken to Russia and Belarus from the occupied Ukrainian territories. At the same time, less than 16,000 have been identified so far. Russia does not provide Ukraine or international organizations with access to deportee data, so it is impossible to assess the exact number of victims. Kyiv considers the forced deportation of Ukrainian children as genocide. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine appealed to the UN regarding the Ukrainian children's deportation to – and by – the Russian Federation. Ukraine and the EU have imposed sanctions against those linked to the deportation of children.

ANALYSIS

The Russian regime is deliberately taking all possible measures to erase the identity of the deported children and make it impossible for them to nationally identify themselves as Ukrainians in the future. Evidence of this is the forced passporting, adoption, and Russification of Ukrainian children. In May 2022, Putin signed two bills: the first simplifies obtaining Russian citizenship for children from Donets, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions; and the second simplifies the procedure for their adoption. This means that the new "parents" formally adopt Russian children, not Ukrainian ones. Thus, it is difficult to find information about adopted Ukrainian children. According to the analytical report "Forced Deportation of Children to the Russian Federation," Russian "adoptive parents" change not only the citizenship but also the personal data of the children - their names and surnames. The Russians also actively use children for propaganda, promoting the narrative of "Russian peacekeeping efforts" for their domestic audience.  

The forced deportation of children and numerous cases of their transfer to Russian families with subsequent adoption is a pre-planned action of the Kremlin. This contains signs of genocide - deliberate actions to destroy a nation or its part; one of the qualifying actions is the forced transfer of children from one group to another. In addition, 43 camps for the "ideological re-education" of Ukrainian children operate on the territory of Russia and in the temporarily occupied Crimea. The Russian government centrally coordinates this operation, the Conflict Observatory research states. More than 6,000 Ukrainian children passed through such camps. All these acts violate the Geneva Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the Russian Federation is a signatory. 

Despite ample evidence of the violation of children's rights, efforts from global international organizations have been insufficient. There is still no mechanism for returning deported children to Ukraine. So far, only 307 children out of the officially identified 16,000 have returned home. Despite the complexity of the situation, the international community and the Ukrainian authorities must do everything possible to gather evidence of the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, find them, and return them home. A special humanitarian operation with a broad coalition of countries and international organizations, such as the UN and the Red Cross, could be conducted. There are precedents for such operations, e.g. on the eve of World War II, Operation Kindertransport was carried out for Jewish children who were in the territories controlled by the Nazis at that time. Then, it became possible to save about 10,000 children.  

The initiative of the European Commission, the UN, and Poland is a good start to such a case, but time and results are crucial.  

Russia's current war against Ukraine demonstrated the readiness of the democratic world to unite in the fight for freedom and liberal values. However, there are democracies all over the world in need of protection against autocracies willing to challenge international order. One year from the start of full-scale invasion, we introduce you the report “War in Ukraine: Lessons identified and lessons learned“, which analyzes policies and practices that have impacted Ukraine’s resilience in key sectors. Outcomes of this research can be used as recommendations for other democracies building resilience against conventional, hybrid, or other threats (e.g., natural disasters), from Europe to the Pacific.

Thank you.

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