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• Security situation update
• Azovstal defenders in captivity
• Internationals sentenced to death by court in the unrecognized Donetsk People’s Republic
• Ukrainian citizenship for “good Russians”
• Orthodox Church – latest development
• Military trainings in Belarus
• The impact of the war on nuclear energy sector in Ukraine
• Ukrainian seaports paralysed
• Recovery plans for Ukraine

The war in Ukraine continues with the heaviest fighting in the eastern regions with the Russian forces slowly advancing towards the borders of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. Russian forces continued ground assaults in Severodonetsk and blew up bridges that connect Severodonetsk to Lysychansk across the Siverskyi Donets River in a likely attempt to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (from Bakhmut to Lysychansk and Severodonetsk. The Ukrainian Armed Forces control the territory of the Azot plant in Severdonetsk where 500 civilians have reportedly found shelter, indicating that this location may see a repeat of the Azovstal scenario. Russian forces made incremental gains to the southeast of Izyum and will likely continue attempts to advance on Slovyansk from the northwest. Also, Russian forces continued efforts to push Ukrainian troops back from contested frontlines northeast of Kharkiv City. In the Southern regions, Russian forces focus on maintaining defensive lines and controlling the besieged territories. Ukraine is not reported to be making significant advances. Daily losses of the military in Ukraine are reported to be 150-200 killed and 500 wounded. Daily missile strikes at Ukrainian cities continue, hitting civilian infrastructure and killing civilians.

ANALYSIS

Russian forces are advancing more slowly than planned, but they have the resources to strengthen the attacking groups. In order to prevent strengthening the Russian group, even with a second-class reserve, Ukrainian armed forces must have maximum influence on the logistical infrastructure of such reserves. Hitting supply routes of the Russian Armed Forces requires long-range artillery and volley fire systems, which are still expected to be delivered by Ukraine’s partners. They come in small numbers, which are not enough to significantly influence the situation. At the same time, Russia more actively targets logistics routes in western Ukraine, so additional air defence system will be required to secure the supply of arms. Ukraine has enough supplies until the end of July. More decisions are to be announced after the meeting of the pro-Ukrainian coalition of the states established in Rammstein, which will take place in Brussels on 15 June. As the Ukrainian Defence Minister mentioned in his interview to The Economist, “We need assistance, quickly, because the cost of any delay is measured in Ukrainian blood.”

On 16 May, the evacuation of civilians and wounded soldiers from the Azovstal plant in Mariupol began. In a few days, it ended with the departure of all Ukrainian fighters from the territory of Azovstal - soldiers of the Azov Regiment, Marines and local police. The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was responsible for the evacuation. It was reported that a simple agreement had been reached with Russia on the application of a mechanism that would allow them to quickly exchange Russian prisoners of war.

ANALYSIS

Three weeks have already passed since the release operation. It is currently confirmed that 2,449 people are being held in a pre-trial detention centre in Olenivka (a village near Donetsk). According to former human rights ombudswoman Lyudmyla Denisova (dismissed on 31 May), these people texted her that “it is practically Buchenwald: very bad food, the wounded are not treated.” Moreover, talks have begun in Russia itself about the need to temporarily restore the death penalty - specifically for the members of Azov. At the same time, two British citizens and one Moroccan man were sentenced to death in the DNR.

On Sunday 12 May, at 12 o’clock, it was announced that 220 bodies of Azovstal defenders had been delivered to Kyiv in one of the major exchanges of bodies since the beginning of the war. However, all the bodies are in very bad condition. It will take months to identify the killed soldiers. As for those defenders who are alive and currently in captivity, the problem is that Ukrainian authorities did not release any details of negotiations with the Russians on their future fate. When exactly should the exchange take place? Who should be responsible and what to do if the Russians change their mind about fulfilling their obligations? How to ensure that all Azovstal defenders are guaranteed a safe return home? All these questions remain open.

Two British men, Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner, and a Moroccan national, Saaudun Brahim, captured while fighting in the Ukrainian Army in Mariupol have been sentenced to death by the so-called Supreme Court of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) after a days-long staged process. Russian state media has portrayed them as mercenaries, and the court has convicted them on the charge of “being a mercenary”. International organisations, including the UN Human Rights Office, OHCHR, Amnesty International, as well as Ukrainian officials claim that the foreigners were serving officially in the Ukrainian Marines Corps, making them active-duty soldiers who should be protected by the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war. “Such trials against prisoners of war amount to a war crime,” said OHCHR spokesperson Ravina Shamdasani. UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss calls death sentence of Britons “an egregious breach of the Geneva Convention.” The sentenced have one month to appeal, but they are not provided proper legal support or access to international support.

