• Three incidents were recorded globally during the reporting period
• East Africa HRA and Indian Ocean: No incidents were recorded during the reporting period
• West Africa HRA: Three incidents were recorded during the reporting period
• South and Southeast Asia: No incidents were recorded during the reporting period
• Americas: No incidents were recorded during the reporting period

• West Africa HRA: Boarding highlights ever-present piracy threat to vessels transiting deep offshore in the Gulf of Guinea
• East Africa HRA: Floating mines threaten vessel transit in Red Sea

• No incidents were recorded during the reporting period
• Continuous piracy threat off the Somali coast and extending to the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Oman. Actors involved in the ongoing conflict in Yemen have targeted vessels transiting the Bab-el-Mandeb Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS); increased vigilance is advised during daylight hours

NSTR

• Three incidents were recorded during the reporting period
• Continuous threat off Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana in addition to the coastlines of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

1. 16/02/2020. 0000 UTC. ATTACK. 05:00N - 005:45E - MDAT-GoG /NYA. 3.4NM S off Torugbene, Bayelsa state, Nigeria.Unidentified gunmen attacked an oil barge along the waterways of Lutegbene, Ekeremor Local Government Area, Bayelsa state. The attack reportedly killed four soldiers escorting the barge, as well as two civilians. Further passengers on board the vessel were reportedly injured but escaped by swimming to safety. Time and location approximate.
2. 14/02/2020. 0812 UTC. BOARDING. 01:49:48N - 005:02:3E. MDAT-GoG / NYA. 122NM NW Santo Antonio, São Tomé and Príncipe. An unknown number of assailants on board at least two skiffs boarded a transiting container vessel. At least two perpetrators were spotted on board. Naval forces, including a Portuguese warship, were dispatched to the area and arrived approximately 15 hours after the original alert was sounded. Nigerian Navy personnel boarded the vessel and found no pirates remained on board. All crewmembers had successfully reached the citadel during the initial incident and no crewmembers were reported missing or injured. However, the perpetrators had damaged the vessel's navigational equipment and stolen crewmember's personal belongings. The vessel was then escorted to Lagos by the Nigerian Navy.
3. 11/02/2020. 0905 UTC. SUSPICIOUS APPROACH. 00:30:00N - 005:58:60E. MDAT-GoG. 32NM NW of Santa Catarina, São Tomé and Príncipe. Nine skiffs approached an unspecified vessel, Crew Members raised the alarm and the vessel took evasive  manoeuvres. Skiffs halted their approach at 1NM from the targeted vessel. Crewmembers were reported safe. Location approximate.

• There were no incidents recorded during the reporting period
• Criminal boardings and boardings remain the primary threat to the region. However, the threat from Extended Duration Cargo Theft (EDCT) is present across the Malacca Strait and South China Sea

NSTR

Due to delayed reporting the following incidents were not included in the previous report.

1. 07/02/2020. 2015 UTC. CRIMINAL BOARDING. ICC-IMB. 01:16:20N - 104:16:15E. 7NM NW of Bandar Bentan Telani, Indonesia. A duty crewmember on board an underway product tanker spotted an unknown individual n the steering gear room. The crewmember then noticed another individual moving towards the poop deck. The individual in the gear room was challenged and the alarm was raised. Upon a search of the vessel, no property was reported stolen. Incident reported to the VTIS.
2. 07/02/2020. 1310 UTC. CRIMINAL BOARDING. ReCAAP / NYA. 21:42:00N - 091:50:00E. Martabari Anchorage, Bangladesh. The duty AB on board an anchored tug vessel sighted two suspicious fishing vessels approaching. Subsequently, several perpetrators armed with knives boarded the tug vessel. The OOW immediately activated the general alarm causing the perpetrators to flee. The crew conducted a search and found mooring ropes and shackles had been stolen. No crewmembers were reported injured.
3. 02/02/2020. 2120 UTC. CRIMINAL BOARDING. ICC-IMB. 01:03:89N - 103:54:38E. Batam Island, Pulau Batam, Indonesia. Crewmembers on board a moored tug vessel noticed three unauthorized individuals on deck. The crew members raised the alarm and attempted to confront the perpetrators, causing the perpetrators to flee the tug with the help of two accomplices on board an unidentified vessel. The incident was reported to local police who came on board to conduct investigations. During a search, an unspecified amount of vessel equipment was reported stolen from the tug's storeroom that had been broken into.