ANALYSIS

Observers believe the process was intended to imitate the war crimes trials of Russian soldiers taking place in Kyiv and was orchestrated by Russia. This instrument will be used to pile pressure on foreign governments, which support Ukraine, as many their citizens voluntarily joined Ukrainian Armed Forces. Such trials put officials in an awkward position, choosing between direct communications with the so-called “authorities” of the “DPR”, asking them to show humanity, or trying to influence the situation through Russia, and again engaging in dialogue. It can’t be excluded that few foreigners may be executed as a show case, to instigate public outcry in respective countries and shake the supportive sentiments towards Ukraine. “DPR” officials already announced that same trial will be conducted against a South Korean citizen.

On 3 June, Anton Gerashchenko, an adviser to the Interior Minister, announced that famous Russian journalist Alexander Nevzorov and his wife, Lydia, had been granted Ukrainian citizenship. According to Gerashchenko, the reason was their “outstanding services to Ukraine.” This information has upset Ukrainian society, provoking a debate over whether it is appropriate to grant Ukrainian citizenship to so-called "good Russians" and whether there are sufficient legal grounds for doing so.

Shortly before the start of the large-scale invasion, in December 2021, the Verkhovna Rada approved amendments to the Law on Citizenship of Ukraine, greatly simplifying the procedure for foreigners to obtain it. This is primarily for those who defend the country in the ranks of the Armed Forces. But there is also an option for those who have provided “outstanding services to Ukraine” (Nevzorov’s case), as well as his (ii) husband (wife), as well as for those who, as a citizen of the aggressor state (i.e. Russia) in the homeland suffer for their political beliefs.

Given martial law, such people can apply for Ukrainian citizenship remotely, an examination for knowledge of the state language is not necessary, and the application process is greatly simplified (normally it lasts about a year). “Filing a declaration of intent to relinquish previous citizenship within two years” is mandatory. The law does not specify any consequences if this does not happen within two years and does not address the issue of owning two or more passports (which is expressly prohibited).

ANALYSIS

After the announcement about Nevzorov’s new citizenship, it emerged that the relevant decree of President Zelensky was signed on 21 May, but had not yet been published on the official website of the President. Nevzorov himself declared him a citizen of Ukraine, but there is no official confirmation of this. Unofficially, the Ukrainian government believes that such a policy - as President Zelensky calls it, “shaking the Russians” - is correct, but the majority of society opposes it. The reason is non-transparent mechanisms for granting citizenship, which has not been granted for years to those, for example, who are fighting for Ukraine in the Armed Forces. In addition, there are many other ways to encourage so-called “good Russians” and giving them a Ukrainian passport is clearly an exaggeration. In the future we expect this practice of issuing Ukrainian passports to “good Russians” to continue.

On 27 May, the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) took place, at which “complete independence from Moscow” was declared. This was done by making appropriate changes to the statutes of the UOC-MP, from which all mentions of ties with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) disappeared. For a long time, the UOC-MP was in a state of internal crisis. With the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, more and more ordinary priests refused to commemorate the service of Patriarch Kirill (who publicly supported the invasion). More than 400 priests even appealed to the Patriarchate of Constantinople with a request to convict Patriarch Kirill by the highest ecclesiastical court - the so-called “Pentarchy Court”. The UOC-MP also came under the law, which significantly limited its activities, since “the centre of management of this organization is located on the territory of the occupying power” (i.e. in Moscow). The leadership of the UOC-MP could no longer ignore all of this - the church risked falling apart from the inside.

Initially, Moscow’s reaction to these events was rather lenient. Patriarch Kirill stated that he treats them “with understanding”. This raised doubts about the sincerity of the UOC-MP “divorce”. However, within a few days, Moscow dramatically changed the tone of its statements, and annexed the Crimean dioceses, transferring them to its direct subordination. It is highly likely that such a fate also awaits the dioceses located in the occupied territories - both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and in the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions.

ANALYSIS

Declaring “independence from Moscow”, the UOC-MP entered the “grey zone”. Because there is no such thing as an “independent church” in canon law. Some theologians call the current state of the UOC-MP “technical autocephaly” - this is indicated by the current provisions in the amended Statutes. However, the term “autocephaly” is never mentioned in the Statutes, which was a smart decision. After all, “autocephaly” cannot be proclaimed, it can only be obtained. It also requires the recognition of world Orthodoxy by local churches (15 of them). If the UOC-MP declared “autocephaly”, it would be tantamount to declaring itself a schismatic, which they do not want. By amending the Statutes of the UOC-MP, it hopes to slow down the “outflow” of its parishes to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). Formally, the UOC-MP states the need for a dialogue with the OCU - for the sake of “unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy”, but in practice, there is currently no dialogue. At the same time, the UOC-MP must look for ways to reconcile with Constantinople.