On 14 February pirates boarded a container vessel in the Gulf of Guinea, 122NM NW of Santo Antonio, São Tomé and Príncipe. This incident follows a reported suspicious  approach recorded in the vicinity, 32NM NW of Santa Catarina, São Tomé and Príncipe, on 11 February. These mark the first recorded incidents that occurred deep offshore in the Gulf of Guinea since 29 December 2019.

NYA Analysis:

The occurrence of repeated PAG operations proximate to São Tomé and Príncipe within a short period over 10-17 February reflects similar trends witnessed between 24-30 December 2019, when four incidents took place within a six-day period proximate to São Tomé and Príncipe’s TTW. The frequency of these incidents within a limited time period, along with the extended hiatuses between clusters of incidents, renders it likely that the activity is being carried out by the same pirate group, probably with the use of a  othership to aid deep offshore incidents. Though these recent incidents did not escalate into successful hijackings, the use of São Toméan waters as a consistent operating area by PAGs renders it likely that the threat to commercial shipping within the locality will remain in place over the medium term, irrespective of any short-term reductions in recorded incidents

On 13 February the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) alerted vessels to the reported presence of mines along the maritime boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen  between Midi, Yemen and Jizan, Saudi Arabia specifically). The mines are believed to have drifted north from waters off the Yemeni coast as a result of seasonal currents rather than having been placed there deliberately by threat actors operating in the region.

NYA Analysis:

The publication of this alert follows incidents of explosions at sea related by news outlets in the previous reporting period. On 7 February it is reported that three fishermen on board a vessel were killed by a mine explosion while transiting the Red Sea, off the coast of Yemen. This incident was originally reported by the Saudi coalition press.  hereas Saudi-backed news outlets identified Houthi rebels as responsible for placing explosives in the Red Sea in the aim of targeting transiting vessels, MARAD did not identify any responsible party. Though in this instance, the mines are believed to have floated north as a result of ocean currents, and subsequently detonating and killing three fishermen, Houthi rebels have been known to deliberately use floating mines and are known to utilise Vessel-Borne IEDs (VBIED) to directly target vessels transiting the region. The Saudi-led coalition has reportedly destroyed at least 137 explosives planted by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, and VBIED attacks are typically intercepted, the number of incidents  successfully directly targeting vessels transiting the  rea remaining low. The MARAD alert pursuant to the incident reported on 7 February emphasise the persistent threat to vessel security in the Red Sea. Vessels are advised to exercise increased caution when transiting the area as the threat is likely to extend further than the maritime boundary delineated by MARAD.

The report’s findings are predictive and estimative. To communicate these findings clearly and in order to accurately compare threat levels, the report uses a variation of terminology used by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

Piracy: NYA uses a modified version of the definition of piracy adopted by BMP5. For the purposes of this report, the term ‘piracy’ includes all violent and non-violent acts against vessels, her crew and cargo occurring either in internal waterways, territorial waters or deep offshore. Based on this definition, NYA classifies piracy incidents into six categories:

• Hijacking – Crew lost control of the vessel and / or pirates kidnapped at least one crewmember and / or passenger (s)
• Boarding – Pirates successfully board a vessel with the intent to hijack it but their attempt to take control of the vessel or kidnap crewmember(s) and / or passenger(s) failed
• Attack – Vessel was attacked with gunfire or RPG fire, no boarding was successfully completed
• Pirate Action Group (PAG) – Sighting or reporting of firearms and boarding equipment on board a suspicious vessel or sighting of a confirmed pirate mother ship
• Criminal boarding – Vessel boarded with criminal intent, theft does not have to occur
• Suspicious approach – Suspicious activity reported (i.e. a vessel was approached by unidentified skiff(s) with one or more persons on board).

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