On 26 May, the self-proclaimed President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko announced the creation of operational command of the country’s Armed Forces in the south of the country and ordered the deployment of new military units on the border with Ukraine. In addition, Lukashenko wants to increase the size of the Belarusian army by creating a "people's militia." Following these statements, Belarus began training near the borders of Ukraine and Poland. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, up until 11 June, 2022, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus were working on the creation of strike groups in one of the areas and have been checking the readiness of transport infrastructure to transport military units. According to the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov, Ukraine is observing the Belarusian direction and is aware of the threat from that direction, as Russian Iskanders (mobile short-range ballistic missile systems) are located near the border. On 7 June, the Defense Ministry of Belarus announced the start of trainings “on the transition from peacetime to wartime.”

ANALYSIS

Belarus is a part of the Union State with Russia and a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Lukashenko has turned Belarus into a springboard for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. From the first days of the war, rockets have been flying from the territory of Belarus to Ukrainian land, making Lukashenko and the top leadership of the Republic of Belarus accomplices in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, the so-called “rail” guerrilla movement emerged in Belarusian society, and Belarusian soldiers refused to fight on Ukrainian territory. Military trainings and testing of the army’s combat capability seem quite a clear step for Lukashenko to show that the security forces remain completely under his control. Regaining control of the army will be key for his political survival. However, the military manoeuvres may be organized as a smokescreen for additional Russian battle groups to advance into Ukraine from the Northern border. In particular, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the movement of Iskanders (mobile short-range ballistic missiles) to the Luninets area of the Brest region may indicate preparation for the new missile strikes in Western Ukraine. Chances of the Belarus regular Armed Forces entering the war at this stage are assessed as low. Observers agree that Lukashenko would be best advised to avoid direct engagement in the Russia-Ukraine war. However, he may succumb to Russia’s pressure once the situation becomes less favourable for the Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine.

The state of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Ukraine occupied by Russia’s military is a matter of serious concern in Europe and the world. Also, more than half of Ukrainians are most afraid of radiation contamination, which can occur as a result of hostilities. After the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, 4 Ukrainian NPPs remain operational. The largest in Europe and the sixth in the world Zaporizhzhya NPP (ZNPP), has been occupied by Russians since March 4. ZNPP essentially operates within Ukraine’s power system, but is controlled by Russians. This poses significant security risks.

The IAEA has expressed concern over the situation at the plant and, in particular, the fact that ZNPP allegedly contains hazardous nuclear materials and insists on an urgent visit to ZNPP. The agency is already preparing an international mission of experts. The Ukrainian side believes that this visit is being actively influenced by the Russian side to legitimize its occupation and control of ZNPP, emphasizing that there are many Russians in the IAEA management.

ANALYSIS

So far there have been no irreversible processes at Ukraine’s nuclear power facilities, but the level of such a threat remains high. The greatest concern is the presence of nuclear materials which, if not properly managed or purposefully misused, can caused radiation leakage and pollution - not only in ZNPP, but also in border countries. This nuclear material must be kept safe. Also the presence of heavy military weapons, explosives and soldiers at the ZNPP increase the risks of such an accident.

The main purpose of the capture of ZNPP by the Russians, apparently, is to connect the station to the Russian power system and supply electricity to the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, in particular, Crimea. Currently, Ukraine’s energy system is synchronized with the European one, and switching it to National Energy Grid of Russia is a complex and time-consuming process.

Ukraine openly expresses distrust in the IAEA and accuses it of acting for the benefit of Russia. Most likely, the IAEA visit will take place. It is important that in addition to resolving technical issues (supply of components, spare parts, resumption of transfer of indicators), the IAEA during this visit clearly state the need to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of ZNPP. If the IAEA comes to ZNPP at the invitation of Moscow through Russian territory, Crimea or other temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories under the protection of the Russian military without the consent of Ukraine, it will mean ignoring international law and interfering in political issues on the side of the aggressor country. Europe and the world must join the pressure on Russia to liberate ZNPP as soon as possible.

As a result of the full-scale Russian invasion, all Ukrainian seaports are currently closed off. The ports of Berdyansk, Mariupol, Skadovsk, and Kherson have ceased operations due to the temporary occupation. Transportation of goods from other ports is currently impossible due to Russia’s mining of sea routes. Until 24 February, seaports accounted for up to 75% of Ukraine’s foreign trade. According to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food and the State Fiscal Service, in the second half of 2021, Ukraine exported 32.6 million tons of grain, legumes, and flour. Approximately 94% of this was exported via sea routes.

In 2021, the total volume of cargo passing through Ukrainian seaports amounted to approximately 145.4 million tons. Ukraine is currently trying to transport goods by road and rail. However, it may be possible to export only around 19 million tons.

Currently, only three ports out of 13 are fully operational in Ukraine. These are river ports located on the Danube River. By 24 February, they accounted for slightly less than 5% of exports. They can carry over the same volumes as before the full-scale invasion. Potentially, these ports can provide up to 10% of trade, which in peacetime was handled by all sea trade ports. However, the Ministry of Infrastructure is already working to increase their capacity.

ANALYSIS

The role of ports in Ukraine’s GDP is estimated at 3%. In 2021, Ukraine exported $47 billion worth of goods via sea alone. This is almost 70% of the country’s total export earnings. According to the Ministry of Economy, in from February to March 2022, exports fell by half, and imports by even more. Every day the economy loses about $170 million because of the blockade of ports.

Even after the end of hostilities, Ukraine will not be able to quickly return the functioning of seaports to pre-war levels. At present, it is impossible to calculate the damage to the ports under the temporary occupation of Russia. In addition, it will take several months to clear sea mines in port areas. It will not be possible to entirely replace seaports with the help of increased cargo transport by rail, road, or river transport. All these methods of exporting and importing goods are logistically more complex, costly and take much more time.

Experts predict that the full impact of the Ukrainian seaports' blockade will be seen in July 2022. Food prices in European countries will increase by at least 20-30%. African countries, to which a large number of food products have been exported, expect a severe shortage of food. Ukraine and partner countries must use all levers to force Russia to unblock sea routes for freight to minimize food and non-food shortages in Ukraine and around the world. So far, all diplomatic efforts have been unsuccessful, and Russia continues to blackmail the world.

According to the Kyiv School of Economics report, as of 8 June, the total direct losses to the Ukrainian economy from damage and destruction of residential and non-residential buildings and infrastructure is $103.9 billion. At least 44.8 million square meters of housing, 256 enterprises, 6,300 railways, 656 medical institutions, 1,177 educational institutions, 668 kindergartens, 198 warehouses, 20 shopping centres, and 28 oil depots have been damaged, destroyed, or seized since Russia’s war against Ukraine. However, this does not include losses of individuals and companies, which can increase the amount of losses severalfold.

Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts suffered the most from the war in Ukraine. Active hostilities are still taking place in the east and south of Ukraine, and 20% of the territory is under temporary occupation. It is difficult to predict the final amount of damage that will be inflicted on the country when the war is over. In addition, even in relatively quiet regions in the west, air strikes are underway on infrastructure. Already, 24,000 kilometres of roads and 300 bridges have been destroyed in Ukraine, which, according to preliminary estimates, will require 2-4 years to restore.

The International Monetary Fund predicts that in 2022 Ukraine’s economy will shrink by at least 35%. At the same time, according to analysts at S&P Global Market Intelligence, Ukraine will be able to return to pre-war levels in at least five years.

ANALYSIS

In the territories liberated from the occupiers, the damage is already being assessed, project documentation is being developed, and priority infrastructure facilities that need immediate rehabilitation are being identified. The Government of Ukraine has already allocated more than 73 million euros to restore critical infrastructure and carry out priority non-capital repairs urgently. City councils are also trying to allocate money from local budgets to rebuild facilities in their communities. In addition, Ukraine is considering all possible options for raising funds for the reconstruction of damaged and destroyed facilities: the state budget, international funds, loans, and assistance from partner countries.

Ukraine awaits years of economic recovery and infrastructure reconstruction. The country will not be able to rebuild all the damage caused by Russia on its own. Ukraine hopes for the help of international partners. The National Council for Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of War has already been established. Its tasks are to develop a plan of measures for post-war reconstruction and development of Ukraine and prepare strategic initiatives, the implementation of which will be necessary for effective work and recovery in the war and post-war periods.

Ukraine has already signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Union to provide the country with soft loans under the emergency macro-financial assistance package of 1.2 billion euros. The EU has already transferred two tranches of aid following Ukraine’s short-term structural reform measures.

To effectively use the future funds and financial assistance from partner countries, the expert community must develop new mechanisms to prevent corruption risks. The most effective way is to rethink approaches to the functioning of state institutions completely. Ukraine needs to move away from the Soviet system of building state institutions and focus on European practices. After the war, one of the important challenges for the state in the fight against corruption will be to reset departments, automate processes, remove the human factor and build transparent procedures for using funds.

This is an opportunity not only to rebuild Ukrainian cities but also to rethink urban planning culture and move away from Soviet standards of creating logistics routes and space. Such changes will help speed up logistics and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in the post-war period.

CZK:   Transparent account

AN:     2300405420/2010

VS:     2022

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